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This dissertation takes as its primary task the evaluation of a conflict of paradigms in Russian 
philosophical thought in the past decade.  If until the early nineties Russian philosophers were 
often guilty of uncritically attributing to their domestic philosophy a set of characteristics that 
fell along the lines of a religious/secular binary (e.g. literary vs. analytic; continuous vs. 
ruptured), in recent years the same scholarship is moving away from the nineteenth-century 
model of philosophy as a “path” or “special mission,” as it has been called by Konstantin 
Aksakov, Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, and later, Nikolai Berdiaev, among others.  I 
begin in the first chapter by throwing light on these binary assumptions, with the goal of 
revealing them to be of decreasing value in the past decade, in that they have contributed to the 
further crystallization of the essentializing ascriptions of the romanticized Orthodox narrative.  In 
the second chapter I then trace the religious paradigm to the twenty-first century, where it 
continues to thrive in the often criticized sub-departments of the History of Russian Philosophy.   
Yet, if the religious narrative has historically been the dominating approach, I argue in 
chapters three and four that a number of trends have emerged that seek to discredit it, many of 
which appeal to Western ideals of “professionalism” while condemning the tradition of the 
Russian intelligentsia.  For these critics, the goal is often not to limit through exceptionalist 
claims in the style of ninetieth-century religious philosophy, but to open up a discursive field 
(from both outside and within the religious tradition) in which connections are made between 
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philosophy in Russia and the rest of the world.  Thus, the title “Between Philosophies” touches 
on the two main observations of this work: 1) that much of philosophical production in Russia 
remains stratified over the issue of religious thought; and 2) that despite great strides to 
demystify philosophy in the twentieth century, there remains an often monolithic approach to the 
discipline, whereby responses to the query “What is contemporary Russian philosophy?” either 
delineate a rigid set of requirements or deny the existence of the tradition altogether. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION1
Russian philosophical thought enjoys a peculiar, isolated popularity in contemporary Anglo-
American scholarship.  While Russianists produce a modest, yet steady, flow of articles and 
books on Sergei Bulgakov, Fedor Dostoevskii, Aleksei Losev, and Vladimir Solov'ev, as well as 
research on nineteenth and twentieth century political philosophy in Russia, this scholarship 
occurs outside the intellectual jurisdiction of both the analytic and Continental philosophical 
schools.
 
2
                                                 
1 Note on Transliteration: System II will be used throughout, except in the case of Russian names 
where the cited author has a specific transliteration preference under which he/she has published, 
in which case that spelling will be used.    
  Though of the highest quality in its own right, were we to transplant this research into 
2 Here the reader will immediately note two areas of exception in Anglo-American scholarship.  
First, there are a small but solid number of scholarly studies on Russian philosophers and 
traditions other than the abovementioned spheres.  These include: George Kline’s work, ranging 
from articles on Semen Frank to the logical works of Nikolai Vasil'ev; James M. Edie, James P. 
Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin’s three-volume Russian Philosophy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 
1965); Caryl Emerson’s body of work on Mikhail Bakhtin; Scanlan’s edited volume Russian 
Thought After Communism: The Recovery of a Philosophical Heritage (Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1994); Philip T. Grier’s work on Ivan Il'in; Edith Clowes’ Fiction’s Overcoat:  Russian 
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the departments of the History of Russian Philosophy in the Russian Federation, we would find 
these two conceptions of one and the same discipline to be incommensurable.  It is not that the 
subject matter of these traditions is so fundamentally different; in fact, as we will see in the 
second chapter, Bulgakov, Dostoevskii, and Solov'ev are the most frequently visited thinkers in 
both Anglo-American scholarship and contemporary histories of Russian philosophy.  Rather, it 
is that the terms and foundations of these traditions, as well as what is at stake in the discourse of 
each, are markedly divergent, making for two schools of thought that rarely enter into dialogue 
with one another.  It is perhaps for this reason that English-language research on Russian 
philosophy is often received quite critically in Russia.  And, although we might be inclined to 
view the position of the literary scholar as a privileged one, in that he is separate from the 
academic practice of philosophy and might therefore be able to provide an external critique, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Literary Culture and the Question of Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004); and Thomas 
Seifrid’s The Word Made Self: Russian Writings on Language, 1860-1930 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell UP, 2005). 
 Second, while it is the case that the majority of research on Russian philosophical thought 
is conducted within Slavic or Russian departments, there are at least three scholars housed in 
departments of Philosophy: Philip T. Grier, George Kline, and James P. Scanlan (as of 2010, 
both Kline and Scanlan are emeritus professors).    
 3 
literary scholars are often received at the doorstep of Russian philosophy as dilettantes—as 
uninformed “Russophiles,” tinkering in disciplines in which they do not belong.”3
While an analysis of such attitudes might easily send us off into a galaxy of broad 
queries, including “Who has the right to practice philosophy?” and “What should this discipline 
entail?,” the first two chapters of this work focus on a problem more specific to the practice of 
philosophy in Russia.  If it is possible to agree on a general definition of philosophy as a cluster 
of universally accessible approaches to knowledge—whether through a consideration of 
concerns pressing to the entire human race, as José Ortega y Gasset proposed, or through the 
creation and manipulation of concepts, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—then 
why has contemporary philosophy in Russia failed to connect with a significant audience 
abroad?
  
4
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Aleksandr Ivanov and Dragan Kujundzic’s highly critical discussion of Slavic 
Studies: “Zapadnaia slavistika na rubezhe tysiacheletii,” Logos 4 (2000),  
http://www.ruthenia.ru/logos  
4 See: Gasset, What is Philosophy? (NYC: W.W. Norton & Co., 1964) and Deleuze and Guattari, 
What is Philosophy? (NYC: Columbia UP, 1996). 
 Here by “universally accessible” I have in mind the classical, or standard, branches of 
philosophy that transverse linguistic, national, and political borders, such as aesthetics, 
epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science, etc.   
  Here I will answer that the failure is both externally and internally imposed: not only 
do Western scholars of Russian philosophy engage consistently with the same predictable 
selection of historical texts, but many of Russia’s own philosophers tend to conform to one of 
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two unproductive models, either adhering to an essentializing and exclusionary approach to 
Russian philosophy or denying the existence of the discipline altogether. 
I begin in the first chapter by addressing the first of these two unproductive models, 
which pivots on a series of binary assumptions often uncritically attributed to Russian 
philosophical thought (both in its study in Russia and in the West).  Traceable in important ways 
to the influence of German idealism in Russian intellectual circles in the nineteenth century, 
these binaries are, at their most basic level: 1) religious/secular; 2) literary/analytic; and 3) 
continuity/rupture.  We can further collapse these three bifurcations into two narratives we find 
existing in opposition to one another from the post-Chaadaev period to the contemporary: the 
religious and the secular narratives.  Although these two narratives are an irremovable aspect of 
historical discourse about philosophy in Russia, by laying out the details of these binaries it is 
my goal to reveal them as unproductive, in that they contribute to the further crystallization of 
the essentializing ascriptions of the traditional Orthodox nationalist (and Romantic, to a certain 
extent) narrative.   
In the second chapter I further analyze the interrelatedness and prevalence of these 
narratives through a close textual study of the genre of the writing of the history of Russian 
philosophy in Russia.  I begin with the very first of such histories, Archimandrite Gavriil’s 
Russian Philosophy [Russkaia filosofiia, 1940], and trace the genre through the contemporary 
period, where a large number of histories have been published during the post-Soviet era.  In 
these histories we see perhaps most clearly the failure of the religious narrative to translate its 
concerns outside the country, let alone outside the walls of each author’s respective sub-
department of the history of Russian philosophy.  The isolation of such thinkers is particularly 
surprising when we view these histories side by side with the discipline of Slavic Studies, given 
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that the subject material of these histories is almost identical with the most popular figures 
(Bulgakov, Dostoevskii, and Solov'ev) in the Anglo-American study of Russian philosophical 
thought. 
Having laid the descriptive groundwork, in the remaining chapters I examine the 
contemporary situation of both narratives through several case studies.  We will see that despite 
the frequent artificial bifurcation of Russian thought into two “schools,” its landscape is quite 
rich, with a plurality of trends and schools equal to, if not unparalleled in, Western philosophical 
practices.  Moreover, within the play of this plurality we see that the Russian philosophical 
tradition is currently undergoing an important paradigm shift.  It is breaking away from the 
essentializing, Orthodox model of philosophy as a “path,” a “lifestyle,” or a “special mission” 
unique to Russia, and moving toward a more universal conception of the discipline, whereby a 
thriving philosophical community is based on interaction with a wider range of foreign scholars, 
contributions to international discussions, and a radically redefined conception of 
professionalism.  Yet, although the fact that questions such as “Who should constitute Russia’s 
intellectual elite” are being asked indicates a shift toward self-reflexivity that the 
historiographical genre has yet to reach, the answers to these questions often still fall along 
religious/secular lines, even within seemingly unrelated contexts, such as discussions on the 
status of the intellectual and intelligent in contemporary culture.   
Here the title “Between Philosophies” touches on two of the primary observations of this 
work.  First, it plays on the “all or nothing” conception of philosophy that is often invoked in 
contemporary histories of Russian philosophy, where the title “Russian philosophy” [russkaia 
filosofiia] frequently requires strict adherence to a specific set of essentializing criteria.  Second 
(and conversely), the title also indicates what I see as an important shift of paradigms in the 
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twenty-first century.  This shift involves a move from a dominating religious tradition in the 
1990s toward attempts in the past five years to identify with different models of professionalism, 
professional organizations, etc.  In fact, as we will see in Chapter Four, in the past decade several 
well-known philosophers have begun to speak out against the religious/secular binary as the 
main internal hindrance to the development of philosophy in Russia.  Embracing the 
advancement of this paradigm shift as the most important task of philosophy at the present, these 
thinkers offer for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union widely publicized 
oppositions to the religious narrative, opening up a discursive field in which criticism seeks not 
to limit through exceptionalist claims but to make connections between philosophy in Russia and 
in the rest of the world.   
 7 
2.0  “THROWING AWAY THE LADDER”: COMMON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN THOUGHT 
According to a number of Western and Russian critics, an enduring assumption about philosophy 
in Russia is that the discipline can be neatly divided into religious philosophy, on the one hand, 
and various forms of secular philosophy, on the other.  For Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who would 
become the first president of Czechoslovakia less than a decade after publishing The Spirit of 
Russia [Rußland und Europa, 1913], it was this supposed split—the juxtaposition of the 
“genuine Russian life” found in the monasteries with the imported Europeanization of downtown 
St. Petersburg and Moscow—that acted as one of the most oppressive burdens weighing on the 
“Russian character.”5
                                                 
5 Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia.  Studies in Literature, History, and Philosophy, Trans. Eden and 
Cedar Paul (NY: Macmillian, 1961-7), 2.  Masaryk’s two-volume Rußland und Europa. Studien 
über die geistigen Strömungen in Rußland (1913) was translated into English in 1919 and then 
into Czech as Rusko a Evropa: studie o duchovních proudech v Rusku between 1919-1921. 
  Masaryk’s conclusion is only one instance in a vast tradition of 
speculation on Russian religious thought as the “true Russian philosophy,” whether in the form 
of myths of the “Russian soul,” a search for the “Russian idea,” or conjecture on the “impending 
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revelation on the Russian soil.”6
2.1 TWO COMPETING NARRATIVES: THE RELIGIOUS AND THE 
SECULAR 
  While the minutiae of these texts vary, when we step back to 
survey a historical selection of responses to the query “What is Russian philosophy?” we see that 
these answers are not only quite consistent, but they contribute to a larger, essentializing 
mythology about Russian thought—one that is much more influential than the sum of its parts.  
In order to better understand the contemporary practice of philosophy in Russia, which is the 
ultimate goal toward which this work is directed, we must first lay bare the often unquestioned 
binary assumptions ascribed to Russian philosophical thought in the past two centuries 
(religious/secular; continuity/rupture; literary/analytic).  Through such a study we will see that 
not only are the twentieth and twenty-first century instantiations of the religious and secular 
narratives intimately tied with a long line of post-Chaadaevian revision, but, in the contemporary 
context, the continued adherence to these binaries is revealed not only to be unproductive, but 
antiquated and nonsensical.    
 
Historically, each branch of the religious/secular disjunction has gone hand in hand with a set of 
features meant to characterize and define Russian thought: the religious tradition, we are told, is 
literary, anti-rational, and unwavering; in contrast, the secular narrative comprises everything 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia: osnovnye problemy russkoi mysli XIX veka i 
nachala XX veka (Paris: YMCA, 1946), 248. 
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that is not religious, and its truths, always susceptible to rupture and fragmentation, take an 
analytic rather than spiritual form.  In Western scholarship, the sub-discipline of Russian 
religious philosophy is by far the more frequently studied half of this binary.  We can say the 
same about Russian criticism of the post-Soviet period, which rediscovered Orthodox thought in 
the late eighties/early nineties and continues to produce a large volume of scholarship on Russian 
religious philosophy to this day.7  The primary claim about this tradition, both in Russia and the 
West, is that it can be attributed with a literary (as opposed to analytic) character.  In The Icon 
and the Axe (1966), for instance, James Billington remarks that “it has been said that Russia’s 
thinkers are not formal philosophers but poets.”8
Yet, even thinkers who prefer philosophical tracts to poetry and fiction are often guilty of 
imbuing their work with literary language on Russian exceptionalism, giving suggestions on how 
  This common assumption gives way to the 
view that Russian religious philosophy is best expressed not according to the rigid logical and 
stylistic conventions of the philosophical tract but within the creative expression of poems and 
novels.  It is not surprising, thus, that Fedor Dostoevskii, Fedor Tiutchev, Lev Tolstoi, and 
Maksimilian Voloshin, among others, often find their way into the religious narrative’s canon of 
Russia’s great minds.   
                                                 
7 Although the religious narrative remains extremely influential in the present, a number of 
competing philosophical approaches have arisen, of which I will speak in chapters three and 
four. 
8 Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (NY: Knopf, 
1966), 55.  
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Russia might “fulfill her destiny” (Konstantin Aksakov),9 accomplish her “mission” (Aleksei 
Khomiakov),10 or “throw off the yoke of the logical systems of European philosophy” in order to 
preserve her “integrity of being” (Ivan Kireevskii).11  For Nikolai Berdiaev, Russian literary 
works, with their moral quality, comprise a philosophical genre that is “specifically Russian”: 
“Russian literature will bear a moral character more than all world literatures, as well as a 
concealed religious character.”12  According to Semen Frank, “in Russia, the deepest and most 
important thoughts and ideas were expressed not in systematic, academic writing, but in the 
literary form.”13  Likewise, Aleksei Losev emphasizes: “Russian fiction—this is the true Russian 
philosophy.”14
                                                 
9 Aksakov, “On the Internal State of Russia,” in Russian Intellectual History.  An Anthology, ed. 
Marc Raeff (NY: Humanity Books, 1966), 235. 
10 Khomiakov, “On Humbolt,” in Russian Intellectual History.  An Anthology, ed. Marc Raeff 
(NY: Humanity Books, 1966), 215.  
11 Kireevskii, “On the Nature of Eurepan Culture and Its Relation to the Culture of Russia,” in 
Russian Intellectual History.  An Anthology, ed. Marc Raeff (NY: Humanity Books, 1966), 207. 
12 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 34.   
 [“Русская литература будет носить моральный характер, более чем все литературы мира, 
и скрыто-религиозный характер.”] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
13 Frank, Russkoe mirovozzrenie (SPb: Nauka, 1996), 151. 
14 Losev, Filosofiia.  Mifologiia.  Kul'tura (M: Respublika, 1991), 212.  
[“Русская художественная литература - вот истинная русская философия”] 
   
 11 
Studies of Russian philosophical thought outside of Russia just as frequently align their 
work with the literary and mystical spheres rather than the analytic.  Not only do contemporary 
English- and German-language publications on philosophy in Russia favor religious and literary 
thinkers, but much of scholarship outside Russia in general seems to suggest that Russia has 
contributed nothing to university and/or academic philosophy.  Indeed, in The Spirit of Russia, 
Masaryk seeks to prove that “an analysis of Dostoevskii is a sound method of studying Russia” 
(viii)—a country whose literary works, he continues, “arouse harmonious echoes in [his] own 
Slav nature.”15
An example of one such amalgamation of the religious and the literary in contemporary 
Russian philosophy appears in the work of St. Petersburg philosopher Aleksandr Kazin, who 
refers to Aleksandr Pushkin and Fedor Tiutchev in order to express what he calls the “formula” 
of Russian thought.
   
16
                                                 
15 Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, 5. 
 Among contemporary Western studies that have offered reasons as to why Russian 
philosophical thought has taken a dominantly literary form, Clowes’ Fiction’s Overcoat is one of 
the most convincing.  Clowes argues that the rich tradition of Russian speculative philosophy 
was in part facilitated by the already long-standing tradition of Russian poets and authors who 
engaged with philosophy in their work, thereby allowing philosophy in Russia to grow “in the 
discursive space between imported systematic models of abstract thought … and narrative, 
dramatic, and lyric models of fictional philosophizing.”  See Clowes, Fiction’s Overcoat, 5-6.   
16 Kazin, “Formula Rossii (k dvukhsotletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Fedora Tiutcheva),” in Sobora 
Pravoslavnoi intelligentsia. http://www.sobor-spb.ru/members/kazin/tutchev.htm 
  For Kazin, the necessity for viewing Russian thought according to a 
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unique formula reveals itself not only in Tiutchev’s over-quoted stanza “Russia cannot be 
understood with the mind” (1866), which famously asserts that “one can only believe in 
Russia,”17 but also in a quotation of Pushkin, who observes that “[Russia’s] history requires a 
different idea, a different formula,”18 since the spiritual nature of the “Russian soul” is 
incompatible with the finitude of human reason—and, ultimately, with sterile, secular 
philosophy.19  Rather than outdated literary musings, these appeals to a “specifically Russian” 
nature (often predictably citing Tiutchev) still surface frequently in academic publications and at 
conferences.  For Al'bert Sobolev, in fact, the literature-centrism of Russian philosophy is so 
strong that it is only by limiting their attention to the humanities (for Sobolev, “philosophy” and 
“science” [nauka] are two distinctly different categories) that Russian philosophers can enjoy 
future successes.20  It is not surprising, thus, that in Kazin’s book Russia and World Culture 
[Rossiia i mirovaia kul'tura, 2004] he emphasizes the literary and non-academic thrust of the 
tradition by spending the majority of the book discussing literature (Aleksandr Pushkin, Fedor 
Tiutchev, Fedor Dostoevskii, and Vladimir Nabokov) and even film (Vasilii Shukshin and 
Andrei Tarkovskii) as the site of Russia’s philosophical monuments.21
                                                 
17 Tiutchev, “Umom—Rossiiu ne poniat',” in Stikhotvoreniia. Vol. 2 (M: Slovo, 2003), 165. 
 [“Умом Россию не понять /[…] / В Россию можно только верить.”] 
18 Pushkin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,  vol. XI (M: AN SSSR, 1937-1949), 127.  
[“История её [России] требует другой мысли, другой формулы …”]  
19 See Kazin, “Formula Rossii.”  
20 Sobolev, O russkoi filosofii (SPb: Mir, 2008). 
21 Kazin, Rossiia i mirovaia kul'tura (SPb, 2004). 
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Furthermore, the religious narrative is frequently described as having not only a non-
academic, and primarily literary, quality, but also an amorphous moral and ideological character, 
often subsumed under the already clichéd category of the “Russian idea.”  This term denotes a 
concept that thinkers like Berdiaev, tracing it back as far as Byzantium, have viewed as an 
irremovable quality of the mysterious “Russian soul.”22  The term “Russian idea” first appeared 
in 1861, when Fedor Dostoevskii wrote, “We foresee that the character of our future activity 
should be panhuman to the highest degree, that the Russian idea, possibly, will be a synthesis of 
all of those ideas, which develop with such persistence, with such courage.”23  Two decades 
later, Vladimir Solov'ev presented his essay “Russkaia ideia” (1888) in a Paris salon, again 
calling for synthesis, this time an ecumenical unification of the Christian confessions.24  In 1946 
Berdiaev’s Russian Idea appeared, though he appealed to his readership not in the name of 
universal salvation, as Solov'ev before him, but in the name of Russia’s becoming the “new 
Jerusalem.”25
                                                 
22 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 14-15.  
23 Dostoevskii, “Ob''iavlenie o podpiske na zhurnal Vremia na 1861 g,” in Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, vol. 18 (L: Nauka, 1911), 37. 
[“Мы предугадываем, что характер нашей будущей деятельности должен быть в вышей 
степени общечеловеческий, что русская идея, может быть, будет синтезом всех тех идей, 
которые с таким упорством, с таким мужеством развивает”]  
24 The lecture was published immediately in French and finally translated into Russian in 1909.   
25 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 248. 
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In reality, the notion of a “national idea” or “national soul” is a relatively modern 
conception, gaining popularity with the Romantic literary tendency of the author to elevate his 
own national scholarship as superior to all others.  In particular, it is indebted to Friedrich 
Schelling’s conception of “national spirit” in his Naturphilosophie, in which all the phenomena 
of nature are interwoven into one interdependent whole.  This Romantic concept was then 
appropriated and projected backwards, becoming an intellectual commonplace as if it had always 
existed.  Indeed, retrospectively reclaimed as early as 1842, this concept underlies the confession 
of Nikolai Gogol'’s Taras Bul'ba, who declares in the Russian-nationalist revision of the novel 
that although he has made the acquaintance of many agreeable individuals from lands both near 
and far, they, in some indescribable way, cannot compare to the brethren of the Russian soil:  
“No, they are sensible people, but not the same; the same kind of people, but not the same!  No, 
brothers, to love as the Russian soul loves is to love not with the mind or anything else, but with 
all that God has given, all that is within you.”26
                                                 
26 Gogol', Taras Bul'ba in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii.  V. 2 (M: AN SSSR, 1937), 133. 
 [“Нет,  умные люди,  да не те; такие же люди,  да не те!  Нет,  бр атцы,  так любить, как 
русская душа, - любить не то чтобы умом или чем другим, а всем, чем дал бог, что ни есть 
в тебе ... .”]  
 It is not surprising that this statement, occurring in book IX of the novel, became the key 
phrase of Vladimir Bortko’s nearly 17 million dollar (500 million ruble) production of Taras 
Bul'ba (2009).  The line both begins the film and acts as the catch phrase of the promotional 
trailer.  See: http://tarasbulbafilm.ru 
  The issue at hand is not whether the old 
Cossack’s assertions about the Russian people are true or false, but the way in which his 
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comment is an early example of the Romantic model of Russian exception.  Here the notion of 
the “Russian soul” is primordialized as an essential feature of the Russian character, becoming 
the pathos of a historical drama that takes place over two centuries before Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie.27
In addition to the literary/analytic disjunction, where, in the religious context, the former 
is privileged and circumscribed by the concept of the “Russian idea,” another set of 
characteristics—a paradoxical mix of continuity and rupture—is found in the religious subset of 
the religious/secular binary.  Here, in accordance with the essentializing requirements of the 
“Russian idea,” philosophy is viewed as a continuous, innate tradition.  In “On Humboldt” [“Po 
povodu Gumbol'dta,” 1849], this is what Aleksei Khomiakov called Russia’s “straight path” 
from Byzantium to the present.
   
28
                                                 
27 For contemporary speculation on the “Russian idea,” see, for example, Mikhail Maslin, comp, 
Russkaia ideia (M: Respublika, 1992), or A. Ia. Zis', Russkaia ideia v krugu pisatelei i myslitelei 
russkogo zarubezhia, vol. 2 (M: Iskusstvo, 1994). 
28 Khomiakov, “Po povodu Gumbol'dta” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. I, 3rd ed. (M: N.p., 
1900-1904), 228. 
Such imagery is still found in contemporary writing, though not always among Orthodox 
oriented philosophers.  For instance, in a February 2010 interview with Russian Journal [Russkii 
zhurnal], Vitalii Kurennoi made the argument that, “through Byzantium, Russian culture is 
historically much closer to the legacy of antiquity than is American culture.”  See: Kurennoi, 
“Filosofiia fil'ma.  Interview with Vitalii Kurennoi,” Russkii zhurnal  (9 Feb. 2010), 
http://www.russ.ru/pole/Filosofiya-fil-ma 
  In symbolist poet Maksimilian Voloshin’s “Wild Field” 
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[“Dikoe pole,” 1920], the unbroken chain of Orthodoxy, which stretches from the distant past 
into the future, is expressed by way of the medieval folk mythology of the bogatyr': “Everything 
that has been will repeat itself nowadays … / And again the vastitude will grow dark, / And they 
will remain, two in the desert—/ In the sky—God, on the earth—bogatyr'.”29
Yet despite the ease of comprehension they permit, a binary understanding of Russian 
thought (Isaiah Berlin’s hedgehogs and foxes; Vladimir Paperny’s cultures one and two), proves 
to restrict more than it facilitates.
  It is this imagery 
that Kazin articulates when he quotes this final segment of Voloshin’s poem, referring to it as “a 
dedication to those who love God and Russia.”   
30
                                                                                                                                                             
[“Русская культура связана с античным наследием более прямыми историческими 
связями, нежели американская, — через Византию.”] 
29 Voloshin, “Dikoe pole,” in Stikhotvoreniia.  Stat'i.  Vospominaniia sovremennikov (M: Izd-vo 
Pravda, 1991), 135.  Kazin’s conservative views conform to traditional narratives surrounding 
Russian religious philosophy, such as the arguments of Khomiakov and the Slavophiles over a 
century earlier. 
[“Все, что было, повторится ныне ... / И опять затуманится ширь, / И останутся двое в 
пустыне—/ В небе—Бог, на земле—богатырь.”]   
30 Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1970); Paperny, Kul'tura “Dva”: Sovetskaia arkhitektura, 1932-1954 (Ann Arbor: 
Ardis, 1985). 
  That is, the religious/secular division encourages the 
anchoring of Russian philosophical thought by an antiquated model, within the discourse of 
essentialist (and, in some cases, nonsensical) categories.  Rather than simplifying a discussion of 
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philosophical thought, this binary instead preempts any serious discussion, as the scholar is first 
required to either a) enter the model without questioning it, or b) reject these assumptions and 
commit himself to breaking down the terms at play.  The deficiency of this model becomes 
apparent when we consider that although thinkers like Khomiakov and Kazin adhere to a 
continuity narrative that constructs genealogical links between Byzantium and contemporary 
Russian thought, when considered in the context of the historical realities of the Soviet period 
their religious narrative also (paradoxically) requires of its adherents a belief in historical 
rupture—a belief necessary in order to account for the majority of the twentieth century, during 
which religious philosophy had no official role.  I call this the “after-the-break” argument.   
In the classics of Russian religious philosophy, the contradictory foundation of the “after-
the-break” argument is most famously articulated in Berdiaev’s Russian Idea [Russkaia ideia, 
1946], in which he asserts that although “discontinuity is characteristic for Russian history” 
[emphasis added], the Russian idea (although paradoxical in nature) does not fluctuate.31  The 
“after-the-break” narrative is also expressed in Khomiakov’s claim that the direct link between 
Byzantium and the present is often obscured by historical discord: “Our gifted young turn 
lovingly to the straight path once shown us by Byzantium and then concealed from us by the 
storms of our turbulent history.”32
                                                 
31 Berdiaev, Russkaia ideia, 1-2.  
[“Для русской истории харакерна прерывность.”]  
32 Khomiakov, “Po povodu Gumbol'dta,” 228.     
  Thus, history itself takes the blame for philosophy’s 
problematic years. 
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In the contemporary period, this paradox is perhaps best articulated in the early work of 
self-titled synergetic anthropologist Sergei Horujy, who stated that, although religious 
philosophy is an irremovable part of the “Russian national character,” it nevertheless remained 
dormant during the almost seventy-five years of atheistic hegemony in 1991.33  Although, as we 
will see in Chapter Four, developments in Horujy’s later writings make it impossible to identify 
him unequivocally with the religious narrative, in the mid-nineties the title of his book, After the 
Break [Posle pereryva, 1994], articulated the Phoenix-like resurrection of Russian thought in 
1991.  In an article by Vladimir Bibikhin, also called “After the Break” and included in the 
collection A Different Beginning [Drugoe nachalo, 2003], Bibikhin writes of the same 
philosophical rupture, replacing the word pereryv [break] with the more poetic umolkanie, or “a 
lapse into silence.”34  Of the early 1990s, during which, in his view, the tradition reemerged from 
its own ashes, Horujy writes: “And only then can you go further—after the break.”35
                                                 
33 Horujy, “Filosofskii parakhod,” in Posle pereryva.  Puti russkoi filosofii (SPb: Aleteiia, 1994), 
1.     
34 Bibikhin, “Posle pereryva,” in Drugoe nachalo (SPb: Nauka, 2003), 157-68. 
35 Horujy, “Predislovie,” in Posle pereryva.  Puti russkoi filosofii (SPb: Aleteiia, 1994).  
http://www.synergia-isa.ru/lib/lib.htm#H, 1. 
[“И лишь тогда сможешь идти дальше – после перерыва.”] 
 It is significant that Horujy and Bibikhin avoid the use of the word “perelom” for 
“break,” with its residual connotations from Stalin’s Great Break [Velikii perelom] of the late 
1920s, after which the Soviet Union veered off the path of NEP toward wide scale 
industrialization and collectivization.    
 
 19 
As I hinted at earlier, the seemingly paradoxical ascription to philosophy of both 
continuity and fragmentation proves, in fact, to be quite strategic.  That is, Russian religious 
philosophy had to “take a break” during the Soviet period in order to secure its own survival.  
For if it is indeed anti-institutional, shirking the rigid structure of academies and faculty meetings 
while flourishing in prose, poetry, and mysticism—if it is, as historian of philosophy Aleksandr 
Ermichev has claimed, “the car that runs the red light,” in that it knows no societal or earthy 
limitations36—then religious philosophers had no choice but to lay their “poor philosophy” to 
rest, lest it become institutionalized and corrupted by curricula, dialectical materialism, and state-
mandated textbooks.37  Had they not done so, these thinkers would have had no way to account 
for the short century during which Orthodox philosophy was not only unable to fulfill its “special 
mission,” as Khomiakov had put it,38 but had absolutely no official role within the borders of the 
Soviet Union.  In this way, the “after-the-break” argument—the idea that Russian philosophy is a 
necessary part of the “Russian soul” but goes into hiding in the face of unfavorable conditions—
allows religious philosophers to bypass this troublesome period.  In effect, they put their 
ideology to sleep for a long winter, so that in late perestroika it could be resurrected “after the 
break” and the mission resumed with a cry “Come forth!” like Jesus to Lazarus in one of the 
most famous passages of the New Testament.39
                                                 
36 Ermichev, Personal interview (April 2007). 
37  With the phrase “poor philosophy” I am referring to Ermichev’s monograph My Poor Russian 
Thought [Moia bednaia russkaia mysl'] (SPb: SPBGU, 1997).  
38 Khomiakov, “On Humbolt,” 215.  
39 John 11:43: King James version. 
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Traditional reconstructions of twentieth-century Russian philosophical thought typically 
adhere to the “after-the-break” view, which takes as its starting point the departures of the 
Oberbürgermeister haken and the Preussen on 22 September and 16 November 1922 
respectively.  These two voyages, which have conjointly come to be known as the Philosophy 
Steamer, carried off some of the period’s most influential Russian philosophers and their 
families, including Iulii Aikhenvald (literary critic and translator of Schopenhauer), Nikolai 
Berdiaev, Semen Frank, Ivan Il'in, Lev Karsavin (historian of art and ideas), Aleksandr 
Kizevetter (founding member of the Kadet Party), Nikolai Losskii, and Mikhail Osorgin 
(journalist and prose writer).40
                                                 
40 The departure of the Philosophy Steamer has been addressed at length both in Russia and in 
the West in a number of historical and cultural studies, including, most recently, books by Lesley 
Chamberlain and Stuart Finkel.  See Chamberlain, The Philosophy Steamer: Lenin and the Exile 
of the Intelligentsia (London: Atlantic, 2006), which was published in the United States as 
Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy Steamer and the Exile of the Intelligentsia 
(St. Martin’s P: NY, 2007).  See also: Stewart Finkel, On the Ideological Front: The Russian 
Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007).  For a 
full list of deportees from Moscow and Petrograd see Appendix Two of Chamberlain’s 
Philosophy Steamer.        
  Lenin had been tracking these intellectuals as early as the 1890s, 
when he began familiarizing himself with contemporary philosophical trends, both Western and 
domestic: “Volodia is vigorously reading all kinds of philosophy,” Nadezhda Krupskaia wrote in 
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a letter to her mother-in-law Mariia Ul'ianova on 20 June 1899.  “That is now his official 
occupation.”41
  This wide scale expatriation of the intelligentsia sent a resounding message to the rest of 
the world.  Often treated by many scholars as the final political move in the wholesale 
transformation of the Russian intellectual climate from idealism to communism, for Horujy the 
domestic impact was irreparable: once these doors closed, they did not open again until after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  He candidly observed, “With the dispatch [of the philosophy 
steamer], philosophy ended in Russia; and that which we have since then called by this name is 
in reality only one of the services of the totalitarian machine.”
  
42
 Skipping more than three quarters of a century, the “after-the-break” story then picks up 
in late perestroika and the early 1990s, during which previously banned texts began to fill the 
pages of scholarly journals.  The return of the intellectual legacy of the Russian religious 
renaissance—or what Georgii Florovskii has dramatically called Russia’s  
“philosophical awakening” [filosofskoe probuzhdenie]
   
43
                                                 
41 Lenin—Krupskaia—Ul'ianovy.  Perepiska (1883-1900), comps. Iu. A. Akhapkin and K. F. 
Bogdanova (M: Mysl', 1981), letter 184. 
 [“Володя усиленно читает всякую философию (это теперь его официальное занятие).”]  
42 Horujy, “Filosofskii parakhod,” 1.    
[“С высылкой кончилась философия в России; и то, что с тех пор у нас называлось этим 
именем—в действительности, лишь одна из служб тоталитарной машины.”] 
43 Florovskii, Puti russkogo bogosloviia, 3rd ed. (Paris: YMCA P, 1983), 234. 
—in turn spurred a conversion from 
dialectical materialism to idealism.  This more recent conversion finds a historical precedent in 
 22 
the 1890s, when the Legal Marxists of the 1890s, such as Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Frank, Petr 
Struve, and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, turned toward idealism.  According to Chamberlain, the 
Legal Marxists “became Marxists as students only because … no liberal theory was available.”44  
While this view is overly simplistic—Berdiaev, for instance, was writing on Marxism as late as 
1937 with The Beginnings and Meaning of Russian Communism [Istoki i smysl russkogo 
kommunizma]—nevertheless, as these thinkers matured they did begin to incorporate Orthodoxy 
into their philosophical systems and, by the early 1900s, most had made a complete transition to 
idealism.  Yet, while the Legal Marxists disagreed with the Tsarist State as students of Marxism, 
and then later disagreed with the impending communist regime as Orthodox thinkers, the 
transition from Marxist-Leninism in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a shift that occurred 
alongside the State; as Russia transformed itself from an officially Marxist-Leninist to an 
officially Orthodox empire, many academics followed.  Despite the differing political events 
behind each conversion, in both cases it is apparent that the distance between materialism and 
idealism is not a chasm but a single step—a space the émigré narrator’s suitcase in Sergei 
Dovlatov’s novella likens to the size of a suitcase: “On the bottom—Karl Marx.  On the lid—
Brodsky.”45
  In opposition to the religious narrative, of which I have been speaking, secular 
philosophy is often deemed the product not of national literature, but of the worldwide 
philosophical stage: that is, it takes place within the international institution of academia that 
      
                                                 
44 Chamberlain, Motherland.  A Philosophical History of Russia (NY: Overlook, 2007), 85. 
45 Dovlatov, Chemodan (SPb: Azbuka, 2001), 10. 
[“На дне—Карл Маркс.  На крышке—Бродский.”] 
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recognizes philosophical rhetoric and not national peculiarities as a common, universal language.  
By its critics, secular philosophy is often treated as a catch-all category, comprising what does 
not fall under the religious rubric.  This “miscellany” includes the various strands of Marxism in 
Russia and the Soviet Union, the poststructuralist and postmodern movements of perestroika and 
the post-Soviet period, and philosophers who simply choose not to mix scholarship and religious 
beliefs.  With its cold rationalism and refusal to draw causal links between the metaphysical and 
the Russian soil, secular philosophy is the antithesis to the amorphous “Russian soul.”  This view 
most often appears in the work of contemporary scholars who reject the model of “national 
philosophy” and who, refusing to require the presence of theology as a prerequisite for the 
existence of philosophy, place their work instead within an ongoing universal intellectual 
dialogue and not within the construction of a national idea.  A secular approach to Russian 
philosophy is present in much Western criticism on Russian philosophical thought, including the 
work of Evert van der Zweerde, who, in his many articles challenges the conflation of the 
designators “philosophy in Russia” and “Russian [russkii] religious philosophy,” consistently 
coming to the conclusion that “philosophy as such cannot be ‘Russian’ any more than it can be 
French or German.”46
                                                 
46 Van der Zweerde, “The Place of Russian Philosophy in World Philosophical History.  A 
Perspective,” Diogenes 56 (2009): 171.  See also Van der Zweerde, “Konets russkoi filosofii kak 
russkoi?,” Voprosy filosofii 2 (1998), 127-35.   
  
 Tere Vadén makes a similar case with regards on Finish philosophy in “What is ‘Local 
Thinking’? (Can there be a Finnish Philosophy?)” in Re-ethnicizing the Minds? Cultural Revival 
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 In Russian scholarship the secular approach is present in Vladimir Pustarnakov’s study 
University Philosophy in Russia [Universitetskaia filosofiia v Rossii, 2003], where he focuses 
exclusively on the rich tradition of Russian academic philosophy, beginning with the early years 
of Moscow State University.  Moreover, Nelia Motroshilova, who has written extensively on 
Russia’s religious philosophers, is careful to distinguish two strains in religious thought: “pure 
theology” and religious metaphysics.  In her work she avoids the essentialism of the former 
while acknowledging the latter as fundamental to the Russian intellectual tradition.47
Another figure who in many ways represents the secular subset of the religious/secular 
binary is Vladislav Lektorskii, editor since 1988 of Russia’s most prestigious philosophical 
journal, Questions of Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii].  In a lecture at a 1998 conference in 
Freiberg, Germany, Lektorskii spoke of the profound wave of philosophical interest in the early 
1990s, designating this period the “philosophical boom.”  As he notes: “Philosophy [was] not 
imposed upon anyone [in this decade].  The most diverse ideas and conceptions [were] 
expounded in philosophical publications.”
   
48
Yet, to Lektorskii’s commentary we must add an important addendum regarding the 
content of the “philosophical boom.”  It was not only that philosophers had begun actively 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
in Contemporary Thought, eds. Thorsten Botz-Bornstein and Jürgen Hengelbrock (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2006), 219-236.    
47 Motroshilova, Personal interview (January 2009). 
48 Lektorskii, “O sovremennoi situatsii v rossiiskoi filosofii (1998),” Landshaft 1 (2008), 1.       
[“Философия никому не навязывается.  В философских публикациях излагаются самые 
разные идеи и концепции.”]   
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publishing and commenting on philosophical themes almost overnight, but, in particular, it was 
the legacy of pre-revolutionary Orthodox philosophers that had taken the discipline by storm.  
The early stages of this “philosophical boom” saw the publication of a number of essays by 
Sergei Averintsev in the tenth issue of Questions of Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii] in 1987, while 
in 1988 a long awaited two-volume collection of Vladimir Solov'ev’s work was released by the 
publisher Philosophical Heritage [Filosofskoe nasledie].  In the following months and years the 
floodgates opened with full force: Questions of Philosophy published several works by Gustav 
Shpet in November 1988, while Thoughts about Literature [Mysli o literature], a collection of 
articles by Vasillii Rozanov, appeared in October 1989 as part of the series “To the Lovers of 
Russian Literature” [“Liubiteliam rossiiskoi slovesnosti”].  In the second half of 1989 a new 
series, “From the History of Domestic Thought” [“Iz istorii otechestvennoi mysli”], appeared as 
a supplement to Questions of Philosophy, publishing both Berdiaev’s Philosophy of Freedom 
[Filosofiia svobody, 1911] and The Meaning of the Creative Act [Smysl' tvorchestva, 1916].49
                                                 
49 It is important to note that the years 1989-1990 also saw the publication of Introduction to 
Philosophy [Vvedenie v filosofiiu], the replacement textbook for the standard ideological readers 
Foundations of Marxist-Leninism [Osnovy marksizma-leninizma] and Foundations of Marxist 
Philosophy [Osnovy marksistkoi filosofii].  Appearing in two volumes and with a substantial 
initial print run of 500,000, Introduction to Philosophy  included an entire chapter in the second 
volume entitled “Personality” [“Lichnost'”] (a previously forbidden topic), attributed to Moscow-
based philosopher and man of the sixties [shestidesiatnik] Erik Solovev'.   
  A 
year later Berdiaev’s The Russian Idea (1946) was published in the first two issues of Questions 
of Philosophy, while in June of 1991 the collections Landmarks [Vekhi, 1909] and From the 
 26 
Depths [Iz glubiny, 1918], many articles in which were contributed by philosophers and critics 
exiled from the Soviet Union on the Philosophy Steamer, were released as part of “From the 
History of Domestic Thought.”50
Yet, while the flood of classics of Russian religious philosophy seemed to signal great 
success and prolificity for the future of Russian thought, the optimism of the “philosophical 
boom” was downplayed by many outside of religious philosophy.  For instance, while Kazin and 
Horujy viewed the post-Soviet period as the time in which philosophy returned to Russia, 
Lektorskii was quick to remind that although the early 1990s marked the introduction of more 
freedom to the discipline, some of the past two hundred years’ most important thinkers emerged 
from the Soviet university system, well before the “philosophical boom.”
  In this fashion, the legacy of Russian Orthodox philosophy 
was resurrected enthusiastically and re-appropriated from all sides as the path of contemporary 
Russian thought, dominating much of philosophical production for the first decade of Russia’s 
newly post-Soviet history.   
51
                                                 
50 For more on the general phenomenon of “return” in the second half of the Glasnost period, see 
Robin Aizlewood, “The Return of the ‘Russian Idea’ in Publications, 1988-91,” Slavic and East 
European Review 71: 3 (July 1993): 491.  
51 Lektorskii, “O sovremennoi situatsii v rossiiskoi filosofii,” 7.       
  As examples, 
Lektorskii names Eval'd Il'enkov and Moscow Methodological Circle [Moskovskii 
metodologicheskii kruzhok, or MMK] members Merab Mamardashvili, Georgii Shchedrovitskii, 
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and Aleksandr Zinov'ev.52  Although Lektorskii does not want to deny that the Soviet period was 
troublesome for philosophers—he points out, for instance, that in the 1950s philosophy was 
taught only in a small number of higher institutions—he nevertheless stresses that Il'enkov and 
the MMK members produced great works of philosophy despite institutional and ideological 
restrictions.53  “Nowadays we sometimes have a distorted image of that time,” Lektorskii stated 
in a 2004 interview.  “Interesting people appeared even then.  They were not always able to 
publish everything, but some ideas were already being worked out and discussed.”54
Moreover, not only was the rapid transition (and in some instances, seemingly overnight 
conversion) of thinkers from the dogma of Marxism to the ideology of Orthodoxy alienating to 
many, but as Valerii Podoroga has noted, there was a growing realization among non-religious 
philosophers of an expanding chasm between the language, methodology, and subject matter of 
Russian philosophy of the late-Soviet/early post-Soviet period and the standards of Western 
academics.
   
55
                                                 
52 After Zinov'ev left the group due to methodological differences, the Moscow Methodological 
Circle gradually became known as the Moscow Logical Circle [Moskovskii logicheskii kruzhok, 
or MLK]. 
53 Lektorskii, “Philosophy is the Self-Consciousness of a Culture.  An Interview with V. A. 
Lektorskii,” Russian Studies in Philosophy 42.4 (Spring 2004), 78. 
54 Ibid., 74. 
55 Podoroga, Personal Interview (June 2009). 
  This disconnect between possibility and actuality was mirrored in the political 
This chasm was apparent to many of the participants of a two-week philosophical summit at the 
Interuniversity Center in Dubrovnik, Croatia in October of 1990, where Susan Buck-Morss 
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climate, where the new promise of international collaboration and cooperation ushered in 
alongside the “philosophical boom” were confronted with the literal boom of El'tsin’s shelling of 
his own White House in October of 1993.  The quick dissipation of the optimism surrounding the 
“philosophical boom” is apparent in the large number of new journals founded during this 
period, most of which failed within two years of El'tsin’s coup.  These include: The Figure of 
Thanatos [Figura Tanatosa; SPb, 1992-1995], Parallels [Paralleli; M, 1991], Silentium [SPb, 
1991-1992, 1996], Sphinx [Sfinks; SPb, 1994-1995], Socio-logos [Sotsio-logos; M, 1991-1993], 
One Hundred Pages [Sto stranits; SPb, 1991-1994], and Steps [Stupeni; SPb, 1991-1997].56
While the “after-the-break” narrative can be viewed as necessary for the survival of the 
religious subset of the religious/secular binary, it is also apparent why thinkers like Lektorskii do 
not find it problematic to view Soviet-era philosophizing as “proper philosophy.”  For, if 
philosophy is a discipline, one that is structured by the professional institutions within which it 
resides, then the Soviet period was nothing more than a changing of the guards—a shift from one 
practice to another.  Within the mindset of this secular narrative, then, it becomes possible to see 
how although the nature of philosophy changed during its tumultuous Soviet history, it could not 
disappear entirely, given that philosophy departments, philosophy professors, and philosophy 
       
                                                                                                                                                             
reports that Western and Soviet Marxists were unable to communicate effectively with one 
another, although both sides were supposed to be representing the same so-called “left.”  See 
Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West 
(Cambridge: MIT, 2000). 
56 Two exceptions include the journal of the Institute of Man, entitled Man [Chelovek; M, 1990 - 
present] and Logos [M, 1991-present]. 
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students remained, and that philosophical texts continued to be produced and discussed.  This is 
the objective of James P. Scanlan’s study Marxism in the USSR (1985), where he demonstrated 
that Soviet philosophy was less monolithic than scholars often assumed and that “power over the 
dictionary, which Soviet authorities have enjoyed for decades, ha[d] not given them complete 
power over minds.”57
2.2 HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND LINGUISTIC ANCHORS 
(RUSSKII VS. ROSSIISKII) 
  Lektorskii further confirms the perseverance of Soviet-era philosophy 
under authoritarian conditions in his two-volume edited collection Philosophy Does Not End: 
From the History of Domestic Philosophy [Filosofiia ne konchaetsia: iz istorii otechestvennoi 
filosofii, 1998], which includes the work of philosophers from the 1920s through the 1980s, 
demonstrating that according to the secular narrative there was no “lapse into silence,” and that 
philosophy never did take a break.   
The division of Russian philosophical thought into two branches (the religious and the secular) 
can in many ways be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century as an outgrowth of 
the Slavophile/Westernizer debate that had consumed much of the 1830s and 1840s.  This 
debate, in turn, was itself in part a result of the post-Chaadaev era of philosophizing ushered in 
with his eight Philosophical Letters [Lettres philosophiques], written in French between 1829 
and 1831 following his service in the Napoleonic wars.  The letters were addressed to Ekaterina 
                                                 
57 Scanlan, Marxism in the USSR.  A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell UP, 1985), 9. 
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Panova, a woman of reputation not only for beating her serfs and having borrowed money from 
Chaadaev’s family and refusing to make good on her debt, but for being sympathetic to the 
Roman Catholic confession.  The latter made her a suitable interlocutor for at least the first of 
Chaadaev’s letters, which condemns Russian Orthodoxy as having paralyzed the Russian 
character.   
As we read from letter to letter, however, we see that each text demonstrates 
extraordinary development in Chaadaev’s own thinking.  Although in the first letter he expresses 
an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of Russia’s place (or lack thereof) in intellectual history, by 
the sixth he has already begun to sketch a philosophical system in which many of the “national 
peculiarities” he denounced in 1829 are now treated as advantages—as testaments to Russia’s 
unique status and exceptional potential.  Regardless, after the first letter was published in the 
Moscow journal Teleskop in 1836 the journal was immediately closed and its editor, Nikolai 
Nadezhdin, was exiled to the north until 1838.  While Chaadaev escaped exile, he was declared 
mad and sentenced to medical examinations and eighteen months house arrest.  It was with a 
sense of irony, thus, that he titled his next (and last) philosophical essay “Apology of a Madman” 
[“Apologiia sumasshedshego,” 1837].     
For Billington, Chaadaev’s work “stands as a kind of signpost, pointing toward the 
radical Westernizing path that was soon to be advocated for Russia.”58
                                                 
58 Billington, The Icon and the Axe, 315. 
  And indeed, in his first 
letter Chaadaev makes claims that would later be reiterated by the Westernizers, accusing Russia 
of having contributed nothing substantial to world culture: 
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One of the worst features of our peculiar civilization is that we have not yet 
discovered truths that have elsewhere become truisms, even among nations that in 
many respects are far less advanced than we are.  It is the result of our never 
having walked with other nations; we belong to none of the great families of 
mankind; we are neither of the West nor of the East and we possess the traditions 
of neither.  Somehow divorced from time, the universal education of mankind has 
not reached us.59
Rejecting the Slavophile’s support of the Orthodox confession as the only true expression 
of Christianity, Chaadaev goes on to lament that Orthodox Christianity has actually paralyzed the 
Russian population with its tendencies toward laziness and resignation in mediocrity.  While 
Catholicism remains the driving force behind all great Western civilizations, he continues, 
Eastern Orthodoxy has transformed the Russian into an eternal nomad, with “no definite sphere 
 
                                                 
59 Chaadaev, “Lettre Première,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis'ma, vol. I ( M: 
Nauka, 1991), 89.   
[“C’est une des choses les plus déplorables de notre singulière civilization, que les vérités les 
plus triviales ailleurs, et même chez les peoples bien moins avancés que nous sous certains 
rapports, nous sommes encore à les découvrir.  C’est que nous n’avons jamais marché avec les 
autres peoples; nous n’appartenons à aucune des grandes familles du genre humain; nous ne 
sommes ni de l’Occident ni de l’Orient, et nous n’avons les traditions ni de l’un ni de l’autre.  
Placés comme en dehors des temps, l’éducation universelle du genre humain ne nous a pas 
atteints.”]     
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of existence” and no proper habits, no rules.”60  This idea was reformulated later by 
Westernizing philosophers such as Vissarion Belinskii in his “Letter to Gogol'” [“Pis'mo k 
Gogoliu,” 1847], where Belinskii wrote that Russia has been buried under sermons, prayers, 
mysticism, and pietism.61
Yet, Billington also notes that “Chaadaev’s dark portrayal of Russia’s past and present 
serves to dramatize the brightness of the future,”
 
62
                                                 
60 Ibid., 90.  
[“Point de sphere d’existence determine pour personne, point de bonnes habitudes pour rien, 
point de règle pour aucune chose.”] 
61 Belinskii, “Pis'mo k Gogoliu,” in Izbrannye filosofskie sochineniia (M: Gos. izd-vo, 1956), 
536-546. 
62 Billington, The Icon and the Axe, 315. 
 and it is this future-oriented view, combined 
with a partially developed theory of unity, that actually places him (the Chaadaev of the later 
letters and of the “Apology”) in dialogue with the Slavophiles in an important way.  In letter 
seven, for instance, in a passage reminiscent of Leibniz’s writing on the harmony between 
theology and the physical sciences, Chaadaev details how finite minds collide metaphysically as 
physical bodies do in nature, united not only in their likeness, but in their mirroring of the one 
“Supreme Mind.”  On this unity between God, men, and physical processes, he concludes letter 
eight: “All the labor of the intellectual generations is destined to produce but this result, the 
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terminal point and goal of all things, the final phase of human nature, the resolution of the 
universe, the great apocalyptic synthesis.”63
Thus, it is not surprising that not only did the Slavophiles—or Samobytniki, as they called 
themselves—take notice of Chaadaev’s contributions, but the writing of the first generation of 
Slavophiles can in many ways be seen as a lengthy reaction to Chaadaev.  We see this perhaps 
most explicitly in the work of Khomiakov, who wrote several letters directly to Chaadaev, as 
well as treatises on the latter’s Philosophical Letters.  Even thinkers who we are hard pressed to 
fit into either the Slavophile or the Westernizing camp reacted to Chaadaev in some way.  For 
Aleksandr Herzen, it was the Chaadaev period—or, more specifically, the Decembrist revolt of 
14 December 1825 (26 December in the New Style)—that marked the point at which we can 
speak of the emergence of “a European state within the Slavic state”
   
64
                                                 
63 Chaadaev, “Lettre Huitième,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis'ma, vol. I (M: 
Nauka, 1991), 205.   
[“Tout le travail des ages intellectuels n’est destiné qu’à produire ce résultat definitive, terme et 
fin de toutes choses, dernière phase de la nature humaine, dénouement du drame universel, la 
grande synthèse apocalyptique.”] Trans. from Edie, James M, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-
Barbara Zeldin, Russian Philosophy, vol. I (Chicago, 1969), 154. 
64 Aleksandr Gertsen, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. VII (M: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954-
1965), 297. 
: a dichotomy visible in the 
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subsequent split of Russian intellectuals, more or less, into Slavophile and Westernizer 
factions.65
In the present period, when Russian philosophical thought has developed into a 
complicated network of trends, thinkers, and inclinations, and when we can easily speak of 
developed intellectual debates within the discipline, the two dominant narratives—the religious 
and the secular—have not only ideological differences, but are separated by a significant 
linguistic rift: the semantic discrepancy between the Russian descriptors russkii and rossiiskii, 
the meanings of both of which are collapsed into the English adjective “Russian.”  The former is 
  
Before Chaadaev—or, perhaps, before the extensive response to Chaadaev—it is difficult 
to speak of developed, coexisting religious and secular philosophical branches.  While there were 
no doubt splits and schisms throughout the history of Russian theology (e.g. between Iosif 
Volotskii and the non-possessors [nestiazhateli], or the Old and New Believers), the 
religious/secular question was traditionally one that was played out on the political stage rather 
than in the philosophical arena.  What is more, pre-Chaadaev philosophical circles had not yet 
gained enough internal support and external acceptance to challenge the validity of one another 
on the scale of the schism that occurred between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, or, much 
later, between the materialist philosophers and religious thinkers of the twentieth century.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that it was precisely the impending political revolution that secured a 
historical place for the religious/secular binary, leading to the grand campaign of Soviet 
philosophy against the religious thought that had not only flourished, but dominated, in Russia. 
                                                 
65 Of course this distinction is easily confounded by a figure like Mikhail Bakunin, who does not 
fit neatly into either category. 
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the more historical of the two and originates as the adjective from the noun Rus', which dates 
back to the Primary Chronicle, or Tale of Bygone Years [Povest' vremennykh let, 1040-1118]—
an annual register of important events in Rus' beginning in the year 852.  In contemporary 
linguistic politics, the word has, in many instances, come to imply a national, and even ethnic, 
character, such as the meaning contained in the word “Russian” in the phrase “His native 
language is Russian,” or “She is of Russian descent.”   
This contemporary meaning makes the adjective favorable to Russian philosophers who 
attest to the “unique,” yet simultaneously universal, nature of their “national philosophy.”  
“Russian [russkii] is not synonymous with Christian,” stated Evgenii Trubetskoi in a paper he 
read at a meeting of the Religious-Philosophical Society on 19 February 1912, “but is a national 
and individual specificity among Christianity, valuable beyond measure, and which has an 
undeniable universal, world-wide significance”66
                                                 
66 Trubetskoi, “Staryi i novyi natsional'nyi messianism,” in Smysl zhizni (М: Respublika, 1994), 
350.  
[“Русское – не тождественно с христианским, а представляет собою чрезвычайно ценную 
национальную и индивидуальную особенность среди христианства, которая несомненно 
имеет универсальное, вселенское значение.”] 
  “Russkii” is the only adjective found in the 
popular histories of Russian philosophy from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including 
Archimandrite Gavriil’s Russian Philosophy (1840), E. L. Radlov’s Sketch of the History of 
Russian Philosophy (1912), Boris Iakovenko’s Sketches of Russian Philosophy (1922), Gustav 
Shpet’s Sketch of the Development of Russian Philosophy (1922), Georgii Florovskii’s The Ways 
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of Russian Theology (1937), Vasilii Zen'kovskii’s History of Russian Philosophy (1948-1950), 
and Nikolai Losskii’s History of Russian Philosophy (1951).67
Russkii has been able to develop this secondary, nationalistic implication thanks to the 
introduction of a second adjective for “Russian,” rossiiskii, inducted into the language by Ivan 
IV and derived from the contemporary proper noun for Russia [Rossiia], which is first known to 
have been recorded in a Moscow grammar in 1517.  It was used frequently by Ivan IV and, later, 
Avvakum.
  
68
In an analogous fashion, the adjective “Soviet” became an equally all-encompassing 
term, stretching its imperial arms from Leningrad to the Central Asian republics to Sakhalin.  In 
  Rossiiskii designates “Russian” in the territorial, geographical, and imperial sense 
of the phrases “The Russian Federation” and “Russian citizenship,” thereby allowing russkii to 
cover the domain of the national, the linguistic, the cultural, and the ethnic.  Unlike russkii, 
rossiiskii allows for individuals of different nationalities, linguistic backgrounds, ethnicities, etc. 
to be included within its demarcation, as it has no national tinge, but simply designates territory.  
It is not surprising, thus, that rossiiskii and not russkii was the term used in the official imperial 
title to designate what fell under the jurisdiction of the Russian empire: it begins “We, … By the 
Grace of God, Emperor, and Autocrat of the all Russias … ” [“My, … Bozhiiu Milostiiu, 
Imperator i Samoderzhets Vserossiiskii … ”] and continues with a list of all the empire’s 
territories, from Finland to Armenia.   
                                                 
67 The corresponding Russian titles are as follows: Russkaia filosofiia; Ocherk istorii russkoi 
filosofii; Ocherki russkoi filosofii; Ocherk razvitiia russkoi filosofii; Puti russkago bogosloviia; 
Istoriia russkoi filosofii (from here on abbreviated as Irf); and Irf. 
68 Maks Fasmer, Etimologicheskii slovar' russkogo iazyka, vol. III (M: Progress, 1987), 505. 
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theory, “Soviet” fulfilled the same function as “rossiiskii”—i.e. to delineate empire without 
excluding any of its peoples, to unite a number of varied ethnicities and religions (Belarusian, 
Jewish, Kazakh, Russian, Ukrainian, Vol'ga-German) under one centralized power.  And while 
any cultural historian is aware that this was the case only in theory (one need only remember, for 
instance, the closings of Yiddish Theatres in the Soviet Union or the State’s policy on Central 
Asia and the “Virgin Lands” campaign of the 1950s), linguistically the two terms purport to 
denote the same idea.       
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term rossiiskii returned to the official State 
lexicon, retaining its monarchic connotations of an empire that reaches to the far ends of its 
territory in order to collect and collapse its many territories under one common term.  It also 
carried on the goal (again, in theory) of the term “Soviet,” in the sense that it is a term that 
purposefully claims to make no ethnic or religious presuppositions, allowing for a manifold of 
ethnic and ethno-territorial modifiers to gather under it its linguistic umbrella.  It is not 
surprising, thus, that secular thinkers often prefer the adjective rossiiskii, which is believed to 
designate the appropriate geographical territory without spinning the thought that occurs within 
its boundaries in a nationalistic light—that is, as a particularistic articulation of a specific 
identity.  Nevertheless, such usage has grown slowly (albeit steadily), and the term rossiiskii is 
still often thought to sound contrived, or even to be ridiculous, by scholars (particularly more 
traditional historians of Russian philosophy) content with the meaning that russkii can bring to a 
title or a text.   
In an early refusal of the use of rossiiskii, Mikhail Gromov writes in his 1997 study, The 
Structure and Typology of Russian Medieval Philosophy [Struktura i tipologiia russkoi 
srednevekovoi filosofii]: “of the term “Russian [rossiiskii] philosophy” it is possible to speak in 
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the sense of a kind of detached conception, as we speak of “European philosophy” as a whole, 
but authors who use this term speak specifically of Russian [russkii] philosophy as such.”69  In 
fact, what Gromov is reacting to here may be the fact that, in reality, there is no ideal term at the 
scholar’s disposal.  For instance, rossiiskii, as well as the newer combination “philosophy in 
Russia,” are criticized for leading to problems in regards to Russian émigré writers, who clearly 
do not fall into that geographical category.70
                                                 
69 Gromov, Struktura i tipologiia russkoi srednevekovoi filosofii (M: IF RAN, 1997), 20-21. 
[“о термине ‘российская философия’ можно говорить в качестве некоего условно 
выделяемого понятия, как мы говорим о ‘европейской философии’ в целом, но авторы, 
испольщуюшие его, говорят … именно о русской философии как таковой”] 
70 Here I would argue that “philosophy in Russia” is not as restricting as it initially seems to be.  
It is not uncommon for intellectual groups or trends to be given geographical names that 
represent only a portion of its members.  Here we could remember the term “Austrian 
philosophy,” which is used to refer to the anti-Kantian school of Franz Brentano during the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, though Brentano himself was German 
and not Austrian.    
  The more awkward title “Russian-language 
philosophy” is equally problematic, as it limits the inclusion of Russian thinkers who publish in 
foreign languages: for instance, Chaadaev’s letters in French or contemporary thinkers who 
regularly publish in English or German-language journals.  At the 2008 presentation of Mikhail 
Maslin’s Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia [Russkaia filosofiia: Entsiklopediia, 2007], 
discussed further in chapter three, Aleksandr Ermichev expressed his distaste for what he 
perceived to be Maslin’s favoring of the “Philosophy in Russia” descriptor: “‘Philosophy in 
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Russia’ and ‘Russian [rossiiskii] philosophy’—I dislike this division terribly.  Believe me, it is 
wrong, it is mistaken.”71
Still, although much has been written about the russkii/rossiiskii distinction in the cultural 
and historical spheres, such discussions have yet to reach the discipline of philosophy in any 
serious way with the exception of a few instances, the earliest perhaps being Artem'eva’s note at 
the beginning of  her 1994 article “‘Departmental Philosophy’ in Russia” [“‘Kafedral'naia 
filosofiia’ v Rossii”], which begins with the clarification that “the conceptions of ‘Russian 
[russkii] philosophy’ and ‘philosophy that is studied in Russian [rossiiskii] educational 
institutions’ are not synonymous, neither in content nor range, although some researchers of 
Russian philosophy cannot imagine the possibility of its development outside the boundaries of 
‘schools.’”
     
72
                                                 
71 Ermichev, Comments at “Presentatsiia entsiklopedii ‘Russkaia filosofiia’” at Seminar 
“Russkaia mysl'” at Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy, St. Petersburg.  28 Feb. 2008.  
http://rhga.ru/science/sience_research/seminar_russian_philosophy/stenogramms/ 
encyclopedia.php   
[“‘Философия в России’ и ‘Русская философия’ – ужасно мне не нравится это разделение.  
Поверьте мне, это неправильно, это ошибочно.”] 
72 Artem'eva, “‘Kafedral'naia filosofiia’ v Rossii.  Istoki i traditsii,” Sfinks 2 (1994), 7.   
[“... понятия ‘русская философия’ и ‘философия, изучаемая в российских учебных 
заведениях’ не тождественны ни по содержанию, не по объему, хотя некоторые 
исследователи русской философии не мыслят возможности ее развития кроме в рамках 
‘школах.’”]  
  Other such examples can be found in a 1998 lecture given by Lektorskii in 
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Freiberg, Germany on “On the Contemporary Situation in Russian Philosophy” [“O sovremennoi 
situatsii v rossiiskoi filosofii”], or in the 2009 collection Russian Post-Soviet Philosophy: An 
Exercise in Self-Analysis [Rossiiskaia postsovetskaia filosofiia: opyt' samoanaliza].73
Still, in a review of the 2007 Historians’ Symposium of Russian Philosophy, held as part 
of the annual conference “Philosophy in St. Petersburg,” Aleksandr Rybas confirmed that the 
majority of philosophers present preferred “Russian [russkii] philosophy” to “philosophy in 
Russia.”
   
74  In fact, all of the most well-known histories in the past seventeen years reflect the 
continuing dominance of russkii by including the word in their titles.  A few of these histories, 
which will be discussed in detailed in chapter three, are: Mikhail Gromov and N. S. Kozlov’s 
Russian Philosophical Thought X-XVII C. (1990), Vasilii Vanchugov’s Sketch of the History of 
“Originally Russian” Philosophy (1994), A. I. Novikov’s History of Russian Philosophy (1998), 
P. A. Sapronov’s Russian Philosophy. An Attempt at a Typological Characterization (2000), 
Aleksandr Zamaleev’s Lectures on the History of Russian Philosophy XI-XX C. (2001), Igor' 
Evlampiev’s History of Russian Philosophy: A Textbook for Higher Education (2002), Aleksandr 
Zamaleev’s Chronicle of Russian Philosophy: 862-2002 (2003), Leonid Stolovich’s History of 
Russian Philosophy (2005), B. V. Emel'ianov and K. N. Liubutin’s History of Russian 
Philosophy (2005), and Mikhail Maslin’s (ed.) History of Russian Philosophy (2008).75
                                                 
73 Lektorskii, “O sovremennoi situatsii v rossiiskoi filosofii”; Maiia Soboleva, Rossiiskaia 
postsovetskaia filosofiia: opyt' samoanaliza (Munich: Otto Sagner, 2009). 
74 Rybas, “On Contemporary Russian Philosophy,” Landshaft 1 (2008), 13. 
 
75 The corresponding Russian titles are as follows: Russkaia filosofskaia mysl' X-XVII vekov; 
Ocherk istorii filosofii “Samobytno-russkoi”; Irf; Russkaia filosofiia. Opyt tipologicheskoi 
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It is clear that in present scholarship the russkii/rossiiskii bifurcation, where rossiiskii is 
what slips out of russkii’s hegemonic grasp, continues to dictate the way about which Russian 
philosophical discourse is written and discussed.  Furthermore, there exists an understood and 
unspoken bifurcation among journal editors and academic publishers where advocates of the 
religious narrative and traditionalists use russkii and consider it normative, while other members 
of the philosophical community use rossiiskii in their own work, or, even if they use russkii, at 
least consider rossiiskii a tenable term.  While the religious/secular binary has been periodically 
challenged, most often by Western scholars calling for the deconstruction of the religious 
narrative and its essentializing and discriminatory tendencies, this linguistic division remains, for 
the most part, unexamined and unchallenged.   
One exception worth noting appears in Horujy’s work, where he privileges the title 
“Christian philosophy in Russia” over “Russian [russkii] religious philosophy.”76  The “ethnic 
characterization” of the latter, Horujy writes, “is alien to philosophy as such [and] should not be 
attached even to its present form.”77
                                                                                                                                                             
kharakteristiki; Lektsii po istorii russkoi filosofii XI-XX vv; Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov; 
Letopis' russkoi filosofii: 862-2002; Irf; Irf, and; Irf. 
76 Horujy, “Breaks and Links.  Prospects for Russian Religious Philosophy Today,” in Institute 
of Synergetic Anthropology, http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=1402   
77 Idid.   
  In this rare example we see Horujy, a thinker who, after all, 
calls for the development of the Russian philosophical tradition along Orthodox (specifically, 
hesyachist) lines, making a clear distinction between religious metaphysics and aggressive 
Orthodox Nationalism.  It is a particularly welcome development when such thinkers speak out 
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against the binaries so often utilized by Russian, and, I would add, Western thinkers, in 
discussions about Russian thought: as Horujy notes, these binaries include “Russia versus the 
West, the authentic Russian (samobytnoye) versus the borrowed, and so on.”78  In an equally 
interesting turn, Horujy asserts that it is precisely Orthodoxy that will break down these binaries.  
“Now an analysis should incorporate a new structural level,” he writes.  “Eastern Christian 
discourse comes forth as the third level mediating the opposition of ‘Russia versus the West’ and 
for this reason both the situation and our analysis of it go beyond the plane of binary 
oppositions” [sic].79
In their study Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstandings and Professorial 
Power (1994), rooted in their perceived crisis in the French university system, Pierre Bourdieu 
and Jean-Claude Passeron argue that what makes a linguistic misunderstanding in the academic 
context “so serious is that it goes beyond the superficialities of jargon to the operation of a 
code.”
  
80  Challenging a historically dominant signifier, like the russkii default, is no easy task.  
As Bourdieu and Passerson write: “Academics and students can walk away from the system, but 
at their own cost.  Stay within the system, and their attitudes and behavior will continue to 
express the particular logic of its operations.”81
                                                 
78 Ibid.   
79 Ibid.   
80 Bourdieu and Passeron, Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstandings and Professorial 
Power (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994), 4. 
81 Ibid., 13. 
  To give up the narrative is to give up one’s 
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security within an established system of values, perhaps explaining the often critical stance of the 
Russian philosophical hegemony to the use of rossiiskii in academic writing and speech.82
                                                 
82 In some ways this can be compared to the movement toward gender neutral language in 
American academia beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present.  Before this period, 
hypothetical situations in academic writing were almost all unquestioningly constructed around 
the preposition “he” (i.e., “The individual concept of each person contains once and for all 
everything that will ever happen to him …”), as opposed to “she” (i.e., “The individual concept 
of each person contains once and for all everything that will ever happen to her”).  And while 
academic writing has often tried to use as much as possible the asexual “one” in order to avoid 
an explicitly masculine gender identification, the influence of the Third Wave of feminism has 
led, in many circles of philosophy, to “she” being considered the new default academic pronoun.  
In a 2008 issue of the prominent analytically inclined philosophical journal Noûs (Vol. 42, Feb.), 
for instance, all six of the articles (all male authors) choose feminine personal pronouns and 
examples more often than male ones.  In only half of the articles did the pronoun “he” appear 
(not counting references to male authors).  While this is a dramatic shift, however, the distinction 
between two similar adjectives—russkii and rossiiskii—surpasses the realms of political 
correctness and gender equality that are at the center of the “he/she” debate.  For neither pronoun 
is colored with national, imperial, religious, and even ethnic implications, as russkii and 
rossiiskii are.        
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2.3 A WESTERN PARALLEL: RUSSIA IN THE ANALYTIC CONTEXT 
Traditionally, the analytic and Continental traditions have been treated as two irreconcilable 
sides of the same problem.  As Babette Babich has formulated it, it as if each side of the debate 
represented a fundamentally different answer to the ever-present question “What is 
philosophy?”83  The moment of rupture between these two trends is typically traced to the 
immediate post-Kantian period, during which it is possible to observe the development of two 
different approaches to philosophy—one gravitating toward figures like Hegel and Heidegger, 
and the other toward Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.  The latter, now termed analytic 
philosophy, is often argued to have been, until very recently, a “pre-Kantian” sub-discipline of 
philosophy, having arisen as a reaction to the absolute idealism of British philosophers like F.H. 
Bradley and T.H. Greene.  Both Russell and G. E. Moore began their careers at Cambridge, 
known for its “Cambridge idealism,” but broke from British idealism and moved toward logic, 
specifically toward Frege, believing that an excessive idealism had become so engrained in 
contemporary philosophical practices that even the study of Kant had been tainted and must be 
quarantined and abandoned.84
                                                 
83 Babich, “On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, 
Heidegger’s Speaking Language, and Philosophy,” in A House Divided.  Comparing Analytic 
and Continental Philosophy, ed. C. G. Prado (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), 63. 
84 On “Cambridge idealism” see: C. J. Dewey, “‘Cambridge Idealism’: Utilitarian Revisionists in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Cambridge,” The Historical Journal XVII.I (1974), 63-78. 
  These thinkers became known for their return to a pre-Kantian 
period, aligning themselves instead with David Hume: for instance Frege, whose Basic Laws of 
Arithmetic [Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1893, 1903] is in some important ways a reply to 
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Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-1740), or Quine, who was rumored to have only 
taught one course in the history of philosophy in his career—on Hume.  In fact, it is often argued 
that it was not until P. F. Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense (1966) that it became thinkable to treat 
Kant in any serious philosophical work (and, soon afterwards, unthinkable not to address Kant).  
Thus, as Wilfrid Sellars, and later, Robert Brandom, have suggested, analytic philosophy can be 
said to have had both a Humean and a Kantian component, both of which persist until the 
present.85
                                                 
85 The analytic tradition clearly holds much of the power in American philosophical 
scholarship—a fact that is apparent in the much debated Blackwell’s Philosophical Gourmet 
Report, which ranks the top fifty Ph.D. programs in Philosophy (as well as the top fifteen in the 
UK, the top five in Canada, and the top five in Australia and Asia) based on “faculty quality and 
reputation” every two years.  See Philosophical Gourmet Report, ed. Brian Leiter. 
http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/.  The list consistently ranks only analytic programs 
highly.  Despite numerous open letters and petitions circulated from within the discipline 
(primarily from Continental scholars) expressing outrage at the rankings, the site remains a 
popular tool for prospective graduate students in Philosophy.  According to an open letter by 
Richard G. Heck, Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, the analytic bias of the list is a 
direct result of editor Brian Leiter’s own “oft-expressed and very intense distaste for much of 
what goes on in certain ‘continental’ departments.”  See: Heck, About PGR. 
http://frege.brown.edu/heck/philosophy/aboutpgr.php.  On the Philosophy Gourmet site, Leiter 
takes a clear stance on this issue: “‘Analytic’ philosophy is now largely coextensional with good 
philosophy and scholarship, regardless of topic or figure. … Only analytic philosophers aspire to 
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While analytic philosophy is said to gravitate toward more technical studies of 
philosophy of language and logic, the Continental tradition is typically said to focus on 
metaphysics, doing so with a more literary (often identified by the analytic tradition as 
“obscure”) style.  Although one can clearly identify methodological and stylistic differences 
between thinkers like Heidegger and Frege, the term “Continental” actually appeared in popular 
use only in the post-WWII era as a way to collect the many strands of so-called non-scientific 
philosophy of Western and Central Europe—existentialism, phenomenology, postmodernism, 
structuralism, and post-structuralism—under one convenient heading.  Nevertheless, as early as 
1945 Bertrand Russell distinguished “two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly 
distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively.”86
Simon Glendinning goes as far as claiming that the term Continental philosophy does not 
denote anything in particular, but is simply a catch-all term, often employed pejoratively by 
analytic philosophers to describe what is left after they have determined what falls under the 
category of “analytic.”  Yet, even if the term did emerge as a post-War post-facto classificatory 
heading, it would be wrong to assert that Continental is still synonymous with that which is not 
analytic.  In America, Continental denotes a very particular type of philosophical education: a 
strong foundation in the history of philosophy and course offerings in contemporary French and 
German philosophy and phenomenology.  In fact, as Randall Collins points out, we would be 
     
                                                                                                                                                             
the level of argumentative sophistication and philosophical depth that marks the great 
philosophers.”  See Leiter, “What the Rankings Mean” and “‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ 
Philosophy,” Philosophical Gourmet.  http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp 
86 Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (NY, 1945), 643.   
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better off to assume that these “two allegedly antithetical traditions are network cousins, full of 
common ancestors two or three generations back.”87  And in fact, the Continental/analytic binary 
is as easily confounded as the Russian religious/secular distinction, not only by the many 
thinkers who converse fluently on both sides of the “chasm,” but in recollecting instances in 
which a thinker clearly aligned with one tradition has acted “out of character.”  By way of 
example we might look to of the dense, technical writing of Edmund Husserl, widely considered 
the starting point of phenomenology proper (a subset of the Continental tradition), or the 
influence of Lev Tolstoi’s The Gospel in Brief [Kratkoe izlozhenie Evangeliia, 1906] on 
Wittgenstein (if not philosophically, than spiritually) during the period in which he was writing 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1918/1921)—a monument of analytic philosophy. 88
                                                 
87 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies.  A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (Cambridge: 
Belknap P, 1998), 753. 
88 I will not discuss such exceptions at length, since they are outside the scope of this 
dissertation, but another such example is Alvin Plantinga, who approaches the philosophy of 
religion from the standpoint of logic.  For a discussion of Plantinga’s work on theology in 
relation to the Continental tradition, see: Nick Trakakis, “Meta-Philosophy of Religion.  The 
Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy of Religion,” Ars Disputandi 7 (2007). 
http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000296/article.pdf 
     
 For studies of the influence of Tolstoi on Wittgenstein, see: Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: 
From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (NY: SUNY P, 1987); Emyr Vaughan Thomas, 
“Wittgenstein and Tolstoy: The Authentic Orientation,” Religious Studies 33 (1997): 363-377; 
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In Russian thought we are hard pressed to make the same clear-cut distinction between an 
analytic and a Continental tradition, although both can be said to exist.  Though it is often taken 
as fact that the so-called Continental tradition barely penetrated Soviet academia in any popular 
way until Merab Mamardashvili, in the contemporary context the term Continental might call to 
mind the flourishing phenomenological schools in both Moscow and St. Petersburg (special 
centers for phenomenological philosophy exist in both cities), as well as the still very real 
influence of Georges Bataille, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, along with other French 
Marxist and post-Marxist thinkers, in the well-known “Sector of Analytical Anthropology” at the 
Moscow Institute of Philosophy and their associated outlets, the publishing house, Ad 
Marginem.  According to Mikhail Epstein, however, the Continental/analytic division is “almost 
irrelevant” in Russia, not because of the absence of Western influence during the Soviet period, 
but because philosophy in Russia “addresses a conception of being that is itself constructed by 
thinking.  Beginning with Chaadaev, and the Westernizers and Slavophiles, Russian philosophy 
focused on the secondary reality, one created by ideas.”89
                                                                                                                                                             
Caleb Thompson, “Wittgenstein and the Meaning of Life,” Philosophical Investigations 20.2 
(2002): 96-116. 
89 Epstein, “Ideas Against Ideocracy: The Platonic Drama of Russian Thought,” in In Marx’s 
Shadow. Knowledge, Intellectuals, and Power in Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. Costica Bradan 
and Serguei A. Oushakine (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2010), 33.  
  In Epstein’s opinion, it seems, 
Russian thought is best compared not to the Western tradition, but to itself: “It may have been 
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‘derivative’  and ‘secondary,’  but not so much in respect to Western thought, as in relation to 
properly Russian, ideologically produced, utterly artificial, fabricated, and fantastic reality.” 90
 Thus, while our initial response might be that that the Continental tradition should align 
with the Russian religious narrative along the lines of conceptual and methodological 
similarities, in fact the former has much in common with the traditional characteristics of 
analytic philosophy.  Not only is religious thought (as is the analytic tradition) often accused of 
its disinterest in meta-analysis and its lack of acceptance for other traditions, but we can place 
the religious narrative and the analytic tradition in dialogue based on indicators of hegemony.  
Like analytic philosophy, the Russian religious tradition has historically been the more 
 
I would argue that the irrelevance of such a classification does not have to do with the 
deficiency of Russian philosophers to overcome internal dilemmas and to relate to their 
international counterparts, as Epstein’s commentary seems to suggest, but more due to a 
difference in self-identification and in the classification and organization of philosophical sub-
disciplines.  While Anglo-American Continental programs offer selections of courses in the 
history of philosophy, postmodernism, feminism, and the philosophy of religion in order to 
appeal to a particular audience and strengthen their status as Continental centers, within Russia 
these sub-disciplines would rarely find common ground with one another.  By this I mean that 
while Russian-language research in phenomenology might remind the Western scholar of the 
English-language study of phenomenology—that is, the same figures, research of the same high 
quality, etc.—in the Russian context the average phenomenologist would balk at the idea of 
having any intellectual relationship to religious philosophy or postmodernism.    
                                                 
90 Ibid., 34. 
 50 
authoritative of the two (minus, of course, the Soviet period) and retains this hegemony to the 
present.91
  Thus, it turns out that the initially peculiar identification of Russian thought with 
analytic philosophy is dictated by the politics of intellectual hegemony.  Such dominating 
forces—what Ivan Kireevskii labeled the “self-propelling knife of reason”
 
92—exist in every 
academic circle, and it is precisely this structure that is the focus of much of Artem'eva’s article 
“Philosophy as Fate: A. T. Bolotov” [“Filosofiia kak sud'ba: A. T. Bolotov,” 2006], where she 
discusses the sometimes arbitrary way in which the philosophical hierarchy—“the list of great 
names”—become canonized, and the difficulty one has in challenging that canon after it has 
become crystallized.93
Having expounded the dominating narratives about Russian philosophical thought in the 
context of the debate between analytic and Continental philosophy, we see that the Russian and 
Western traditions, in this respect (and in others, as I will later propose), are in fact quite 
  
                                                 
91 The monolithic grasp of both the religious (in Russia) and the analytic (in the English-
speaking world) can be argued to be slipping: for example, in Russia we see the emergence of 
Western-trained, secular scholars and, in the West, the appearance of “Continental” 
philosophical personalities such as Slavoj Žižek, who now has had several films made about his 
life and work. 
92 Kireevskii, Kritika i estetika (M: Iskuuskvo, 1979), 251. 
93 Artem'eva, “Filosofiia kak sud'ba: A. T. Bolotov,” Die Welt der Slaven LI (2006): 2. 
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similar.94  This leads to an understanding of philosophy not as nation specific, as many 
representatives of the religious subset of the religious/secular binary would like to claim, but as 
universal and, in its universality, dialectical.  While Glendinning wants to argue that the 
analytic/Continental distinction is in fact a fiction—a “projection of the Anglo-American 
academy onto a Continental Europe”95—I prefer to agree with James Stieb’s claim that the 
divide is not only unavoidable (he notes that today even the sciences are no longer unified) but, 
in many cases, necessary, as “philosophy is dialectical (like political systems).  It needs an 
‘other’ to pit itself against.”96
                                                 
94 One study, W. J,. Gavin and T. J. Blakeley’s Russia and America: A Philosophical 
Comparison (Dordrecht and Boston: Springer, 1976), also puts Russian thought and American 
philosophy in dialogue with one another, drawing comparisons between Petr Chaadaev and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson; Aleksandr Herzen and William James; John Dewey and Nikolai 
Chernyshevskii; etc. 
95 Glendinning, The Idea of Continental Philosophy.  A Philosophical Chronicle (Edinburgh, 
2006), 3. 
96 Stieb, “Philosophy: Reflections on the Analytic/Continental Divide,” Schuylkill 1.2.  
http://www.temple.edu/gradmag/spring98/stieb.htm: 6.   
We can even see divisions within individual academic strains, such as the fact that within 
analytic philosophy there can be said to be a further division over the validity of naturalism, 
aligning thinkers either with the naturalist camp or against it.  For more on this debate see Mario 
De Caro and David Macarthur, eds.  Naturalism in Question (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004). 
  This is why some of the most productive years in Russian 
philosophical production occurred after Chaadaev, after the emergence of rival camps within the 
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discipline—all helping to usher in the period from 1838-1848: what Pavel Annenkov, and later 
Isaiah Berlin, called the “Remarkable Decade” [Zamechatel'noe desiatiletie].  I would augment 
Stieb’s argument, however, with the claim that this dialectical “pitting” is most productive only 
when it is combined with a certain amount of self-reflexivity: such reflection is apparent in the 
multitudes of books and articles in recent years that have appeared on the topic of the 
analytic/Continental divide, but are noticeably absent from the majority of Russian philosophical 
production, a topic I will take up in detail in the following chapters.   
Although binaries often present themselves as convenient organization tools, it is not my 
intention here to work within their borders.  Instead, I address the religious/secular disjunction to 
lay bare the common assumptions about Russian philosophical thought in order to move towards 
demystifying and transgressing them.  The necessity for such a task is supported by the number 
of thinkers in the history of Russian philosophical thought who have confounded the above 
binary (rendering it restrictive and, thus, unproductive), and also by the fact that, despite these 
contradictory moments, the religious/secular question continues to be an often unquestioned 
assumption.   
One such figure who confounds this binary is Vasilii Rozanov, who repeatedly aligned 
himself with the literary tradition by referring to himself frequently as Dostoevskii’s 
Underground Man, but whose loosely connected, often paradoxical, works were often highly 
critical of religion.  Sometimes the paradox exists on the level of the author’s view of his own 
work, such as Dostoevskii, who claimed to avoid mysticism, defining Orthodoxy in A Writer’s 
Diary [Dnevnik pisatelia, 1873-1881] as achieved “not by mystical beliefs but by love of 
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humanity,”97 but who all the while supported Russian ethnic (and, by extension, national) 
superiority through his many mentions of the “Russian idea.”  Another such instance of paradox 
is found in the work of Aleksandr Zinov'ev, whose oeuvre includes both logical tracts and 
philosophical novels (or “sociological novels,” as he has referred to the genre).  Like Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s apostrophe to the reader at the conclusion of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
while binaries may appear helpful tools initially, the reader “eventually recognizes them as 
nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them.  (He must, so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it).”98
                                                 
97 Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelia, in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh, vol. XXIV 
(M: Gos. Izd-vo, 1972-90), 254.   
98 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(London and NY: Humanities P, 1974), Sect. 7. 
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3.0  HOW RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY WROTE AND UNWROTE ITS OWN HISTORY 
One of the broadest statements we could make about contemporary Russian philosophy, were we 
to allow ourselves for a moment the pleasure of such generalizations, might concern the 
difficulty of its characterization.  While the average non-American philosopher has things to say 
about American pragmatism, the non-French about French postmodernism, and the non-German 
about German traditions of philosophical historiography, it is rarer that the non-Russian 
philosopher would care to converse on the topic of Russian thought.99  With the exception of 
small pockets of specialists (most notably in China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United States), as Konstantin Rylev notes, outside Russia, “Russian 
philosophy is received … with a shrug of the shoulders.”100
                                                 
99 Even in the field of Slavic Studies, which is the location of much of the scholarship on Russian 
culture and intellectual life, rarely do we find work on philosophical thought.  Vladimir Krasikov 
discusses the lackluster representation of Russian philosophy on the English-language internet in 
Russian Philosophy Today (2008).  See Krasikov, Russkaia filosofiia today (M: Volodei, 2008), 
234-260. 
   
100 Rylev, “Zamarochki russkoi filosofii.  250 let bezumstvu slavianskoi mysli,” Chastnyi 
korrespondent (6 Aug. 2009), http://www.chaskor.ru/p.php?id=8956.  Rylev then continues by 
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Several reasons are repeatedly given to explain the marginal status of Russian 
philosophy.  The most common of these claim Russia’s turbulent political history as a retarding 
factor in its intellectual development, point to a general unease within leading philosophical 
circles over inducting additional countries into the Western intellectual community, or cite the 
Russian language as a barrier in a predominantly English-driven philosophical market.  While 
there is truth in all of these reasons, I would add one additional explanation that specialists, 
rightfully optimistic about the promise in Russian’s swift, post-Soviet intellectual development, 
are often hesitant to intimate: namely, that Russian thought has only a marginal role in the 
international community in part because Russian philosophers have yet to assert themselves in 
this community in any substantial way.101
                                                                                                                                                             
noting that while Russian literature, art, science, film, and even the ‘Russian character’ are more 
or less well-defined, the nature of Russian philosophy remains a mystery.   
[“В Европе русскую философию воспринимают … с пожиманием плеч.”]  
  Here it should be noted that Harbin, China, the primary destination of anti-Bolshevik, 
Russian émigrés during the pre-revolutionary period, is home to an active center for the study of 
Russian religious philosophy that regularly sends graduate students to Russia.    
  While this does not absolve the intellectual politics of 
101 There are certainly exceptions to this claim, such as Nikolai Berdiaev, whose many books in 
Western languages have been and remain influential; Lev Shestov, who enjoyed popularity 
especially in France in the twentieth century surrounding an elevated interest in existentialism; 
Vladimir Kantor, who was included among the list of twenty-five “great global thinkers” in 2005 
in the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur; and Mikhail Ryklin, who was awarded the Leipzig 
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the West, with its tendencies to canonize and colonize certain names and trends while letting 
others disappear into the folds of history, Russia must first enter into the system before we 
evaluate how that system reacts.  Thus, while the non-French philosopher is bound to have come 
across American philosophy at some point during his academic career, we cannot rightfully 
expect the non-Russian philosopher to have any acquaintance with Russian thought.102  Even if a 
rich tradition of philosophy exists in Russia—one that is perhaps even, as Evert van der Zweerde 
has noted, “part of the European philosophical tradition from the very beginning”103—it slips 
further and further off the philosophical map if no one is reading it.104
If the cards for Russia abroad look grim, when we turn to Russian-language criticism we 
are given the impression that the domestic situation is even worse.  Not only is it impossible to 
speak of a developed study of Russian philosophy outside the borders of Russia, but it is also 
often just as difficult to find a satisfactory characterization of Russian philosophy within 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Book Prize for Mutual Understanding in 2007, and whose work on the Moscow metro has 
enjoyed widespread popularity among Slavists. 
102 That is, to go out of his way to be a specialist in everything: to realize that Orthodox 
philosophy, for example, far from comprises the majority of the philosophical production of 
Russia, let alone know what Orthodox philosophy entails.   
103 Van der Zweerde, “The Place of Russian Philosophy in World Philosophical History.  A 
Perspective,” Diogenes 56.170 (2009): 174. 
104 By “philosophical map” I mean what is accepted as the “philosophical canon,” usually 
corresponding to what is taught in required courses to university students. 
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Russia.105
According to a 2003 article by Aleksandr Ivanov, for instance, there can be no 
philosophy in Russia because contemporary Russian intellectual culture is entirely without 
ideas.
  Philosophy in Russian is incredibly pluralistic—at times almost unmanageably so, as 
we will see in chapters three and four.  Yet a frequent opinion of Russia’s philosophers reflects 
another set of beliefs: that there is no philosophy at home, or that philosophy now exists 
primarily in deficient, imitative, or absurd forms.   
106  In 2009, philologist Igor' Smirnov (University of Konstanz) travelled to Moscow to 
present an augmented version of Ivanov’s thesis: not only is the current Russian intellectual 
climate “idealess,” but its dominating characteristics are deception and hedonism.107  Daniil 
Kotsiubinskii has talked of Russian philosophers’ “deficient intellectual independence”; Dmitrii 
Gal'kovskii of their “complete unfruitfulness.”108
                                                 
105 Here I remind the reader that in speaking of “Russian philosophy” I mean “philosophy in 
Russia” and not the more narrow “Russian philosophy” [russkaia filosofiia], as defined in 
chapter one.  I periodically use the English “Russian philosophy” for the sake of variability. 
106 Ivanov, “Negumanitarnaia epokha,” in Mysliashchaia Rossiia.  Kartografiia sovremennykh 
intellektual'nykh napravlenii, ed. Vitalii Kurrenoi (M: Nasledie Evrazii, 2006), 55. 
107 Smirnov, “Byvaiut li bezydeinye epokhi?” (paper presented at “Intellektual'nti iazyk epokhi: 
istoriia idei, istoriia slov” conference at the Russian State University for the Humanities, 
Moscow, Russia, 16-17 February 2009). 
108 See Kotsiubinskii, Teoreticheskie i metodicheskie voprosy istoricheskoi psikhologii (SPb: 
Limbus P, 1999), 27; Gal'kovskii, Inoe.  Khrestomatiia novogo rossiskogo samosoznaniia, vol. 3 
(M: Agrus, 1995), 23. 
   Although a member of a more conservative 
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generation (he completed a graduate degree in philosophy in 1955), Valentin Tolstykh (Institute 
of Philosophy, Moscow) expressed the same cynicism in his memoirs: “The current era is clearly 
not philosophical.  It is rather, in spirit and tone, more about the commercial market and the 
social scene,” he laments.109  In a review of “the year in philosophy,” publisher Valerii Anashvili 
summed up the situation colorfully and to the point: “the year 2008 did not really demonstrate 
any ‘trends or directions,’ but rather, it revealed a magnificent illustration of a simple fact: in the 
heads of our intellectuals, politicians, and population, only the most wild, impetuous, absurd, far-
from-reality phantasms and perceptions continue to live and thrive.”110
                                                 
109 Valentin Tolstykh, My byli.  Sovetskii chelovek kak on est' (M: Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 2008), 
191. 
[“Время сейчас явно не философское, скорее, тусовочно-рыночное по своему духу и 
тону.”] 
110 Anashvili, “Intellektual'nye itogi 2008 goda.” Interview with Vitalii Kurennoi, Chastnyi 
korrespondent (31 Dec. 2008), http://www.chaskor.ru/p.php?id=2368  
[“2008 год скорее не продемонстрировал какие-то ‘тренды и направления,’ а явил собой 
великолепную иллюстрацию простого факта: в головах наших интеллектуалов, политиков 
и народонаселения продолжают жить и резвиться лишь самые дикие, буйные, несуразные, 
далекие от реальности фантазмы и представления.”] 
  The sheer number and 
ardor of such comments suggests an alarming poverty of philosophy, as if a scan of the 
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“domestic philosophy” stacks in any Russian library would not yield any contemporary additions 
to the collection.111
Yet, turn to the most traditional sub-field of philosophy in Russia, the history of Russian 
philosophy, and we are faced with a paradox.  The self-abnegation of Russian philosophers, 
publishers, and intellectuals in regards to their own discipline stands out against a publication 
boom in the field of the history of Russian philosophy.  Here I speak primarily of textbooks for 
the courses on Russian philosophy taught by their respective authors, all bearing some version of 
the same generic yet totalizing title: History of Russian Philosophy [Irf].
     
112
                                                 
111 It should be noted that such accusations are by no means limited to contemporary Russian 
thought.  In a 2009 review of Vladimir Krasikov’s previously mentioned Russian Philosophy 
Today, Vitalii Kurennoi recalls a similar allegation by the Marquis Astolphe de Custin in 1839: 
“Russia in an empire of catalogs.  If you look over the headings alone everything seems 
wonderful, but beware of looking past the chapter names.  Open a book and you will see that 
there is nothing in it.  True, all the chapters are labeled, but they have yet to be written.”  Qtd. 
Kurennoi, “Soblazn tekhnologii,” Pushkin 1 (2009), 114.    
  Most also include 
112 In the name of manageability, I have made two important distinctions here.  First, I am 
interested solely in the history of Russian philosophy and not the entire study of the history of 
philosophy in Russia.  While I would not disagree that the writing of Russian philosophy is part 
of this larger discipline, substantial work has already been done on the writing of the history of 
philosophy.  See, for instance, Evert van der Zweerde, Soviet Historiography of Philosophy.  
Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) and Vitalii Kurrennoi, “Zametki o 
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some sort of pedagogical subtitle, such as Textbook for Higher Education Institutions [Uchebnik 
dlia VUZov], Course of Lectures [Kurs lektsii], or, on the front cover of one history, 
“Recommended by Teachers at Moscow State University” [“Rekomenduetsia prepodavateliami 
MGU”].113
Certainly the active publication of histories of Russian philosophy is not enough to 
combat the argument that there is no philosophy in Russia today.  If we look past the generic 
titles to the actual content of these histories, however, we see that although most present 
themselves as textbooks or educational supplements (many of which enjoy steady institutional 
funding precisely because of this fact), they are much more interesting than these pedagogical 
designation suggests.  On the one hand, when compared to the tradition of Russian philosophical 
historiography, these histories are highly conservative in matters of content and form: both the 
subject matter (names, trends, movements) and the manner of presentation are predictable in 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
nekotorykh problemakh sovremmenoi otechestvennoi istorii filosofii,” Logos 3-4 (2004), 3-29.  
Moreover, these studies rarely touch the writing of the history of Russian thought.   
The second distinction I have made is that, in order to work with a manageable number of 
texts, I have limited myself only to those books that purport to be histories of Russian 
philosophy.  This thereby excludes the overwhelming number of pedagogical texts found on the 
shelves of university bookstores, many of which focus on exam preparation by advertising 
themselves not just as textbooks, but as study guides, handbooks, definition lists, and even “cheat 
sheets” [shpargalki]. 
113 The book in question is Mikhail Maslin’s Istoriia russkoi filosofii, 2 ed. (M: Gruppa ACT, 
2008).   
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almost every instance.  On the other hand, in their traditionalism they are received as 
anachronistic.  They clash with the changing discipline around them—a discipline that is 
increasingly looking to the contemporary West rather than to the Russian past in the search for a 
new philosophical paradigm.  With such a vast array of histories in play at the present moment 
and with new histories and textbooks continuing to be published in the Russian Federation, it 
appears that the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy is paralyzed in the role of 
historian, when continuously rewriting the history of Russian philosophy is unlikely to earn it a 
place in the international philosophical community.  In this chapter I argue that it is precisely this 
confusion of paradigms—the distinction between the sub-discipline of the History of Russian 
Philosophy [Istoriia russkoi filosofii] and a Western model of philosophical dialogue; the 
distinction between “historian of Russian philosophy” and “Russian [rossiiskii] philosopher”—
that is at the center of the tension surrounding the sub-discipline of the history of Russian 
philosophy, which retains its commitment to a philosophical tradition of the past while inciting 
an impassioned, discipline-abnegating compulsion to speak out against it.   
Although it is not my goal here to retell the history of histories of Russian philosophy, a 
detour is necessary in order to make clear the tradition out of which the contemporary writing of 
the history of Russian philosophy comes.     
3.1 HISTORIOSOPHY AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
When we speak of modern European historiography, it is impossible to agree on a common 
genesis point.  While in Germany the tradition is typically thought to have begun with Leopold 
von Ranke (e.g. History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514 [Geschichte der 
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romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514], 1824), in Denmark it is traceable 
back to Arild Huitfeldt’s non-chronological Chronicle of the Kingdom of Denmark [Danmarks 
riges krønike, 1595-1604].  Evaluations of the French tradition then generally move forward in 
time, either to the Marquis de Condorcet, who wrote his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human Mind [Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain] 
while in hiding from the authorities between 1793 and 1794, or to Jules Michelet, who 
completed his eighteen-volume history of France in 1867. 
By “modern history” I have in mind histories that take a narrative approach to their 
subject matter, be it Huitfeldt’s noticeable sympathies for the aristocratic state and skepticism 
with regards to primary sources, or the emphasis on great politicians and quotations from 
primary sources in Von Ranke.  In other words, modern historiography marks the deliberate 
interpretive retelling and organization of history.  Here we cannot but turn to Hayden White’s 
thesis in Metahistory (1973), where he maintains that writing a history is essentially a poetic act.  
The historiographer takes texts, which make up the “data” of his work, and fashions an aesthetic 
product from them, which he then labels and distributes as “history.”  As White notes, “there can 
be no ‘proper history’ which is not at the same time ‘philosophy of history,’” as to write a history 
is to already have a particular reading of the past in mind.114
While annalistic literature, or the simple recording of history, was present in Rus' as early 
as the Primary Chronicle [Povest' vremennykh let], Vasilii Tatishchev’s five-part interpretive 
Russian History Dating Back to the Most Ancient Times [Istoriia Rossiiskaia s samykh 
   
                                                 
114 White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins UP, 1973), xi. 
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drevneishikh vremen]—presented to the Academy of Sciences in 1739 but the first volume 
published only in 1768-1769—is typically considered the beginning of modern Russian 
historical inquiry.  This continues with historical investigations by Mikhail Lomonosov, Mikhail 
Shcherbatov, and Ivan Boltin, and, several decades later, blooms in the form of Nikolai 
Karamzin’s unfinished poetic epic—his twelve-volume History of the Russian State [Istoriia 
gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, 1818].115
An interest in historiography was slow to take up root in the discipline of philosophy, 
however.  The first history of Russian philosophical thought—Russian Philosophy [Russkaia 
filosofiia]—was published in 1840 by Archimandrite Gavriil, yet it was not until the early 
twentieth century that other texts of the same genre began to appear.
   
116
                                                 
115 For a history of the transition from an annalistic to a modern mode of history writing, see 
Tat'iana Artem'eva, “Ot letopisi k istorii” in Ot slavnogo proshlogo k svetlomu budushchemu.  
Filosofiia istorii i utopia v Rossii epokhi Prosveshcheniia (SPb: Aleteiia, 2005), 12-52.  For a 
summary of the writing of Russian history from Tatishchev to the post-Stalin years, see Anatole 
Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, 2 ed. (Princeton: Greenwood P, 1958).  
In the context of chapter one, it should be noted that Tatishchev and Karamzin use 
rossiiskii, a likely product of their enlightenment-era approach to historiography.  On the first 
page of his history, for instance, Tatishchev directs his reader to Christian Wolff’s treatises on 
physics and moral philosophy to gain a better understanding of the author’s own conception of 
history.  
  Still, from the very 
116 In University Philosophy in Russia [Universitetskaia filosofiia v Rossii, 2003], Vladimir 
Pustarnakov identifies the period between 1819 and 1823 as the first stage in the development of 
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beginning, these histories embraced the identification of Russian philosophy’s “characterizing 
traits” as their primary task.  The goal was to delineate clearly Russian thought from other 
philosophical traditions, albeit (rather surprisingly) rarely with the motive of elevating it above 
all others.  In fact, Boris Iakovenko and Gustav Shpet, following in the footsteps of Petr 
Chaadaev, would instead make a case for Russia’s intellectual inferiority in their Sketches of 
Russian Philosophy [Ocherki russkoi filosofii, 1922] and Sketch of the Development of Russian 
Philosophy [Ocherk razvitiia russkoi filosofii, 1922], respectively.  Given that their approaches 
to form are nearly identical, what distinguishes histories of Russian philosophy from one another 
are the sets of “characterizing traits” that they offer—an objective that leads to a competitive 
dialogue between histories in which they reference, polemicize with, and, sometimes, even 
denounce, one another.     
                                                                                                                                                             
Russian philosophical historiography.  In this period, Russia saw the gradual release of a four-
volume collection of speeches by Moscow University professors from its founding in 1755 to the 
1820s, supplemented with short biographical sketches.  See: Rechi, proiznesennye v 
torzhestvennykh sobraniiakh Imp. Moskovskogo universiteta russkimi professorami onogo s 
kratkim ikh zhizneopisaniiem, 4 vols (M: N.p., 1819-1823).  This project is more accurately 
described as historical documentation rather than historiography, however, as the collection does 
not include any attempt to provide a historical narrative but simply brings historical documents 
together under one heading.  The same could be said about Aleksandr Galich’s earlier two-
volume History of Philosophical Systems [Istoriia filosofskikh system, 1818]—a dictionary of 
philosophical terminology.     
 65 
Archimandrite Gavriil, or Vasilii Voskresenskii, was Professor in the Department of 
Ecclesiastical Law at Kazan' State University from 1835 until 1850.  Russian Philosophy was the 
concluding volume of his six-part History of Philosophy [Istoriia filosofii], written between 1839 
and 1840.  Here Gavriil offers a tripartite model for understanding Russian thought, emphasizing 
Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality [narodnost'] as the three fundamental pillars of Russian 
philosophy—a tradition he traces back to the Christianization of Rus' in 988.117
                                                 
117 Even before Archimandrite Gavriil’s history there is a long tradition of viewing Russian 
thought as something removed from both Western and Eastern practices.  In the first decade of 
the eighteenth century, when G. W. Leibniz began his correspondence with Peter the Great 
regarding the establishment of a Russian Academy of Sciences, it was precisely this 
“otherness”—specifically, Russia as a tabula rasa in matters of the sciences—that drew him to 
the project.  See Leibniz, Leibniz in seinen Beziehungen zu Russland und Peter dem Grossen, 2 
parts, comp. Wladimir Guerrier (Leipzig: N.p., 1873), II 9.   
  While his 
inclusion of theologians and statesmen in the ranks of Russia’s first philosophers would evoke 
suspicion from his predecessors, there is nothing surprising in Gavriil’s methodology.  Seven 
years earlier, in 1833, along with his Minister of Education Sergei Uvarov, Nicholas I had 
adopted a tri-partite policy concerning the structure of the university system in the Russian 
Empire, declaring that the principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality (often called the 
“Uvarov triad”) should govern where public education was concerned.  Even before Nicholas’ 
decree, early glimmerings of the triad are found in Karamzin’s history.  Structurally typical of 
the Enlightenment in its encyclopedic, catalogic leanings, Karamzin’s history reprimands the 
early Slavs for their misguided belief in unfettered freedom, failing to recognize what they would 
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later relish: the advantages of strong rule.  It was precisely this allure of despotism in Karamzin 
that Pushkin mocked in his epigram from 1818:  
  In his History, elegance and simplicity 
  Prove to us without bias 
  The necessity of autocracy  
  And the charms of the whip.118
By the early twentieth century other histories of Russian philosophy began to appear.
 
119
                                                 
118 Pushkin, “Na Karamzina,” in Sobranie sochinenii A. C. Pushkina v 10 Tomakh, vol. I, #37 
(1818), (M: Gos. izd-vo, 1959), http://www.rvb.ru/pushkin/toc.htm  
[“В его «Истории» изящность, простота / Доказывают нам, без всякого пристрастья, / 
Необходимость самовластья / И прелести кнута.”] 
119 It should be noted that in the 1800s Sil'vestr Gogotskii’s Philosophical Lexicon [Filosofskii 
leksikon, 1857] and Philosophical Dictionary [Filosofskii slovar', 1876] were also published in 
Russia. 
  
The earliest of these was Evgenii Bobrov’s three-volume Philosophy in Russia. Materials, 
Research, and Notes [Filosofiia v Rossii. Materialy, issledovaniia i zametki, 1889-1903].  A 
student of Leibniz scholar Gustav Teichmuller at Dorpat University (present-day University of 
Tartu) and, later, professor at Kazan' State University, Bobrov was himself a dedicated 
Leibnizian.  He is often linked with the early university tradition in Russian philosophy, which, 
although neglected in comparison with scholarship on German or American academic 
philosophy, was itself rich with an often psychology-oriented positivism and a substantial neo-
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Kantian tradition.120  Known for his own contribution to the Russian neo-Kantian movement—
the reformulation of the slogan “back to Kant” as “back to Leibniz”—Bobrov’s history, which he 
published in six installments over the course of fourteen years, is equally centered on the 
academic tradition.  Rather than provide classifying traits (and in this way, making a 
methodological choice that we will later see is typical of those histories that focus on academic 
philosophy), Bobrov concluded that it was structured inquiry in the discipline of the history of 
philosophy alone that could provide objective answers in an intellectual climate of controversial 
topics.121
A decade after the release of Bobrov’s third volume, Ernest Radlov published Sketch of 
the History of Russian Philosophy [Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii, 1912], a development of an 
earlier work published in a German-language journal in 1890.
   
122
                                                 
120 On Russian academic philosophy see: Pustarnakov, Universitetskaia filosofiia v Rossii (SPb: 
Izd-vo Russkogo khristianskogo gumanitarnogo in-ta, 2003). 
121 Bobrov, Filosofiia v Rossii.  Materialy, issledovaniia i zametki, 3 vols (Kazan': N.p., 1899-
1903). 
122 Radlow, “Bericht über Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie in Russland,” in Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3 (Berlin: N.p., 1890), 675-92. 
  After studying in St. 
Petersburg, Berlin, and Leipzig, Radlov returned to Russia to become a founding member of the 
Philosophical Society at St. Petersburg University in 1901, a member of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, and, toward the end of his life, director of the St. Petersburg public library (1917-
1924).  He wrote several philosophical textbooks and histories, including History of Philosophy 
[Istoriia filosofii, 1897], Sketch of the History of the Historiography of Philosophy [Ocherk 
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istorii istoriografii filosofii, 1899], Introduction to Philosophy [Vvedenie v filosofiiu, 1912], and 
Philosophical Dictionary [Filosofskii slovar', 1913].123
In his Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy Radlov undertakes a task as 
paradoxical as the above coexistence of critical reflection and speculation.  He sets out to write 
the history of philosophy of a country that, according to him, has produced no original 
philosophy. Here we clearly see the legacy of Chaadaev’s first philosophical letter from 1829, as 
  For Radlov, philosophy was a universal 
knowledge system comprised of sub-disciplines (philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, 
psychology, and sociology), all of which are directed toward the investigation of three primary 
philosophical concepts: truth [istina], existence, and duty [dolzhenstvovanie].  The unpacking of 
these concepts, in which intuition, speculation, and critical reflection were all to play an 
important role, would in turn lead to answers to what Radlov viewed as the three fundamental 
questions of human existence: How does one explain natural phenomena, human perception and 
knowledge, and human action?   
                                                 
123 Radlov also participated in the editing of the collected works of Vladimir Solov'ev (1911-
1914), about whom he wrote several books.  For his editorial work, see Radlov and S. M. 
Solov'ev, eds., Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergieevicha Solov'eva, 3 vols (SPb: 
Prosvieshchenie, 1911-14).  For his original work on Solov'ev, see Radlov, Kharakter 
tvorchestva Vl. Solov'eva (SPb, 1909); Uchenie Vl. Solov'eva o svobode voli (SPb, 1911); 
Gnoseologiia Vl. Solov'eva (M, 1913); and Vladimir Solov'ev.  Zhizn' i uchenie (Spb, 1913).  
Radlov also published a Philosophical Dictionary of Logic, Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, and 
the History of Philosophy [Filosofskii slovar' logiki, psikhologii, etiki, estetiki i istorii filosofii, 
1911 and 1913]. 
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Radlov laments that the Russian people “do not have an original philosophy or a self-sustained 
philosophical system at all.”124  It is impossible to speak of Russian philosophy in the same way 
that one speaks of French, German, or English philosophy, he continues, insofar as a national 
philosophy and national philosophers (“Descartes for the French, Kant for the Germans, Bacon 
for the English”) do not exist in Russia.125
Yet, after first condemning Russian thought as unoriginal, bordering on nonexistent, 
Radlov continues by delineating its two distinguishing characteristics, retracing the same 
paradoxical steps Chaadaev took as his thoughts develop over the course of the eight letters.  The 
   
                                                 
124 Radlov, Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii (SPb: N.p., 1912), 3. 
[“У русских нет вполне оригинальной философии, самостоятельной философской 
системы.”] 
125 Ibid., 4.  Here Radlov’s argument is consistent with Chaadaev’s allegations in his 
Philosophical Letters, where he states that, thus far, Russia has made no significant intellectual 
strides and has contributed nothing substantial to world progress.  Similar accusations can be 
found in the work of Nikolai Berdiaev, who titles one section of his Cloudy Faces: Types of 
Religious Thought in Russia [Mutnye liki: tipy religioznoi mysli v Rossii, 1915-1922] as 
“Apotheosis of Russian Laziness” [“Apofeoz russkoi leni”].  Narratives that emphasize the 
unoriginality and failure of Russian thinkers are prevalent even in contemporary scholarship, 
such as Boris F. Egorov’s more recent book Russian Utopias [Rossiiskie utopii, 2007], in which 
he argues that the defining features of Russian philosophers are faith in utopia, hope in 
providence, and crippling laziness (what Nikolai Dobroliubov coined “Oblomovshchina” in 
1859).   
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first distinguishing characteristic that Radlov cites is a borrowing and simplification of Bobrov: 
the propensity toward the search for truth and the meaning of life.  The second characteristic, 
Radlov continues, is Russian philosophy’s preoccupation with spirituality, mysticism, and 
questions that address the power and necessity of faith.  It is this paradox—the identification of 
distinguishing traits of a philosophy we are told does not exist—that fails to trouble Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk in his 1913 The Spirit of Russia when he praises Radlov for “admit[ting] that 
Russia has not yet produced a thoroughly original and independent system of philosophy” while 
also “refus[ing] to accept the skeptical view that, while philosophy is known in Russia, there is 
no Russian philosophy.”126
In the second edition of Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy (1920), Radlov 
revises his take on Russian philosophy significantly.  The tradition is now characterized, he 
writes, by “a dominating interest in ethical questions—not in theoretical questions, but 
specifically in the application of ethical theories in practice.”  It is also characterized by “a love 
for the objective, in the negation of subjectivity.”
 
127
Matvei Ershov’s The Path of the Development of Philosophy in Russia [Put' razvitiia 
filosofii v Rossii, 1921] combines the university-focus of Bobrov’s Philosophy in Russia with the 
     
                                                 
126 Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia.  Studies in Literature, History, and Philosophy, Eden and 
Cedar Paul, trans. (NY: Macmillian, 1961-7), 199. 
127 Radlov, Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii (SPb, 1912), 4.   
 [“Первая—это преимущественный интерес к этическим вопросам, притом не 
теоретическим, а именно к применению этических теорий на практике ... Вторая ... 
состоит в любви к объективному, в отрицании субъективизма.”] 
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negation of Radlov’s 1912 Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy.  He discusses in detail 
developments in philosophy at Moscow State University (e.g. Pamfil Iurkevich, Matvei Troitskii, 
Nikolai Grot), St. Petersburg University (e.g. Mikhail Vladislavtsev, Aleksandr Vvedenskii, 
Nikolai Losskii), and Kiev University (e.g. Sil'vestr Gogotskii and Aleksei Kozlov).  Although 
Ershov’s approach is optimistic—Russian philosophy will, without a doubt, make its mark—he 
admits that it has so far failed in developing an original domestic tradition: what he views as the 
main requirement of a “national philosophy.”128  Like Bobrov’s methodologically similar 
history, Ershov fails to provide an answer as to what “original” might mean in this case.  He is 
clear, however, that it can occur only in the universities (specifically, in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg)129 and only in a post-1863 Russia—the date of the statute that called an end to over a 
decade of prohibition of philosophy in institutions of higher education (between 1850 and 
1861/63, depending on the university).130
As the century progresses and university philosophy is quickly upstaged by religious 
metaphysics and theological concerns, the delineation of “characterizing traits” becomes an 
irremovable part of philosophical historiography.  Although the insistence of historians on 
offering these personalized schemas is explainable by White’s evaluation of history as a 
 
                                                 
128 Ershov, Put' razvitiia filosofii v Rossii (Vladivostok, 1922), 5.  Ershov’s conception of 
philosophy here is linked to the Russian nation [natsiia], as the development of philosophy in a 
particular country is dependent on the political policy, both foreign and domestic.  See Ershov, 
Puti razvitiia, 66-67. 
129 Ibid., 23.  
130 Ibid., 14. 
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narrative, or poetic, act, his thesis does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the 
exceptionalist, and often messianic, tendencies in these histories.  I would argue that these 
tendencies are profitably viewed in terms of a changing view of the discipline of philosophy 
from something that occurs in the universities and academies to a metaphysically based practice.  
This change is then reflected in a linguistic distinction prevalent in the discussion of Russian 
history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Just as russki and rossiiskii have taken on 
particular etymological and ideological functions, beginning at the turn of the nineteenth century 
and continuing into the twentieth, historiography is often set aside in favor of the Romantic 
borrowing, “historiosophy.”  Moreover, Russian thinkers have taken great care to distinguish and 
elevate historiosophy from the history of philosophy, though the distinction is never truly 
clear.131
In his 1883 essay “Philosophy of History and Historiosophy” [“Filosofiia istorii i 
istoriosofiia”], for instance, historian Nikolai Kareev claims that while the philosophy of history 
is the “philosophical survey of the past fates of humanity,” historiosophy refers to the 
 
                                                 
131 On historiosophy in Russian Rosicrucian thinker Ivan Lopukhin see Andreas Berg, “Ivan 
Lopukhin and the Development of Mystical Historiosophy in Late Eighteenth-Century Russia,” 
The Yearbook of the “Gheorghe Şincai” Institute for Social Sciences and the Humanities of the 
Romanain Academy XI (2008), 44-57.  For a rare contemporary use of the term in reference to a 
non-Russian thinker, see Arthur McCalla, A Romantic Historiosophy: The Philosophy of History 
of Pierre-Simon Ballanche (Boston: Brill, 1998). 
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development of philosophical theories of historical knowledge and the historical process.132  
Here Kareev seems to want to identify the surveying and description of various views (for him a 
somehow purely empirical, and possibly objective, project) as the philosophy of history, whereas 
the actual formation of these positions falls into the category of historiosophy.  In this way the 
historian of philosophy turns his back to the future, becoming the passive observer of the past 
that Walter Benjamin saw in Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus (1920), whereas the historiosopher 
participates actively in the making of intellectual history.133
The ill-defined term “historiosophy” also appears in Nikolai Berdiaev’s assertion that 
“original Russian thought is born as historiosophical thought,” thus elevating historiosophy as 
superior to other historical modes.
  Alongside the many problems with 
this opaque distinction, such a view lies in clear contrast with the dominant Western model that 
places historical investigation precisely within the bounds of the philosophy of history (Hegel, 
Marx, Nietzsche, and even, for that matter, Fukuyama).     
134  According to Georgii Florovskii, historiosophy is any 
speculation on the “fate of Russia,” which he sees most apparently in Chaadaev and, shortly 
after, the Slavophiles.135
                                                 
132 Kareev, “Filosofiia istorii i istoriosofiia” in Russkaia istoriosofiia.  Antologiia, ed. L. I. 
Novikova and I. N. Sizemskaia (M: Rosspen, 2006), 239.     
133 See Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations.  Essays and 
Reflections, ed.  Hannah Arendt (NY: Schocken, 1966), 253-264. 
134 Berdiaev, O russkoi filosofii (Ekaterinburg, 1991), 5. 
135 Florovskii, Puti russkogo bogosloviia (Paris: YMCA, 1982), 247.  
  We encounter the same discriminating use of the term as representative 
of some “innate” quality of Russian thought in Vasilii Zen'kovskii’s History of Russian 
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Philosophy [Irf, 1948-1950], where he explains that Russian thought is “completely 
historiosophical” [“splosh' istoriosofichna”], since “it is constantly addressing the question of the 
meaning of history, the end of history, etc.”136  In recent scholarship, Lev Shaposhnikov and 
Aleksandr Fedorov’s 2006 History of Russian Philosophy [Istoriia russkoi religioznoi filosofii] 
evokes this enigmatic category in a section dedicated to “The Historiosophy of the Slavophiles” 
[“Istoriosophiia slavianofilov”], while Mikhail Maslin’s 2008 History [Irf] notes that, for 
Solov'ev, historiosophy was “an attempt to understand world history as a ‘long line of free 
actions.’”137  In his 1994 “Introduction to the Historiosophy of Russia” [“Vvedenie v 
istoriosofiiu Rossii”], Aleksandr Kazin notes that in Russia the historiosophical question is “a 
question of Russia as a spiritual-historical reality: her past, her present, and her future.”138  In all 
cases, no attempt is made to explain to the reader in what the difference between the philosophy 
of history and historiosophy might consist.139
                                                 
136 Zen'kovskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (L: Ego, 1991), 22.   
[“… больше всего занята темой о человеке, о  его  судьбе и путях,  о  смысле и целях  
истории.”] 
137 Shaposhnikov and Fedorov, Istoriia russkoi religioznoi filosofii (M, 2006); Maslin, ed, 
Istoriia russkoi filosofii (M: Vysshaia shkola, 2008), 344. 
138 Kazin, “Vvedenie v istoriosophiiu Rossii” in Sfinks 1 (1994), 58. 
    
139 Here a productive comparison can be made to Henry Laurie’s history of Scottish philosophy, 
Scottish Philosophy in its National Development (1902).  Although Laurie’s history clearly 
employs a romantic model, in that the author consistently returns to stating his goal of 
“considering the philosophy of Scotland as a national development,” he does so exclusively by 
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In an entry for “istoriosofiia” in Viacheslav Kemerov’s Philosophical Encyclopedia 
[Filosofskaia entsiklopediia, 1998], author E. V. Gutov provides us with a bit more clarity, 
defining the term as “the philosophy of history in the form of an integral [tselostnoe] insight into 
                                                                                                                                                             
drawing Scottish thought into comparison with corresponding international philosophical 
dialogues: for instance, discussing Immanuel Kant as a critical response to David Hume, or 
tracing the influence of Thomas Reid on French spiritual thought.  See Laurie, Scottish 
Philosophy in its National Development (Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1902), 7.   
 However, James McCosh’s The Scottish Philosophy from 1874 does engage in 
identifying explicit “characterizing traits” and, in fact, the first section of the work is entitled 
“Characteristics of the School.”  Here we learn that Scottish philosophy is identifiable by three 
main features: 1) its employment of the method of observation; 2) a view of self-consciousness 
as the instrument of observation; and 3) the idea that, with the help of consciousness, one is able 
to come to know principles prior to and independent of experience (what Reid called “principles 
of common sense”).  See McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (NY: R. Carter, 1874), 2-7.   
 In contemporary histories, however, we no longer find such Romantic inclinations.  For 
instance, Alexander Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy (2009) does not focus on 
providing characterizing traits of Scottish philosophy (except for the assertion that Scotland’s 
rich philosophical tradition testifies to a deep interest in abstract speculation), but instead poses 
the question, “What do we mean by ‘Scottish philosophy?’”  He concludes: “There surely cannot 
be anything Scottish about the question whether our powers of sense perception deliver up truths 
about the world, nor anything Scottish about the answer.  That is surely incontestable.”  See 
Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), 2.  
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the variability and the continuity of concrete historical forms.”140  Here we see the influence of 
F. W. J. Schelling, who, in parting ways with what he saw to be the stifling rationalism of his 
college roommate, G. W. F. Hegel, viewed history not only as the process of the gradual 
unfolding and self-revelation of the absolute.  It also included an intuitive element, engaging the 
human intellect in the urgent task of grasping history’s “One Ideal.”141
For Gutov, the object of history is revealed through historiosophical intuition, or 
knowledge of the three stages in which history is grounded: 1) the beginning of history; 2) the 
end of history; and 3) the space between them, which includes the process of world-creation 
  Under the early influence 
of Fichtean transcendental idealism, this ideal was most attainable through the creativity of the 
arts.  After moving through a period of productivity on absolute identity (which was, for 
Schelling, the condition for consciousness), Schelling would later add religion as another access 
point into the object of history.  What the arts and religion had in common was that they reached 
this “One Ideal” of the world system through intuition [Anschauung], on which was based not 
just the whole of mathematics, but the natural sciences in their most perfect form.  Although 
much of Schelling—particularly the Naturphilosophie—is criticized for being poorly organized 
and underdeveloped (or simply erroneous), it was perhaps this porosity that made his thought so 
attractive to Russian thinkers, finding in it room for interpretation and appropriation.    
                                                 
140 Gutov, “Istoriosofiia,” ed. Kemerov, Filosofskaia entsiklopediia (Panprint, 1998), 
http://terme.ru/dictionary/183/  
[“философии истории, созданная как целостное постижение вариативности и 
преемственности конкретных исторических форм”] 
141 Schelling, Werke, vol. III, ed. M. Schröter (Munich, 1927), 603 and 588. 
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[mirotvorenie] in the form of historical, social cultural, and religious continuity—that is, as 
Gutov elaborates, man’s inclusion in the universal process.  This tripartite division of human 
history will immediately take the reader back to Hegel’s division between traditional society, 
modernity, and a third stage—one that would take the best aspects from the previous two, and 
one that the author’s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807] was, rather 
egotistically, meant to usher in.   
Perhaps an even more fruitful connection could be made to August Cieszkowski’s 
reading of Hegel in Prolegomena to a Historiosophy [Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, 1838].  
Here the three stages include: 1) the primal harmony of antiquity; 2) the alienated reflection of 
the Christian period, marked by a tension between spirit and matter, as between action and 
thought; and 3) the eventual overcoming of duality through the synthesis of opposites.  While 
Cieszkowski’s three-fold division appears almost structurally identical to the Hegelian 
arrangement, it was, as Arthur McCalla notes, a “confrontation of Hegel with the messianism of 
the Polish Romantics.”142  Cieszkowski’s third stage was in fact a post-Hegelian state, in which 
the Hegalian dualism between spirit and particular existence was overcome through a synthesis 
of opposites, making way for a palingenetic immortality.143
                                                 
142 McCalla, A Romantic Historiosophy, 403. 
143 Here we are reminded of Emanuel Swedenborg’s much earlier hints at post-religion in 
Angelic Wisdom About Divine Providence [Sapientia Angelica de Divina Providentia, 1764], 
where confessional differences are leveled by the commonalities between all religions.  
Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom About Divine Providence, trans, William Frederic Wunsch (NY: 
Swedenborg Foundation, 1961), 358 -61.  
  In this final stage, the soul would 
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progressively perfect itself through a series of transfigurations, continuing well past the endpoint 
of history in Hegel’s Phenomenology.  
Indeed, Gutov may have had Cieszkowski in mind when he called attention to the 
specifically Christian form of historiosophical insight, where the individual comes to 
comprehend the “essence” of history—the universal laws and metahistorical meanings 
developing in it.144
In the writing of the history of Russian philosophy, the growing messianic urgency to 
have a historiosophy—a theory of history that is somehow particularly suited to the Russian 
context—escalates in the mid and late twentieth century: this time, not only as an extended 
response to Romanticism, but as a result of the fact that, after the expatriation of the intelligentsia 
in the early 1920s, Orthodox philosophy continued its life abroad in émigré communities of 
exiled religious philosophers.  Georgii Florovskii’s history, The Ways of Russian Theology [Puti 
russkogo bogosloviia, 1937], for instance, not only limits its content to religious philosophy, but 
spends at least half of its focus on what the author calls “the path to catastrophe”—the lead-up to 
the Philosophy Steamer—with section titles like “On the Eve” [“Nakanune”] and “The Russian 
Soul at the Fatal Junction. The Beginning of the Tragedy of Russian Culture” [“Russkaia dusha 
  This happens, he notes, through a synthesis of Judaic messianism and the 
eschatological elements of the New Testament, in particular the Book of Revelation.  For Gutov, 
thus, historiosophy is a higher form of the history of philosophy, in which the individual gains 
insight into the absolute knowledge of history: for Cieszkowski—its post-Hegelian telos; for 
Schelling—its “One Ideal.”  
                                                 
144 See: McCalla, A Romantic Historiosophy, 403. 
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na rokovom perekreste. Zaviazka russkoi tragedii kul'tury”].145  In fact, of the most well known 
of such philosophers, only Pavel Florenskii and Aleksei Losev remained in Russia, and both 
ended up in the camps.146  The writing of the history of philosophy during this period, thus, can 
in some way be seen as an attempt to recreate pre-revolutionary orthodox scholarship within 
Russian diasporas.147
                                                 
145 Florovskii left the Soviet Union before the dispatch of the steamer, moving first to Bulgaria in 
1920, to Prague in 1926, and to New York in 1948.  
146 Losev, who was arrested in 1930 on the charge of “militant idealism,” served three years of a 
ten-year sentence and, nearly blind, was allowed to return to Moscow in 1933 after working to 
complete Stalin’s White Sea Canal; Florenskii, imprisoned for a monograph he had written about 
the theory of relativity, spent several years in the infamous Solovki prison camp before he was 
shot in 1937. 
  As Adbusalam Guseinov and Vladislav Lekstorskii have put it, “it was 
147 It should be noted, however, that Florovskii’s history was received as extreme even within the 
context of émigré Orthodoxy.  Its orientation on an idealized, pre-revolutionary past received 
staunch criticism from other philosophers abroad and in the 1937 article “Orthodoxy and 
Humaneness” [“Ortodoksiia i chelovechnost'”] published in the émigré journal Path [Put'], 
Nikolai Berdiaev, who was known for his own form of religious extremism during the later years 
of his life, condemned Florovskii’s history, suggesting that it would have been better titled the 
Waylessness of Russian Theology [Besputstvo russkogo bogosloviia].  Angry about the way he 
was portrayed in the book, Berdiaev accuses its author of being a “Romantic Byzantinist” and 
not a “Russian Christian:” “Florovskii describes Fr. S. Bulgakov and me up until the year 1917, 
but our most important books, those defining our world-view, were written after 1917.  This is 
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effectively Russian philosophy itself which was in exile: it survived in the countries of Europe, 
but as a fragment of the old Russia, as a pale manifestation of its arrested dreams.”148
Following Florovskii’s history, between 1948 and 1950 in Paris Vasilii Zen'kovskii 
published History of Russian Philosophy [Irf].  “If it is necessary to give some sort of general 
characteristics of Russian philosophy,” Zen'kovskii begins, as though any proper 
historiographical project requires such a characterization, “then in the first place I would have to 
propose the anthropocentrism of Russian philosophical pursuits.  Russian philosophy … is above 
all concerned with the theme of man, of his fate and paths, of the meaning and goals of 
history.”
  
149
                                                                                                                                                             
not right.”  Berdiaev, “Ortodoksiia i chelovechnost',” Put' 53 (April-July 1937), 
http://www.krotov.info/library/02_b/berdyaev/1937_434.html  
[“О. Г. Флоровский характеризует о. С. Булгакова и меня до 17 года, в то время как 
главные наши книги, определяющие наше миросозерцание, написаны после 17 года.  Это 
неправильно.”] 
148 Guseinov and Lektorskii, “Philosophy in Russia: History and Present State,” Diogenes 56.3 
(2009), 6. 
149 Zen'kovskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, 21.  
[“Если уже нужно давать какие-либо общие характеристики русской философии, … то я 
бы на первый план выдвинул антропоцентризм русских философских исканий.  Русская 
философия … больше всего занята темой о человеке, о его судьбе и путях, о смысле и 
целях истории.”] 
  Here Zen'kovskii emphasizes the “profound and essential” role of religion,” yet he is 
careful not to subsume the majority of Russian thought under the category of theology—a 
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reservation that may account for the popularity of his text and its perceived objectivity among 
many contemporary historians, religious and secular alike.    
A year later, History of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 1951] was published by Nikolai Losskii, 
whose death in 1965, along with the death of Fedor Stepun in the same year, is typically 
considered to mark the end of the period of Russian émigré philosophy.  Like Radlov and 
Florovskii, Losskii defines the nature of Russian thought as anti-theoretical and religion-
oriented: “Russian philosophers believe in intellectual intuition, in moral and aesthetic 
experiences, which reveal the highest values to us; but above all they believe in the mystical 
religious experience, which establishes a connection between man and god and his kingdom.”150  
Although he dedicates a substantial part of the chapter “Epistemology, Logic, and Metaphysics 
on the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century” to the importance of epistemological questions to 
Russian thinkers (particularly “intuitivism in epistemology,” or what he calls “epistemological 
realism”), his history quickly lapses into a predictable survey of the principal thinkers and ideas 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with over sixty pages on Vladimir Solov'ev 
alone.151
                                                 
150 Losskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (M: Progress, 1994), 472.  
[“Русские философы доверяют интеллектуальной интуиции, нравственному и 
эстетическому опытам, раскрывающим нам высочайшие ценности, но прежде всего они 
доверяют мистическому религиозному опыту, который устанавливает связь человека с 
богом и его царством”] 
151 Losskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, 90-146. 
  Perhaps the most interesting moment of Losskii’s text appears in the penultimate 
chapter, dedicated to “recent developments in Russian philosophy,” which also unfortunately 
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includes a nepotistic nod to himself and his son, with individual sections entitled “N. Losskii” 
and “V. Losskii.”   
The streamlining of philosophy during the Soviet era, whether in the form of early purges 
or varying restrictions on publishing, in many ways carved out an attractive niche for the study 
of the history of philosophy.  As Van der Zweerde notes, historiography developed as “a semi-
autonomous discipline in combination with the—in the last resort political—requirement to stay, 
at least formally, within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.”152
For instance, the multi-authored From the History of Russian Philosophy [Iz istorii 
russkoi filosofii, 1952] begins by denouncing the histories of Iakovenko, Shpet, and Radlov as 
fallacious works by “the most cynical idealist-reactionary White-émigré pseudo-historians” for 
engaging in the “mockery of the philosophical thought of the Russian people.”
  In other words, the 
history of philosophy was an almost ideologically neutralized sphere in which philosophers 
could quietly carry out their research without the anticipation of much trouble from the 
authorities.  The same could not be said for the sub-field of the history of Russian philosophy, 
however, which, when separated from its ideologically problematic components (i.e. mysticism, 
religious philosophy, idealism), left little for the researcher to study.  It is not surprising, thus, 
that the few histories of Russian philosophy in the Soviet Union took the form of criticism of 
these very elements. 
153
                                                 
152 Van der Zweerde, “Recent Developments in Soviet Historiography of Philosophy,” Studies in 
Soviet Thought 39-1 (Feb. 1990), 39.  
153 M. T. Iovchuk, “Ob istoricheskikh osobennostiakh i osnovnykh etapakh razvitiia russkoi 
filosofii” in Iz istorii russkoi filosofii, Ed. P. Pavelkin (M: AN SSSR,1952), 3.   
  In the first 
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chapter, Mikhail Iovchik (founder and former chairman of the Department of the History of 
Russian Philosophy at Moscow State University under the auspices of which this history was 
written) assures the reader that in the place of religious thought, Marxist-Leninism has allowed 
the realization of the previously impossible: that is, the scientific study of the particularities of 
the development of Russian philosophy (and the philosophies of all nations, for that matter).  The 
identifying characteristic of Russian thought, he continues, is its fusion of progressive 
materialistic tendencies with democratic thinking as it seeks to answer the burning question of 
philosophy: Did God create the world, or does material exist independently and eternally?  The 
impatient reader is in luck; the answer is given before the question is posed.154
We find a less dogmatic appraisal in Anatolii Galaktionov and Petr Nikandrov’s History 
of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 1961], which appeared in two later versions: the second in 1970 as 
History of Russian Philosophy XI-XIX c. [Isf XI-XIX vekov], and the third in 1989 as History of 
Russian Philosophy IX-XX c. [Isf IX-XX vekov]. 
 
155
                                                                                                                                                             
[“издевательство над философской мыслью русского народа”] 
154 No less biting in its criticism is Valerii Kuvakin’s Religious Philosophy in Russia 
[Religioznaia filosofiia v Rossii, 1980], which studies Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and others as 
examples of an anti-intellectual bourgeois philosophy.  See Kuvakin, Religioznaia filosofiia v 
Rossii (M: Mysl', 1980). 
155 In the 1961 version the volume declares its task to be the illumination of philosophical trends 
“in correspondence with Lenin’s instructions” [“v sootvetstvii s ukazaniiami V. I. Lenina”].  This 
preface is removed from both subsequent editions.  Galaktionov and Nikandrov, Istoriia russkoi 
filosofii (M: Izd-vo sotsial'no-ekon. lit-ry, 1961), 3.  
  Both members of the Department of the 
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History of Philosophy at the then Leningrad State University, Galaktionov and Nikandrov begin 
their study of “original Russian philosophy” in the mid-nineteenth century, spending a 
considerable amount of time on Maksim Antonovich, Mikhail Bakunin, Vissarion Belinskii, 
Nikolai Dobroliubov, Aleksandr Herzen, and Dmitrii Pisarev.  By the 1860s Russian thought was 
so influential, the history confirms, that it had an influence not only on its brother Slavic peoples, 
but on the more progressive countries of Western Europe.156  While naturally spending a great 
deal of time on the tension between idealism and materialism, the history ironically spares the 
reader the totalitarianism of “characterizing traits,” providing instead a welcome summary of 
thinkers (e.g. Konstantin Kavelin, Nikolai Speshnev, and Maksim Kovalevskii) that are rarely 
mentioned in religious or university-focused histories alike.  The same is the case for the five 
volume, multi-author History of Philosophy in the USSR [Istoriia filosofii v SSSR, 1968-1988], 
which instead highlights “tendencies” [tendentsii] in Russian philosophical thought, such as 
“god-searching” and “confrontations with rationalism,” rather than characterizing traits.157
We find a similar situation in Georgii Plekhanov’s three-volume History of Russian 
Social Thought [Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, 1914-1925].  Although Plekhanov opens 
by stating that the entirely of his work comes from the point of view of Marx’s famous formula 
“being determines consciousness,”
   
158
                                                 
156 Galaktionov and Nikandrov, Russkaia filosofiia XI-IX vekov (L, 1970), 17-18. 
157 V. E. Evgrafov, Istoriia filosofii v SSSR, v. 4 (M: Nauka, 1971), 24. 
158 Plekhanov, Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, ed. D. Riazanov (M: Gos. Izd-vo, 1925), 
1. 
 he avoids essentializing Russian philosophy, actually 
referring to Belinskii as a fanatic for his claim in “A View of Russian Literature from 1864” 
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[“Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1846 goda”] that “one of the greatest, most intelligent successes 
of our time is that we finally understood that Russia had her own history, one that does not 
resemble the histories of any of the European states.”159
                                                 
159 Plekhanov, Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, 9. 
    
In looking back over the writing of the history of Russian philosophy, the reader will be 
immediately struck by the relentless insistence on essentialization with regards to classification.  
While classification is an unavoidable aspect of scholarship, here the answer to the question 
“What is Russian philosophy?” can be summed up in the delineation of sets of intrinsic 
properties or “characterizing traits” in the Introduction (or, in the case of Losskii’s history, the 
Conclusion), which the remainder of the text then serves to prove.  These characteristics, in turn, 
are highly correlative to the structure of the intellectual hegemony of the day.  In Archimandrite 
Gavriil’s history, this classificatory tendency took the form of an essentializing “national” 
narrative that offered a view of philosophy as intimately connected with a concept of Russian 
Orthodoxy, autocracy and, nationality.  In Russian histories from the beginning of the twentieth 
century until 1922, and then continuing in émigré communities abroad until 1965, this same 
classifying tendency is apparent in philosophy’s movement to an almost exclusive Orthodox 
focus, as well as an increase in messianism and “historosophical” approaches.  At home, 
histories from this same period responded to the further compaction of the discipline according 
to the current official narrative, where the representation of Russian philosophy (for instance, on 
the pages of the many editions of the philosophical encyclopedias and dictionaries) depended on 
the edition, as each re-print reflected the state’s stance on philosophy at a given time.   
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3.2 CONTEMPORARY HISTORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS AND 
ARGUING OVER PHILOSOPHY 
When we turn to contemporary histories of Russian philosophy we see that, in regards to content, 
they do not differ substantially from their predecessors.  There is still a frequent focus on the 
religious tradition (e.g. Serbinenko, Shaposhnikov, Zamaleev), with few either substantially 
(Maslin) or exclusively (Pustarnakov) addressing university philosophy.  What sets the 
contemporary writing of the history of Russian philosophy apart from the earlier tradition, 
however, is the sheer volume of histories published.  This trend begins in the nineties, with 
Mikhail Gromov and N. S. Kozlov’s Russian Philosophical Thought X-XVII c. [Russkaia 
filosofskaia mysl' X-XVII vekov, 1990], Vasilii Vanchugov’s Sketch of the History of “Original 
Russian” Philosophy [Ocherk istorii filosofii “Samobytno-russkoi”, 1994], Sergei Levitskii’s 
Sketches on the History of Russian Philosophy [Ocherki po istorii russkoi filosofii, 1996], and 
Avraam Novikov’s History of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 1998].160
                                                 
[Один их величайших умственных успехов нашего времени в том состоит, что мы, 
наконец, поняли, что у России была своя история, нисколько не похожая на историю ни 
одного европейского государства.] 
 
160 Here we should also note Andrei Sukhov’s tediously titled Russian philosophy.  Path of 
Development.  Sketches of Theoretical History [Russkaia filosofiia.  Put' razvitiia.  Ocherki 
teoreticheskoi istorii], which appeared in 1989.  Sukhov was the head of the sub-department for 
the history of Russian philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences (Moscow) 
between 1982-1992 and was influential in policy making.  Another interesting text by Sukhov, 
though not structured as a history, is his Russian Philosophy. Particularities, Traditions, 
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By the early twenty-first century we see the publication of these histories develop into an 
outright historical boom with several histories released each year, the most well-known of which 
are Petr Sapronov’s Russian Philosophy. An Attempt at a Typological Characterization 
[Russkaia filosofiia. Opyt tipologicheskoi kharakteristiki, 2000]; Aleksandr Zamaleev’s Lectures 
on the History of Russian Philosophy XI-XX C. [Lektsii po irf XI-XX, 2001]; P. V. Kalitan and A. 
P. Kozyrev’s Russian Philosophy: Diversity in Unity [Russkaia filosofiia: Mnogoobrazie v 
edinstve, 2001]; Petr Apryshko’s History of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 2001]; Igor' Evlampiev’s 
History of Russian Philosophy [Irf, 2002]; Zamaleev’s Chronicle of Russian Philosophy: 862-
2002 [Letopis' russkoi filosofii: 862-2002, 2003]; Leonid Stolovich’s History of Russian 
Philosophy [Irf, 2005]; Boris Emel'ianov and Konstantin Liubutin’s History of Russian 
Philosophy [Irf, 2005]; Lev Shaposhnikov and Aleksandr Fedorov’s History of Russian Religious 
Philosophy [Istoriia russkoi religioznoi filosofii, 2006], and Mikhail Maslin’s History of Russian 
Philosophy [Irf, 2008], although this list is far from exhaustive.   
While it could be argued that in the past twenty years literature and cinema have lived 
through their respective historical crises and moved on to other topics of investigation (e.g. 
ethics, contemporaneity, imperial anxiety), the legacy inherited from perestroika—the idea that 
everyone has the right to his own history and to publish this history—remains an increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Historical Fates [Russkaia filosofiia. osobennosti, traditsii, istoricheskie sud'by, 1995].  Here 
Sukhov vacillates between essentializing Russian philosophy and situating the tradition critically 
in the history of philosophy.  That is, he makes comments about the “uniqueness” of Russian 
thought while also labeling some phenomena as products of a shared Western philosophical 
approach.  See: Sukhov, Russkaia filosofiia (M: IF RAN, 1995).  
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relevant guiding principle in the discipline of philosophy.  We can, thus, speak of an almost 
hyper-developed tradition of philosophical historiography.  And while we cannot deny the solid 
scholarship of many of these texts, after twenty years of publishing such histories they are rarely 
able to offer anything new, solidifying their role as the frequent object of scrutiny in the 
mainstream Russian academic community.  
Furthermore, not surprisingly the majority of these contemporary studies are still engaged 
in the pigeonholing of Russian thought according to essentialized characterizing traits.  Take, for 
instance, Shaposhnikov and Fedorov’s 2006 History of Russian Religious Philosophy.  Although 
more developed and self-reflexive than many histories from the twentieth century, the authors 
still present their characterizing traits in the work’s Introduction.  These are: 1) diffusion, relating 
specifically to the wide array of philosophical ideas at play at any time; 2) ontologism, referring 
to the ontologization of truth as apparent in the hesychist tradition; 3) aestheticism; and 4) 
sobornost', or “unity in the many.”  While these four traits are perhaps a helpful summary of 
important trends in Russian philosophical thought, Shaposhnikov and Fedorov go on to flex their 
historiosophical muscles in their condemnation of earlier histories by Shpet and Iakovenko, 
noting that both philosophers could not have possibly properly understand the role of “original 
Russian thought,” given their own European-centric bias.161
Evlampiev’s 2002 History of Russian Philosophy continues down this path, though taking 
an unexpected approach.  The author argues that one of the pivotal characteristics of Russian 
philosophy is its “intuitive relationship to the world,” expressed best through artistic, non-
       
                                                 
161 Shaposnikov and Fedorov, Istoriia russkoi religioznoi filosofii, 3. 
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academic, and emotional stylization.162  By itself, this thesis is not novel.  Evlampiev’s argument 
conforms to the literary-mysticism attributed to the religious narrative, and here the use of the 
word “intuition” reminds us not of Kant, but of the above discussion of historiosophy.  Yet, 
although his nearly 600-page history includes all the expected names, it begins with nineteen 
pages on the medieval “prehistory” of Russian thought (of which six are dedicated to 
iconography), devotes 166 pages to the nineteenth century, 353 to the twentieth century, and 
ends with fifteen pages on Soviet philosophy: five on Marxism and Leninism in the Soviet 
Union; ten on Mikhail Bakhtin and Merab Mamardashvili.  Evlampiev concludes by identifying 
Andrei Rublev, Fedor Dostoevskii, and Andrei Tarkovskii as Russia’s most important 
philosophical minds—the exemplifying trio of the “path” of the Russian philosophical 
tradition.163
                                                 
162 Evlampiev, Istoriia russkoi filsofii: Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov (SPb, 2002), 5. 
163 Ibid., 576. 
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Figure 1. Approximate distribution of pages by time period.164
In this regard, Evlampiev’s history is unlike the others, which spend a substantially larger 
number of pages on the nineteenth century than the twentieth.  Were we to remove Evlampiev’s 
history from the above graph (he spends thirty-eight pages on Lev Karsavin, forty-two on Semen 
Frank, and thirty on Ivan Il'in), the twentieth century would be substantially less represented than 
the nineteenth.
 
165
                                                 
164 Although each history has a different number of total pages, the use of a stacked-column 
graph resolves this discrepancy.  
165 For comparison’s sake, Evlampiev spends only ten pages on Shpet.  
  Despite this discrepancy, however, scholarship on these two centuries greatly 
outweighs that on the pre-Enlightenment period, which is treated as a pre-history to Russian 
philosophical thought, and also on the eighteenth century, which is typically only discussed 
superficially.  As Mihkail Gromov noted, an entry for “Enlightenment” is even missing from 
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Maslin’s Russian Philosophy: An Encyclopedia [Russkaia filosofiia: Entsiklopediia, 2007].166
The one exception to this is Maslin’s 2008 History of Russian Philosophy.  Favoring the 
secular and academic traditions over the religious, Maslin’s study spends sixteen more pages on 
the Westernizers than on the Slavophiles—a difference that comprises more pages than are 
devoted to Solov'ev in the entire history.  Maslin’s History also includes developed chapters on 
the Russian academic structure, Soviet materialism, cosmology, philosophy of science, and 
discussions of late-Soviet philosophy of methodology and cognition (e.g. Bonifatii Kedrov, 
Pavel Kopin, and Merab Mamardashvili).  A total of sixty-three pages are devoted to secular 
philosophy during the Soviet period (thirty-seven to Marxist-Leninism; twenty-six to non-
Marxist, non-religious Soviet thought), while an unprecedentedly high number of five pages is 
dedicated to the post-Soviet era.  Unfortunately, this final section, “Philosophical Research in the 
Post-Soviet Period,” is as vague as its title.  Maslin speaks mainly of the post-1991 crisis of 
values and “search for elements of a new worldview,”
  
However, no period is as neglected as the contemporary, which is almost always passed over in 
silence.    
167
                                                 
166 Gromov, “Obsuzhdenie knigi ‘Russkaia filosofiia: entsiklopediia,’” Voprosy filosofii 9 
(2008), 25.  
167 Maslin, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, 613. 
 though he does not say much about the 
actual academic work being done in the present.  The exception is a brief overview of Aleksandr 
Zinov'ev’s political writings and the identification of a few post-Soviet trends, such as the 
“philosophy of international relations” and new developments in logic, the details of which are 
left to the reader’s imagination.   
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Moreover, looking over contemporary histories of Russian philosophy, we also cannot 
help but notice the profoundly flexible concept of philosophy at play, where the title 
“philosopher” includes theologians, writers, and other cultural figures that would never find their 
way into the Anglo-American canon, and rarely even into the Continental one.  In Zamaleev’s 
2001 History, for instance, we learn that the Russian philosophical tradition stretches as far back 
as the eleventh-century, to Vladimir Monomakh.  Similarly, in one of the earliest of the 
contemporary histories, Gromov and Kozlov’s Russian Philosophical Thought from 1990, the 
authors trace the history of philosophy back to the Primary Chronicle [Povest' vremennykh let] 
entry for 6494 (986) often referred to as “The Philosopher’s Speech” [“Rech' filosofa”], calling it 
Russia’s own version of a Socratic dialogue.168
While it cannot be denied that religious metaphysics make up a large part of the Russian 
philosophical tradition, more often than not, anomalies in the philosophical canon often 
correspond to a conflation between religious metaphysics and theology.  In Viktor Il'in’s history 
from 1997, philosophy has its roots in Byzantine thinkers like fourth century bishop Vasilii the 
Great (Kesariiskii) and, three hundred years later, John of Damascus.  Viacheslav Serbinenko’s 
  In Maslin’s Russian Philosophy: An 
Encyclopedia, Russia’s philosophers include a list of names—Aleksandr Blok, Catherine II, 
Denis Fonvizin, Nikolai Gogol', Kazimir Malevich, Sergei Uvarov—that would make a 
mainstream Slavist feel like an expert in the domain of Russian philosophical thought.   
                                                 
168 Gromov and Kozlov, Russkaia filosofskaia mysl' X-XVII vekov (M: Izd-vo Moskovskogo un-
ta, 1990), 44-7. 
 The entry for 6494 (986) begins on line 84:17, the philosopher’s first appearance is at 
line 86:8, and the philosopher’s speech begins at 87:23.  
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history details the development of philosophy from eleventh century Kiev-Pechersk monk 
Feodosiia of Pechersk to Aleksei Losev.  Most histories include the Greek born, Italian educated 
Mount Athos monk Maximus the Greek (Michael Trivolis) among the ranks of Russia’s great 
early philosophers.  As Edward Swiderski speculates, it would be illuminating to see the reaction 
of an outsider, unaware of the specificities of Russian culture and philosophy, to “how explicitly 
philosophical schemes are set alongside overtly theological frames of reference.”169
One such debate concerns the work of Aleksandr Zamaleev, head of the sub-department 
of the History of Russian Philosophy at St. Petersburg State University, and his philosophy 
textbook Lectures on the History of Russian Philosophy from the 11th to the 20th century.  This 
textbook was the subject of a controversial newspaper article in 2000 by St. Petersburg 
   
In fact, with the exception of their shared treatment of the three most discussed 
thinkers—Solov'ev, Bulgakov, and Berdiaev—it seems that on all other fronts, philosophers 
cannot agree on what the title “Russian philosophy” signifies, when it began, or what thinkers 
are to be included among its ranks.  The positive result of this is that the influx of differing 
opinions has led to the development of a wide array of interpretational schools apart from the 
universalizing tendencies of a single hegemonic narrative.  The negative result is that not only 
has the post-Soviet influx of historical narratives on many levels attenuated respect for the sub-
discipline of the history of Russian philosophy, but the publication and distribution of many of 
these histories are surrounded by hegemonic struggles and bitter polemics—squabbles that 
emphasize the vacuum-like nature of this facet of post-Soviet philosophical production.   
                                                 
169 Swiderski, “Culture, Contexts, and Directions in Russian Post-Soviet Philosophy,” Studies in 
East European Thought 50.4 (Dec. 1998), 285. 
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philosopher Pavel Kuznetsov, where Zamaleev is accused of presenting a false history in his 
book and, ultimately, of being a phony scholar.  At one point Kuznetsov indirectly suggests 
through a clever use of paralipsis that Zamaleev is a “fossilized Soviet dinosaur” [“iskopaemyi 
sovetskii dinozavr”],170 and here the reader is reminded of 1950s-era issues of Questions of 
Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii], where it became common for authors to refer to their colleagues 
with zoological metaphors, some of the most popular being “mole,” “ostrich,” and, of course, 
“goat.”171
Then, in 2001, Zamaleev published his own monograph entitled New Research on 
Russian Philosophy [Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii], which is dedicated to criticizing 
his colleagues for their recent histories of Russian philosophy, as well as for misquoting his work 
in their own (here we remember Berdiaev’s quarrel with Florovskii over the misrepresentation of 
his own work).  By way of criticism of Evlampiev’s history—a revised version of his doctoral 
dissertation, for which Zamaleev acted as a committee member—Zamaleev published his formal 
comments from the defense.  “There is absolutely no room [in Evlampiev’s work] for 
Christianity,” Zamaleev notes.
  In his article, Kuznetsov also plays a game where he opens to random pages of 
Zamaleev’s History in order to find what he deems the most ridiculous statement on the page. 
172
                                                 
170 Kuznetsov, “Filosofiia v Rossii…,” Knizhnoe obozrenie “Ex libris NG” (15.06.2000), 3. 
171 For more on this see Aleksandr Sekatskii, “Opyt tekstologicheskogo analiza sovetskoi 
filosofskoi literatury 50-x godov,” Sfinks 1 (1994): 7-41. 
172 Zamaleev, Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii (SPb: Letnii sad, 2001), 19.  
[“совершенно не нашлось место для христианства”] 
  And had Evlampiev read Berdiaev more carefully, he 
continues, he would have known “that Dostoevskii, as a metaphysical thinker, was formed in the 
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womb of Christianity and not Gnosticism.”173  The work takes a tone similar to that of 
Kuznetsov’s article, and Zamaleev begins his monograph with an address to the reader that 
seems to sum up the state of post-Soviet philosophy particularly well: “Have you noticed,” 
Zamaleev asks, addressing the reader, “how much misunderstanding and discord has arisen in 
the name of love for the history of Russian philosophy?”174
One might expect that such an intellectual scuffle could occur only in St. Petersburg, 
which has gained the reputation of being the more ostentatious and bohemian of Russia’s “two 
capitals.”  It is often taken as fact in Moscow that St. Petersburg thinkers are more provincial, 
more Orthodox, and, thus, try harder to produce something “original” in order to make a mark on 
the academic scene.  Vasilii Vanchugov confirms this stereotype in his study Moscowsophia and 
Petersburgology: the Philosophy of a City [Moskvosofiia and peterburgologiia: filosofiia 
goroda, 1997] where he notes that, in cultural and geographical mythology, Moscow is 
represented as more organic, academic, and—in the end more “Russian—city.”
 
175  In Moscow, 
Aleksandr Ostrovskii wrote, “everything Russian becomes clearer and dearer.”176
                                                 
173 Ibid., 23. 
[“Достоевский как метафизический мыслитель формировался в лоне христианства, а не 
гностицизма”] 
174 Ibid., 6.  
[“Замечали ли Вы, читатель, сколько недоразумений, сколько разногласий возникает на 
почве любви к русской философии”] 
175 Vanchugov, Moskosofiia i Peterburgologiia. Filosofiia goroda (M: Piligrim, 1996), 110-1. 
176 Ostrovskii, O literature i teatre (M: Sovremennik, 1986), 81.  
  While such 
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overarching claims are obviously unproductive, besides being outright fallacious, St. 
Petersburg’s reputation is bolstered by its long legacy of intellectual squabbles beginning in the 
early Academy of Sciences (est. 1724): most notably, Mikhail Lomonosov’s 28 May 1743 arrest 
in correlation with the case against Chancellery Director Schumacher on charges of discourteous 
behavior toward his colleagues at the Academy, interrupting academic conferences with indecent 
pranks, and rowdy drunkenness in the Department of Geography—the same year in which he 
reportedly hit an Academy translator in the face with a candlestick.177  However, not only do the 
histories under discussion here come from Moscow and St. Petersburg in almost equal numbers 
(taking into consideration the greater number of philosophy faculty members in Moscow than St. 
Petersburg), but Moscow too participates in its fair share of “misunderstanding and discord … in 
the name of love for the history of Russian philosophy.”178
The most recent of such disagreements concerns the publication of Maslin’s Russian 
Philosophy: An Encyclopedia.  Together with Russian Philosophy: A Dictionary [Russkaia 
filosofiia: Slovar', 1995], two History of Russian Philosophy textbooks edited by Maslin and 
others from 2001 and 2008, and an electronic library of Russian philosophical thought from the 
eleventh to the eighteenth century (Russian Philosophical Thought XI-XVII c. [Russkaia 
filosofskaia mysl' XI-XVIII, 2007]), this encyclopedia was meant to serve as “an essential 
  
                                                 
177 It was while under arrest for this rowdiness that Lomonosov wrote his famous “Morning” and 
“Evening Reflections upon God’s Grandeur” (“Utrenee” and “Vechernee razmyshlenie o 
bozhiem velichestve”).  For more on scandals in the early Academy see Tatiana Artem'eva, 
“Skandaly v Academia” in Semiotika skandala (M: Evropa, 2008). 
178 Zamaleev, Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii, 6. 
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foundation for systematic professional preparation by specialists in the history of Russian 
philosophy,” both in Russia and abroad.179  Its objective, as expressed by Maslin at a 2008 
roundtable, sponsored by the journal Questions of Philosophy, is commendable: to demonstrate 
that “Russian philosophy is by no means concerned only with its own ethno-cultural reality, but 
with the universal problems of world philosophy.”180
Much of this roundtable, however, was spent on debates over the names present or absent 
in the history, over how many pages were spent on a work by Vasilii Rozanov, and over why 
substantially fewer pages were spent on works perceived to be more important.  Most critical of 
this work was Sergei Horujy, who concluded that not only was the History lacking a rationale 
and methodology, but that it did not do Russian philosophy the justice that it deserves.
   
181
                                                 
179 Maslin, “Obsuzhdenie knigi ‘Russkaia filosofiia: entsiklopediia,’” Voprosy filosofii 9 (2008),  
4. 
 [“составляют необходимую основу для систематической профессиональной подготовки 
специалистов по истории русской философии.”] 
180 Ibid., 5. 
[“русская философия обращена отнюдь не только к собственной этнокультурной 
реальности, а ко всеобщим проблемам мировой философии”] 
 Horujy was not present at the roundtable discussion but sent written comments on the 
volume for inclusion in Questions of Philosophy. 
  
181 For a similar debate surrounding the 2000 publication of the New Philosophical Encyclopedia 
[Novaia filosofskaia entsiklopediia, 2000], see Andrei Vaganov, “Internet eshche ne stal 
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Regarding what he saw as the unfettered, irrational representation of the history of Russian 
philosophy in this encyclopedia, Horujy wrote: “The subject matter presented to us under the 
name Russian Philosophy … is actually, as expressed in Gogol', ‘neither this nor that.  The devil 
knows what it is.’”182
While we have come to expect a certain amount of intellectual discord among academics, 
philosophers in Russia have earned a reputation of practicing philosophy in a style that 
Aleksandr Rybas has likened to the style of a Russian horn orchestra [rogovaia muzyka], where 
the goal is to drown out one’s neighbor rather than to complement him.
   
183
                                                                                                                                                             
filosofiei,” Nauka v Sibiri 25. 2311 (June 2001), http://szmn.sbras.ru/win/ 
elbib/hbc/article.phtml?nid=52&id=28  
182 Khoruzhii, “Obsuzhdenie knigi ‘Russkaia filosofiia: entsiklopediia,’” Voprosy filosofii 9 
(2008), 29. 
[“Предмет, что под именем РФ представлен нам … на самом деле, по Гоголю выражаясь, 
– ни то ни се, а черт знает что.”]  
183 For Alexander Rybas’ use of this metaphor in a review of the X Historians’ Symposium of 
Russian Philosophy (2007), see Rybas, “On Contemporary Russian Philosophy, Landshaft 1 
(2008), 18.  The first such horn orchestra was organized in 1751 by S.K. Naryshkin and Ia. 
Maresh.  Performances included anywhere between 91 and 300 copper hunting horns, each one 
emitting only one note.  See K. Vertkov, Russkaia rogovaia muzyka (L, 1948).  Horn orchestras 
are also mentioned in Derzhvin’s odes “Felitsa” (1792) and “Ruins” [“Razvaliny,” 1799, as well 
as in Lomonosov’s “On the Invention of Horn Music” [“Na izobretennie rogovoi myzyki”] 
(1753).   
  Like the cacophony 
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of Dostoevskii’s “Bobok” (1873), voices compete with one another in such a way that they cause 
what Dostoevskii described as a dissonant muddle [katavasiia], resisting the traditional 
point/counterpoint model of contemporary academic philosophical criticism and creating what 
Zamaleev has colorfully described as “an arena for ideological clanking.”184  Such a situation is 
surely what Victorino Tejera had in mind when he wrote that “it is unphilosophic for living 
thinkers to argue with, or criticize each other, from their own premises only and not address each 
other’s basic assumptions.”185
3.3 WHAT COMES AFTER THE END OF PHILOSOPHY? 
   
Having traversed the history of Russian philosophical historiography, we have seen that the 
discipline is constantly engaged in a process of self-definition—of attempting to encase itself 
within a single totalizing narrative, one that was often dependent on the intellectual hegemony of 
the day.  Most frequently taking the form of the identification of “characterizing traits,” these 
aligned themselves with the political realities of the time—whether the Orthodoxy, autocracy, 
and nationality of Nicholas I, the renewed optimism in secular philosophy after the discipline’s 
return to the universities in the early 1860s, or the growing preoccupation with identifying the 
                                                 
184 Zamaleev, Novye issledovaniia po russkoi filosofii, 38.  
[“арена для идеологических бряцаний”] 
185 Tejera, “Intellectual History as a Tool of Philosophy,” in History and Anti-History in 
Philosophy, eds. T. Z. Lavine and V. Tejera (Dordrecht: Springer, 1989), 124. 
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characteristics of the Russian “national character” and/or “Russian idea” in the twentieth century 
as the Soviet regime squeezed Orthodoxy out of its imperial ideology.   
 In the contemporary period, references to the “Russian idea” and “straight path of 
Byzantium” have been replaced by two dominating approaches: 1) an adherence to traditional 
methods of historiography; and 2) a denial of the domestic philosophical tradition altogether, 
where the response to the query “Is there philosophy in Russia?” is often emphatically negative.  
If we were to step back and look at these symptoms as a trend in philosophy rather than as 
nation-specific—as a path chosen by philosophers rather than as some Florovskian “path of 
philosophy”—then the conflicted state of philosophy in Russia actually brings it in to closer 
dialogue with contemporary Western debates, particularly those occurring in the American 
philosophical tradition.   
 A useful model can be found in Alasdair MacIntyre’s book After Virtue (1981), where he 
describes a hypothetical situation (modeled on the opening of Walter M. Miller’s novel A 
Canticle for Leibowitz [1960]) in which a natural disaster has destroyed the continuity of all 
academic knowledge, leaving behind only fragments of books and memories of experiments.  If 
humankind were to go about trying to reconstruct this lost knowledge from what remained after 
the catastrophe, MacIntyre continues, the results of academic progress would look more or less 
the same on the surface, but underneath they would lack the theoretical contexts and attitudes 
that once gave them their significance and grounded them within a shared history of intellectual 
progress.   
For MacIntyre this condition of “grave disorder” is not merely a hypothetical catastrophe, 
but describes the state of contemporary American ethical philosophy, where “modern moral 
utterances and practices can only be understood as a series of fragmented survivals from an older 
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past,” disconnected from the intellectual connections that should accompany them.186  He locates 
evidence of the collapse in two dominating symptoms of the period: 1) “the multifariousness and 
apparent incommensurability of the concepts invoked;” and 2) “the assertive use of ultimate 
principles in attempt to close debates.”187  In describing these symptoms, in fact, MacIntyre 
could very well have been speaking not of ethical philosophy but of the writing of the history of 
philosophy in contemporary Russia, where both traits—bitter debates and the tendency to fall 
back on “ultimate principles” (i.e. essentialized characterizing traits)—comprise the primary 
avenues for criticism against this sub-discipline.188
                                                 
186 MacIntyre, After Virtue.  A Study in Moral Theory (South Bend, Indiana: U of Notre Dame P, 
1984), 2 and 110-1. 
187 Ibid., 35. 
188 Ibid., 35. 
  
While the explosion of historical narratives in the past twenty years demonstrates that 
there is widespread interest within Russia in producing philosophical texts and in the search for 
Russia’s intellectual legacy, we are hard pressed to describe a way in which they offer something 
new to contemporary scholarship.  More often than not they say a lot without saying anything at 
all, in the sense that they conform to an already crystallized canon of historiography and recreate 
what has already been published.  In the case of those histories that do provide a radically new 
reading of history, such as Evlampiev’s naming of Rublev, Dostoevskii, and Tarkovskii as the 
thinkers most indicative of the Russian philosophical tradition, their adherence to the 
traditionalism of the religious/literary narrative detract from their academic credibility, rendering 
them, in the eyes of their critics, just another history of Russian philosophy. 
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Those who comment on Russian philosophy are often equally guilty, continuously 
refuting its existence in totalizing critiques.  In many ways the “end-of-philosophy” narrative of 
thinkers like Ivanov and Smirnov is just as essentializing as the ultimate principles of histories of 
Russian philosophy.  Both offer totalizing, “characterizing traits” through which one is 
encouraged to view the whole of Russian thought.  This danger is particularly apparent if we 
remember Sergei Prozorov’s suggestion that the “end of history” narrative is so prevalent that it 
is a contender for a new Russian idea189
If we return to the abovementioned imagery of “intellectuals without ideas” (Ivanov and 
Smirnov) and heads filled only with phantasms (Anashvili), I would argue that when critics 
speak out against the idealessness of Russian philosophy, they speak not of ideas, per se, but of 
“originality.”  Each of these histories offers many ideas—one would be hard-pressed to dispute 
this fact.  But whether these ideas are original or not is up for debate.  Without delving into the 
countless approaches on what constitutes originality and the implications of such a judgment, we 
might best be guided by Adriaan Peperzak’s view that the label “originality” depends wholly on 
the reception of a particular idea among others who are qualified to receive that idea.  If a 
community of specialists finds an idea novel and worth referencing in their own work as such, 
then it has proved itself original.
—a new set of totalizing characteristics within which 
Russian thought must be viewed.   
190
                                                 
189 Sergei Prozorov, “Russian Postcommunism and the End of History,”  Studies in East 
European Thought 60.3 (2008): 225. 
190 Peperzak, “On the Unity of Systematic Philosophy and History of Philosophy,” in History 
and Anti-History in Philosophy, eds. T. Z. Lavine and V. Tejera (Dordrecht: Springer, 1989), 26. 
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I would go one step further and argue that by “idealessness” these critics have in mind 
not only “originality,” but that by “originality” they actually mean “Western.”  When they speak 
of empty discussions, academics with heads full of nonsense, and the end of history, they are not 
necessarily implying that the country is not producing anything, but that it is not producing 
anything up to the standard of some Western ideal of philosophical production.  Not surprisingly, 
this model is often a German one.  Vitalii Kurennoi, for instance, compares what he sees as the 
subpar level of some Russian scholarship—rash generalizations, irresponsible use of sources, 
and speculations on the “Russian soul”—with the rigor of the German academic model.  In 
particular, he compares Krasikov’s 2008 study of contemporary Russian thought, Russian 
Philosophy Today, with Christian Tilitzki’s 2001 study of German university philosophy [Die 
deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten], pointing out that 
only the latter includes “two volumes of empirical material.”191
In distributing much of philosophical production between either histories of Russian 
philosophy and speculation on the end of philosophy, Russian commentators on the history of 
Russian philosophy are, in some metaphorical sense, writing themselves out of existence.  Better 
yet, they are in-between philosophies, separating themselves from an old tradition while 
stagnating in the formation of a new one.  As Valerii Podoroga noted at a June 2009 Moscow 
conference in response to Fredric Jameson’s “new reading” of Marx’s Capital, “We do not need 
another reading of Capital, what we have to do is re-write Capital.”
  
192
                                                 
191 Kurennoi, “Soblazn tekhnologii,” 116. 
192 Podoroga, Commentary at “Critical Thought in the 21st Century” conference, Moscow, Russia 
(June 2009).  
  Here Podoroga is 
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speaking to a crucial accusation of the history of philosophy—that its historians are involved in 
the endless regurgitation of dead philosophers in place of actually producing philosophy 
themselves.  In the context of the history of Russian philosophy, we might say that rather than 
repeatedly revisit and rewrite its past, historians of Russian thought might set themselves toward 
contributing something “original” (in Peperzak’s view of the word) to that history.   
In this vein, in his study Soviet Historiography of Philosophy from 1990, Van der 
Zweerde wrote:  
 If … Soviet philosophy can finally drop its claim to be the highest    
 achievement of the historical development of philosophy, to be on the right  
  path, set down by Lenin, and to be a unified, continuously developing system, …   
in that case we might be surprised by the intellectual vigor of many Soviet 
 philosophers and should be prepared to see historians of philosophy turn into 
 philosophers in their own right.193
Although its fortuitous publication—less than a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union—
quickly rendered the language of these comments outdated, Van der Zweerde’s appraisal not 
only captured the trouble of late Soviet historiography, but continues to epitomize the 
contemporary situation in the sub-discipline of the history of Russian philosophy.  Though Hegel 
asserts in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that the study of the history of Philosophy is 
the study of Philosophy itself, as the Mad Hatter edifies Alice in Lewis Carol’s work: this does 
not mean that the opposite is true.  That is to say that although many of Russia’s preeminent 
   
                                                 
193 Van der Zweerde, Soviet Historiography of Philosophy, 39. 
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scholars of Russian philosophy are content in the role of historian, that does not mean that to 
study philosophy in Russia is necessarily to rewrite its history.   
Having been engaged in the writing of the history of Russian philosophy since 
Archimandrite Gavriil’s Russian Philosophy, histories of Russian philosophy have changed 
little—both in form and content—for almost two-hundred years.  They continue to be published 
in ever increasing numbers in the face of equally increasing commentary on the emptiness of the 
Russian philosophical tradition.  However, out of this radical divergence of opinions we see an 
exciting paradigm shift taking place in other areas of philosophy.  Just what this new paradigm 
entails will be the subject of the next two chapters. 
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4.0  CONTEMPORARY DEBATES OVER THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE 
INTELLIGENT 
In the previous chapter we saw how the contemporary writing of the history of Russian 
philosophy, when viewed in the context of the critical attitude that surrounds these histories, 
appears to paint a rather bleak picture for the study of Russian philosophical thought.  If we 
move outside the debates surrounding these histories, however, we see that by no means is 
Orthodox thought the dominant philosophical approach in the twenty-first century, though the 
issue of Russian religious thought does often figure predominantly in contemporary debates.  If 
in the nineties an explosion of Orthodox speculation seemed to define much of the philosophical 
production in Russia, in the contemporary period the post-Soviet revival of the pre-revolutionary 
religious narrative has been put into question on a number of fronts.  The religious narrative, in 
turn, is rapidly being overtaken by a plurality of developed, self-reflexive philosophical trends—
many of which are unrecognizable against the backdrop of the religious/secular binary discussed 
in the first chapter.  One such trend takes the form of an on-going dialogue on the transition of 
the model of “Russian philosopher” from a member of the intelligentsia [intelligent] to an 
intellectual [intellektual].  The latter is a category with a lengthy Western history, including 
elaborations by Stefan Collini, Antonio Gramsci, P.G. Hamerton, Russell Jacoby, Richard A. 
Posner, and others, although such discussions on the status of the intellectual (often referred to as 
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the “public intellectual”—the term to which Jacoby has laid claim as being the first to use194
4.1 THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF THE INTELLECTUAL 
) 
have more or less ceased in the twenty-first century following a flurry of studies in the eighties 
and nineties on the “death” of the public intellectual.  In Russian philosophical discourse, this 
discussion has recently become a popular topic of inquiry in some circles, although its 
understanding of the role of the intellectual differs substantially. 
In the past century, speculation on the role of the intellectual in society has inspired volumes of 
criticism from a number of camps.  Although the prehistory of the adjective “intellectual” in 
scholarship can be traced back as far as the thirteenth century, with Italian chronicler and 
archbishop Jacobus de Voragine and his contemporaries using the Latin intellego and its range of 
forms (e.g. intellectus, intelligentia) to refer to the human faculty of understanding,195
                                                 
194 Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (NY: Basic, 1987), 
xvi. 
195 See Stephen T. Leonard, “Introduction,” in Intellectuals and Public Life, ed. Leon Fink, 
Stephen T. Leonard, and Donald M Reid (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), 5. 
 Stefan 
Collini notes that the term began its contemporary life only in the mid-nineteenth century.  
According to Collini, the development of a social connotation outside the term’s traditional 
employment in the cognitive realm was facilitated by P. G. Hamerton’s idiosyncratic study The 
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Intellectual Life, appearing in 1873.196  Though he does not use “intellectual” as a noun, 
Hamerton paints a portrait of variations on “the intellectual life,” dedicating each segment of his 
book to a different genus of participant in this erudite existence: these include “the student of 
literature,” “the lady of high culture” and “the young man of the middle class, well-educated, 
who complained that it was difficult for him to live agreeably with his mother.”197
By the 1890s, this meaning of “intellectual” had begun to appear in the work and 
correspondence of Maurice Barrès, Henry Bérenger, Paul Bourget, and other fin-de-siècle “men 
of letters.”
  Hamerton’s 
definition is remarkably egalitarian, as he understands “the intellectual life” in the most general 
sense—it does not require an elite status, but simply a dedication to literature, the sciences, or the 
fine arts.   
198  However, the term is generally accepted to have gained notoriety with the public 
response that surrounded the publication of Émile Zola’s open letter, “J’Accuse!,” on the front 
page of L’Aurore on 13 January 1898.199
                                                 
196 Collini, “The History of a Word,” Absent Minds.  Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2006) 18-19. 
197 Hamerton, The Intellectual Life (NY: J. B. Alden, 1873), xiii-xix. 
198Collini, “The History of a Word,” 20.  For a detailed history of the development of the term 
“intellectual,” see Collini, ibid., 15-44.  
199 Zola, “J’Accuse!”  L’Aurore 87 (13 January 1898): 1-2. 
  Written in support of French officer Alfred Dreyfus, 
who had been tried and convicted on charges of treason, Zola’s letter is considered the 
inaugurative modern instance of a link between a Hamertonian understanding of the “intellectual 
life” and the media vehicles of the public sphere.  Although, as in Hamerton’s book, the noun 
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“intellectual” is absent from Zola’s letter, it gained currency less than a month later in Maurice 
Barrès’ “Protest of the Intellectuals” [“La Protestation des intellectuels”], which was published 
in support of “J’Accuse!” on 1 February 1898 in Le Journal.  Together these letters, colored by 
the public and political drama that surrounded their publication, were seen as the pioneering 
effort on the part of intellectuals to influence public opinion—or, as Zola put it: “to enlighten 
those who have been kept in the dark.”200
Yet, if we turn backwards in time to Kant’s essay “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?” [“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” 1784] and, later, The 
Conflict of the Faculties [Der Streit der Fakultäten, 1798], we see that the expectation of a civic 
function from the intellectual was not novel to the late nineteenth century.
  
201
                                                 
200 Ibid., 2.  For more on Zola and the Dreyfus affair see: Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-
Welch A, eds. Intellectuals in Politics. From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie (London: 
Routledge, 1977). 
201 Here we might also remember Moses Mendelssohn’s “On the Question: What Does “to 
Enlighten” Mean?” [“Über die Frage: was heißt aufklären?,” 1784]. 
  Kant had already 
speculated on the public dimension of intellectual life in his discussions of the “Gelehrter.”  
Although translated most often as “scholar,” Gelehrter does not mean for Kant a scholar in the 
pedagogical sense of the word, nor is he referring to a well-rounded homme de lettres.  Instead, 
with Gelehrter he is indicating a particular group of public intellectuals whose duty it was to 
address the public on particular issues of expertise: one Gelehrter may investigate the injustice of 
taxes, he notes, while another might be obliged to lay bare the mistaken aspects of Church 
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symbolism.202  This necessary public function is what Kant calls the “public use of reason:” that 
is, “the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world.”203  In this 
way Kant’s intellectual is responsible not only to his own faculty of reason but to the public that 
he addresses, whereby he has a civic duty to impart to the public only “carefully considered and 
well-intentioned thoughts.”204
 While the Dreyfus affair thrust the category on which Kant had already speculated into 
the public eye, by the twentieth century it had become common to speak of “intellectuals” not 
only as a social category, but as intimately connected with both the public and political spheres.  
Not surprisingly, for Gramsci the intellectual was necessarily a political being given that his 
     
                                                 
202 Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” in Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?, ed. 
Jean Mondot (Saint-Étienne: P de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 1991), 76. 
203 Ibid., 76. 
[“Ich verstehe aber unter dem öffentlichen Gebrauche seiner eigenen Vernunft denjenigen, den 
jemand  als Gelehrter von ihr vor dem ganzen Publikum der  Leserwelt macht.”]   
204 Ibid., 76.  
[“Aber als Gelehrter hat er volle Freiheit, ja sogar den Beruf dazu, alle seine sorgfältig geprüften 
und wohlmeinenden Gedanken mitzuteilen.”]   
Kant’s view of an intellectual elite, or Gelehrten, was challenged by Herder’s 
contemporary ideal of citizen’s vanguard, in which the national culture of the people [Volk] 
played a prominent and universalizing (and, in some senses, homogenizing), role.  For more on 
Kant’s and Herder’s views of the intellectual see: John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth 
of Anthropology (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002).   
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social function was bound in his class roots.  It is along these lines that Gramsci famously 
distinguished organic intellectuals from traditional intellectuals.  Organic intellectuals are those 
thinkers who make up the core of a particular class; their profession is an incidental 
characteristic of their being, as they are identified first and foremost with the class to which they 
organically belong.  Conversely, traditional intellectuals are those professionals in the sciences 
and humanities who serve the particular social function of their profession.  While they are likely 
to conceal their attachment to their class in order to claim that their social function (i.e. the fruits 
of their particular vocation) is somehow independent of class ties, they too are guided by 
concrete historical processes and social developments.”205  We see these same sentiments in 
Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli’s claim at the end of the twentieth century that the 
intellectual is necessarily a political being, in that he is either the creator or employer of 
ideology.206
It was precisely the shift from a view of the “intellectual life” as one of abstraction 
(taking place in the realm of “pure thought”) to having a necessary public (and, often, political) 
function that French homme de lettres Julien Benda resisted in 1927 in his La Trahison des 
 
                                                 
205 See Gramsci, “The Intellectuals,” in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. 
Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (NY: L International P, 1971), 3-23. 
 Later, Carl Boggs adjusts this argument, differentiating between technocratic and critical 
intellectuals.  See Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity (Albany: State U of NY P, 
1993). 
206 Ory and Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France de l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris: A. Colin, 
1986), 10.   
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Clercs [The Betrayal of the Learned, 1927].207
However, Benda’s backward-looking attempts to neutralize the sphere of the intellectual, 
relegating the savant to a de-politicized and de-ideologized space of pure reflection, did not stand 
up against the growing tendency to collapse the terms “intellectual” and “public intellectual” into 
one another.  In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, the public function about which Kant 
had spoken had become a prerequisite for one to be bestowed the title of “intellectual.”  We see 
the emphasis on public value epitomized in Richard A. Posner’s table of the top six-hundred 
intellectuals (1995-2000), which includes such well-known figures as Hannah Arendt, Roland 
Barthes, Isaiah Berlin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, George Orwell, and Edward Said, and 
which was compiled based solely on measures of public notoriety: media mentions, web hits, and 
scholarly citations.
  According to Benda, the group of learned 
individuals whose duty it was to speculate about abstract metaphysical concepts of the good, the 
beautiful, and the just without being influenced by individual and institutional concerns—a kind 
of pre-Kantian intellectual milieu—had let themselves be swayed and seduced by class, national, 
and revolutionary politics in the twentieth century.   
208  Indeed, according to Neil Jumonville, the intellectual is “a generalist 
knowledgeable about cultural and political matters … whose ideas reach a substantial public.”209
                                                 
207 The book was translated into English in 1955 as The Betrayal of the Intellectuals, although 
“learned” more accurately captures Benda’s use of the “des Clercs.” 
208 Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 2001), 194-
206.  
209 Jumonville, ed, The New York Intellectuals Reader (NY: Routledge, 2007), 1. 
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For Collini, the intellectual’s creative, analytical, and scholarly capacities are almost secondary 
to his public function.  The intellectual must: 1) reach a wide (often unintended) public; 2) 
successfully articulate some concerns of that public; and 3) establish a positive reputation for 
these articulations.210  Like Kant before him, Noam Chomsky adds to the intellectual’s public 
responsibility the duty “to speak the truth and to expose lies,” particularly where “the creation 
and analysis of ideology” is concerned.211
Yet, alongside the crystallization of the intellectual as a necessarily public being, 
beginning in the 1980s surrounding Russell Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in 
the Age of Academe (1987) we see the emergence of a number of works that posit the “death” of 
the intellectual in the face of his failure to live up to his communal duty.  In his book, written as 
a response to Harold Stearn’s 1921 America and the Young Intellectual (a study of the problem 
of the emigration of American intellectuals to Europe), Jacoby makes the claim that boredom 
and demoralization have become the prevalent sentiments in the American universities.  He 
criticizes academics of being “high-tech intellectuals, consultants, and professors—anonymous 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
For another in-depth comparative study on the public function of intellectuals, see: Ahmad Sadri, 
Max Weber’s Sociology of Intellectuals (NY and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992). 
210 Collini, Absent Minds, 52. 
211 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” The New York Review of Books 8.3 (23 Feb. 
1967), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12172   
 Earlier, Hannah Arendt addressed similar questions of intellectual responsibility in The 
Life of the Mind (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978). 
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souls, who may be competent, and more than competent, but who do not enrich public life.”212  
While in the preface to the 2000 edition of his work Jacoby admits that time has partially 
eclipsed part of his original argument, his conclusion remains relatively unchanged: 
“[Intellectuals] have become more professional and insular; at the same time they have lost 
command of the vernacular, which thinkers from Galileo to Freud had mastered.”213
We see the same disillusionment with the intellectual milieu in Michel Foucault.  “If this 
category exists,” Foucault writes, “which is not certain nor perhaps even desirable—[they] are 
  Whether 
nostalgia plays a role in this disenchantment (the author argues in the preface to the second 
edition that it does not), Jacoby is lamenting the eclipsing of the intellectual by the academic, 
whereby, in this view, the demands of the professional sphere have corrupted the ideals of 
reflection and public service.   
                                                 
212 Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals, x. 
213 Ibid., xv. 
 Even as early as 1979, George Konrád and Ivan Szelńyi’s Intellectuals on the Road to 
Class Power (1979), a Marxist samizdat manuscript smuggled out of Hungary, suggested that 
intellectuals were falling short of fulfilling their public function.  Intellectuals have “a monopoly 
over culture in any society,” Konrád and Szelńyi claim, but they fall short of using their power 
wisely by “refus[ing] to foster the culture of other classes. … In this way they prevent the 
working class from becoming conscious of its own identity.”  See: Konrád and Szelńyi, 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, ed. Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen (NY: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 247. 
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abandoning their old prophetic function.”214  It is in this vein that Alexander Nehamas, a 
philosopher known for his achievement in interdisciplinary “border crossing” (between analytic 
and Continental philosophy, as well as between philosophy and literature) accused his 
contemporaries in American philosophy of being good scholars but poor intellectuals.215  
Although they had impressive publication records, no amount of peer-reviewed journal articles 
or conference presentations could keep them from falling further away from the public, their 
work virtually inaccessible to those outside their specialization.216
As John Gross sees it, the death of the intellectual may not be necessarily due to 
shortcomings within the profession, but is perhaps indicative of a shift in intellectual culture 
more broadly conceived, whereby the written genre no longer holds the esteemed position it did 
    
                                                 
214 Qtd. Paul Bové, Intellectuals in Power: A Genealogy of Critical Humanism (NY: Columbia 
UP, 1986), 20.   
215 Nehamas, “Trends in Recent American Philosophy,” in American Academic Culture in 
Transformation.  Fifty Years, Four Disciplines, ed. Thomas Bender and Carl E. Schorske 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997), 227-241.  
 According to J. P. Nettle, while the intellectual must engage the public (typically in 
periodicals), the scholar has no predicate for societal action and his medium of choice tends to be 
academic books and/or refereed journals.  See Nettle, “Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of 
Dissent,” in Philip Rieff, On Intellectuals; Theoretical Studies, Case Studies (Garden City, NY: 
Doubeday, 1969), 89.     
216 Nehamas, “Trends in Recent American Philosophy,” 240-241.  
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during an earlier stage of modernity.217  More specifically, for Daniel Bell this shift was made 
possible by the rise of the sciences in the twenties, thirties, and forties, during which theoretical 
knowledge came to the forefront as the determining factor in new directions in research and 
scholarly inquiry: “Does one want a more awesome example than the atom bomb?,” he 
provokes.218  In the opinion of Paul Johnson, however, the “death” of the intellectual was made 
possible much earlier, in parallel with the decline of clerical influence in the eighteenth century, 
thereby opening a space for the influence of secular knowledge.219  We could add to this list of 
factors the rise of specialization in academia, whereby the “man of letters” is often viewed to 
have been replaced by specialized academics who cater to the university market and not the 
public.  Bruce Wilshire aligns this phenomenon with the emergence of the research university 
where specialism, in his opinion, has taken precedence over teaching.220  While these two skills 
are not mutually exclusive as Wilshire imagines them to be, Gramsci makes a similar claim when 
he speaks of academia in the twentieth-century as the multiplication and narrowing of knowledge 
into various specializations.221
                                                 
217 Gross, The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters: A Study of the Idiosyncratic and the Humane 
in Modern Literature (NY: Macmillan, 1969), 285. 
218 Bell, The Intellectual and the University (NY: The City College, 1966), 3. 
219 Johnson, Intellectuals (NY: Harper & Row, 1988), 1. 
220 Wilshire, The Moral Collapse of the University.  Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation 
(Albany: State U of NY P, xiii). 
221 Gramsci, “The Intellectuals,” 10. 
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4.2 PARTITIONING MINDS: INTELLECTUAL MEETS INTELLIGENT 
When transposing the seemingly endless debates over the status, responsibilities, and origins of 
the “intellectual” into the Russian context, it becomes necessary to distinguish the word 
“intellectual” from the Russian “intelligent.”  While we have seen that the development of the 
term “intellectual” takes place in a developed Western literature (which, in the present, both ties 
the intellectual to the public sphere and refutes his existence), intelligent refers specifically to a 
member of the intelligentsia: a social group emerging in Russia in the 1850s and l860s with 
figures like Fedor Dostoevskii, Mikhail Katkov, Nikolai Mikhailovskii, Vasilii Rozanov, and 
Anatolii Lunacharskii, among others.  As Vera Leikina-Svirskaia has noted, for the most part 
these thinkers came from the land-owning classes but not from the gentry222; they were the 
product of the formation of educated raznochintsy in the 1840s who became déclassé as they 
emerged from the universities highly educated and, as Hugh Seton-Watson points out, 
“profoundly alienated from the political and social regime.”223
The word “intelligentsia” is generally accepted to have first appeared in the Russian 
language in 1836 in the diaries of Vasilii Zhukovskii, though it was still only in sporadic use in 
the 1860s and 1870s.  We find it, for instance, in Petr Boborykin’s novel Sound Virtues [Solidnye 
dobrodeleti, 1870], but it is absent from definition dictionaries such as Vladimir Dal'’s Definition 
Dictionary [Tolkovoi slovar'], 1861-1868) and Feliks Toll'’s Table Dictionary [Nastol'nyi 
   
                                                 
222 Leikina-Svirskaia, Intelligentsiia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka (M: Mysl', 1971), 25. 
223 Seton-Watson, “The Russian Intellectuals,” in The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait, ed. 
George Bernard de Huszar (N.p.: Free Press, 1960), 43.  See also Martin Malia, “What Is the 
Intelligentsia?,” Daedalus 89.3 (Summer 1960), 446. 
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slovar', 1864], among others.224  Yet, the lack of a word for this phenomenon did not stop 
scholars like Bulgakov from projecting the intelligentsia back to the eighteenth century, 
identifying its emergence as a product of the Petrine reforms—a result of the introduction of 
modern, secular education to Russia (for Johnson, we will remember, the role of the intellectual 
declined in the West in the eighteenth century along with a decline in the influence of the 
clergy).225  In his 1999 study Vittorio Strada concurs, noting the contemporary intelligentsia is a 
post-Petrine phenomenon, “the roots of which differ from the pre-modern form of intellectual 
life.226
In fact, upon attempting to assemble a stable definition of word “intelligentsia” one finds 
the task nearly impossible, as the term was employed from a variety of positions, used as both a 
term of high tribute and a term of abuse.  In “Psychology of the Russian Intelligentsia” 
[“Psikhologiia russkoi intelligentsii,” 1910], literary and language scholar Dmitrii Ovsiannikovo-
Kulikovskii tries to forge a universal definition, whereby the intelligentsia is equivalent to all of 
educated society—“it includes everyone who one way or another, directly or indirectly, actively 
  
                                                 
224 Viktor Vinogradov, “Intelligentsiia,” in Istoriia slov, http://wordhist.narod.ru/ 
intelligencija.html 
225 Bulgakov, “Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo,” Vekhi (M: N.p., 1910), 25.  
226 Strada, “Intelligentsiia kak zerkalo evropeiskoi revoliutsii,” in Russkaia intelligentsia i 
zapadnyi intellektualizm: Istoriia i tipologiia, ed. N. G. Okhotina (M: OGI, 1999), 30.    
[“ … явление, коренным образом отличающееся от форм интеллектуальной жизни 
 домодернистского общества”]   
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or passively takes part in the intellectual life of the country.”227  According to P. B. Ivanov-
Razumnik, the intelligentsia has a strong humanistic component, as it is “characterized by its 
creation of new forms and ideals and by the active realization of them in life in the tendency 
toward physical and intellectual, societal and personal liberation of the individual.”228  For 
Maksim Slavinskii, journalist and editor of several political and economic journals (e.g. Freedom 
and Justice [Svoboda i pravo], Russian Thought [Russkaia mysl'], and Herald of Europe [Vestnik 
Evropy], “the intelligentsia is not just the creator of all immaterial values, … but is the 
permanent distributor of [those values].”229
                                                 
227 Ovsiannikovo-Kulikovskii, “Psikhologiia russkoi intelligentsia, Intelligentsiia v Rossii (M: 
Mysl', 1971), 192. 
[“Интеллигенция — это все образованное общество; в ее состав входят все, кто так или 
иначе, прямо или косвенно, активно или пассивно принимает участие в умственной жизни 
страны.”] 
228 Ivanov-Razumnik, “Chto takoe intelligentsia,” in Intelligentsiia - Vlast' – Narod, ed. L. I, 
Novikova and I. N. Sizemskaia (M: Nauka, 1993), 73-80. 
 [“… характеризуемая творчеством новых форм и идеалов и активным проведением их в 
жизнь в направлении к физическому и умственному, общественному и личному 
освобождению личности.”] 
229 Slavinskii, “Russkaia intelligentsia natsional'nyi vopros,” Intelligentsiia v Rossii (M: Mysl', 
1971), 231. 
  In this view, without the intelligentsia progress 
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would be impossible for the Russian people.  It is no surprise, thus, that for Slavinskii “it is the 
intelligentsia [that] stands guard for all elements of the national consciousness of its people.”230
While in the above definitions, all from the first decade of the twentieth century, the term 
“intelligentsia” has a positive significance, “intelligentsia takes on a negative connotation in the 
same decade with its employment in the 1909 collection Landmarks [Vekhi], edited by political 
philosopher and future government functionary Mikhail Gershenzon.  The debates within and 
surrounding Landmarks demonstrate the flexibility of the term.  While the authors of Landmarks 
(Nikolai Berdiaev Sergei Bulgakov, Petr Struve, and others) would most certainly have 
considered themselves the vanguard that, in Slavinskii’s 1910 definition, “stands guard for all 
elements of the national consciousness of its people,”
  
231
                                                                                                                                                             
[“Интеллигенция является не только создателем всех нематериальных ценностей, 
находящихся в культурном обороте данного народа, но и неизменным распределителем 
их”] 
230 Ibid., 231. 
 [“Интеллигенция стоит на страже всех элементов национального сознания своего 
народа.”] 
231 Ibid., 231.  
 it is precisely this vanguard that they 
spoke out against with their employment of the term.  In its usage among these thinkers, 
“intelligentsia” takes on a pejorative function, referring to the positivists that emerged in Russia 
in the seventies with (e.g. Mikhailovskii, Petr Lavrov) and the Marxist materialists that followed 
in the nineties (e.g. Aleksandr Bogdanov and Anatolii Lunacharskii).   
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According to Berdiaev, for instance, the materialistic hegemony that had taken hold of 
Russia’s intellectual and political life “combined a rational consciousness with extreme 
emotionalism and with a weak appreciation of intellectual life as an autonomous value.”232  The 
intelligentsia was demagogic and averse to objectivism and universalism, he continued, and it 
maintained a dangerous reverence of science.233  It is because of this materialist intelligentsia, 
the Landmarks authors claimed, that Russia had been unable to form a “national philosophical 
tradition.”234  For Berdiaev in particular, the intelligentsia’s primary transgression was its 
atheism: “its atheism is the fault of its will, for it freely chose the path of worshipping man and 
thereby crippled its soul and deadened within itself the instinct for truth.”235  This view was 
shared by Ivan Petrunkevich, who claimed in 1910 that “the Russian intelligentsia, having 
adopted an atheist worldview, took up a false place in its relationship to the people.”236
                                                 
232 Berdiaev, “Filosofskaia istini i intelligentskaia pravda,” Vekhi (M: N.p., 1910), 9. 
 [“В русской интеллигенции рационализм сознания сочетался с исключительной 
эмоциональностью и с слабостью самоценной умственной жизни.”]  
233 Ibid., 7-8. 
234 Ibid., 13. 
235 Ibid., 22.  
[“Виновата и сама интеллигенция: атеистичность ее сознания есть вина ее воли, она сама 
избрала путь человекопоклонства и этим исказила свою душу, умертвила в себе инстинкт 
истины.”] 
236 Petrunkevich, “Intelligentsiia i ‘Vekhi’,” Intelligentsiia v Rossii (M: Mysl', 1971), viii. 
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In this way, the term “intelligentsia” could be easily filled with a particular meaning and 
used in one’s favor as frequently as it was used against ones enemies.  According to Martin 
Malia, what united the various directions in which the term was spun was the fact that all the 
groups against whom the term was employed no longer had a place in the old estate system.237  
Thus, it is not surprising that although the Landmarks writers had the future Bolsheviks in mind 
when they attacked the “intelligentsia” for being a false, atheist vanguard, when Lenin 
dispatched many of Russia’s philosophers abroad (including some of these same Landmarks 
authors) on the two voyages of the Philosophy Steamer in 1922, he sentenced them on the 
charges of being members of the intelligentsia.  The front-page headline in Pravda on 31 August 
1922, titled “The First Warning” [“Pervoe predosterezhenie”], announces the impending 
expulsion of the Kadet Party, White Guard “intelligentsia” on which the government has 
“already wasted enough effort.”238
                                                                                                                                                             
[“Усвоив атеистическое мировоззрение, русская интеллигенция заняла ложное положение 
и в своем отношении к народу”]  
For more a detailed history of the development of the word “intelligentsia” in Russia, see 
S. O. Shmidt, Obshchestvennoe samosoznanie rossiiskogo blagorodnogo sosloviia: XVI-pervaia 
tret' XIX veka (M: Nauka, 2002); Sergei Sergeev, “Dosovetskaia Rossiia (XVIII – do nachala 
XX veka),” Mysliashchaia Rossiia 2, ed. Vitalii Kurennoi (M, Nasledie evropy: 2009), 15-53. 
237 Malia, “What Is the Intelligentsia?,” 446. 
238 Pravda 194 (31 August 1922), 1. 
  While Berdiaev and company were criticizing the 
materialists for sitting in their ivory towers—for being ineffectual, “secretarian intellectuals who 
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are artificially isolated from national life,”239—Lenin was using the same argument (and the very 
same word) as fuel to scatter them across Europe.240  Like the title “philosopher”—which was 
for Plato one of the highest honors an individual could attain, and for Dostoevskii “a term of 
abuse, meaning fool”241
Despite the lengths to which speculators on the meaning of “intelligentsia” were willing 
to go to defend their own definition of the word—employing it to mean either idealist or 
materialist, Orthodox or socialist practices of thought—until recently the distinction between the 
intellectual and the intelligent has been discussed only superficially.  We see this distinction 
anachronistically imposed on Berdiaev in the English-language versions of his contribution to 
Landmarks, where he is translated into English as saying that “there is good reason for calling 
this group ‘intelligenty,’ as distinct from ‘intellectuals’ in the broad national and historical sense 
of the word.”
—from our historical position we see that the term intelligentsia was a 
space easily filled with the particular intention of the user as a form of ideological ammunition. 
242
                                                 
239 Berdiaev, Vekhi, 1. 
240 We see the flexibility of this term not only in Lenin’s 1922 dispatch of the intelligentsia, but 
in the work of Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, economist and “Legal-Marxist,” who claimed that 
one of the most characterizing traits of the Russian intelligentsia was its sympathy to socialism.  
See Tugan-Baranovskii, “Intelligentsiia i sotsializm,” Intelligentsiia v Rossii (M: Mysl', 1971), 
235. 
241 Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, v. V, ed. V. G. Bazanov, 329. 
  However, there was no precedent for the word “intellectual” in Russian at the 
242 Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman, trans. and eds., Signposts (Irvine, CA: Charles 
Schlacks Jr. P, 1986), 1.  The original reads [“ … не без основания называют 
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time, and Berdiaev never makes use of the word “intellektual.”  Instead, alongside 
“intelligentsia” he occasionally employs the pejorative suffix “shchina” in “intelligentshchina.”  
In this way he is able to not dismiss the historical phenomenon of the intelligentsia entirely, 
structuring his word choices accordingly so that if the intelligentsia refers to the phenomenon in 
general, then the intelligentshchina is the embodiment of the negative pathos of the 
contemporary Russian intelligentsia.  The use of “intelligentshchina” as specific to the 
materialist intelligentsia appears to be strategic, as in the last line of his contribution to 
Landmarks he states that the goal of the volume is to set the stage for a new intelligentsia to be 
born.243
As Aleksandr Kustarev notes, the semantic flexibility—and frequent opacity—
surrounding the word “intelligentsia” continues into the Soviet period.  Kustarev posits that there 
were two primary myths according to which the intelligentsia was viewed, each (ironically) 
labeling the Russian intelligentsia as “unique” in an argument that pivoted on the intelligentsia’s 
supposed unparalleled spirituality [dukhovnost'].
    
244
                                                                                                                                                             
"интеллигентщиной" в отличие от интеллигенции в широком, общенациональном, 
общеисторическом смысле этого слова.”] Berdiaev, Vekhi, 1. 
243 Berdiaev, Vekhi, 22. 
244 Kustarev, “Sovetskaia Rossiia: samoopredelitel'nye praktiki sovetskoi intelligentsia,” in 
Mysliashchaia Rossiia II: Istoriia i teoriia intelligentsii i intellektualov (M: Nasledie Evrazii, 
2009), 69-70. 
  According to the first story, the intelligentsia 
was hailed as superior because of this spirituality; according to the second, it was the 
intelligentsia’s claim to spiritual insight that had retarded Russia’s intellectual and political 
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development.  In both narratives the Russian intelligentsia is treated as unique—whether as 
unique in a superior way, or unique in its Chaadaevian predisposition to stagnation.  However, as 
Kustarev notes, in both it is also taken as fact that there is no intelligentsia in the West, while in 
Russia there are no intellectuals.245
Kustarev’s work is only one of many recent instances of contemporary Russian-language 
criticism on the difference between the intelligentsia and intellectuals.  Just as Western criticism 
of the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first saw a number of books on 
the downfall and disappearance of the intellectual from public life, in contemporary Russian 
writing we could turn to Serguei Oushakine’s “Functional Intellectuality” [“Funktsional'naia 
intelligentnost',” 1998], Boris Uspenskii’s edited volume The Russian Intelligentsia and Western 
Intellectualism: History and Typology [Russkaia intelligentsia i zapadnyi intellectualism: istoriia 
i tipologiia, 1999], or Boris Firsov’s “Intelligentsia and Intellectuals at the End of the XX c.” 
[“Intelligentsiia i intellektualy v kontse XX veka,” 2001].
 
246
                                                 
245 Ibid., 69.  For more on the intelligentsia and intellectuals by Kustarev, see: Kustarev, Nervnye 
liudi. Ocherki ob intelligentsia (M: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2006). 
246 See: Oushakine, “Funktsional'naia intelligentnost',” Polis 1 (1998), 8-22; Uspenskii, ed., 
Russkaia intelligentsia i zapadnyi intellectualism: istoriia i tipologiia (M: OGI, 1999); Firsov, 
“Intelligentsiia i intellektualy v kontse XX veka,” Zvezda 8 (2001). 
  More recently, the debate over the 
distinction between intelligenty and intellectuals has found a home in the two-volume series 
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Thinking Russia [Mysliashchaia Rossiia], edited by Vitalii Kurennoi and published in 2006 and 
2009 respectively.247
In “Intellectuals” [“Intellectualy”] from the first volume, Kurennoi speaks of Russian 
thought in the twenty-first century as making the transition from the model of the intelligentsia to 
the contemporary model of the intellectual.
   
248  For Kurennoi, the intelligent can be differentiated 
from the intellectual in that the former not only has a social function, but he fits into a specific 
type of behavior and style of life [obraz zhizni].249  “The intelligent is an ‘integrated individual,” 
he continues.250  It is a social type—a group of “well-rounded dilettantes” [“vsestoronnie 
diletanty”].251
                                                 
247 Both volumes were included on the short list for the 2009 “Social Thought Prize,” presented 
annually by the Institute for Social Design [Institut obshchestvennogo proektirovaniia].   
248 Kurennoi, “Intellektualy,” in Mysliashchaia Rossiia I.  Kartografiia sovremennykh 
intellektual'nykh napravlenii (M: Nasledie Evrazii, 2006), 9. 
249 Ibid., 8. 
250 Ibid., 8. 
  The recent demand for a new word—“intellectual”—to replace a social group that 
251 Ibid., 9.  Here, the label “dilettante” seems not only to play into the pejorative use of the term 
surrounding Landmarks, but picks up on the contemporary negative connotation surrounding the 
title “generalist.”  While in biology, a generalist species is an exceptional one in that it is able to 
thrive in a variety of habitats and that can survive off any number of food sources, with the rise 
of the contemporary university system generalism has been used as the negative opposite of 
specialization.  This despite the fact that, in the intellectual sphere, “generalist” has historically 
referred to those polymaths (“Renaissance men,” or the Latin Homo universalis) who were 
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no longer exists (and, as he notes, has not existed for a long time), signals the emergence of a 
new paradigm for understanding intellectual culture in the Russian Federation.252  This is not 
unlike Vladimir Shlapentokh’s thesis that while the intelligentsia involves itself in routine 
functions, intellectuals are those superior individuals who comprise the highest stratum of the 
learned.253  Not surprisingly, however, in his 1990 book Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power 
Shlapentokh uses the words interchangeably, noting that “intelligentsia” is the word used in 
Russia, while “intellectuals” is the Western word for the same phenomenon.254  For, in his 
opinion, “only at the height of McCarthyism did the lives of American intellectuals compare to 
those of their colleagues in socialist societies.”255
Sergei Sergeev’s distinction between intelligent and intellectual in his contribution to 
Thinking Russia II is much different than Kurennoi’s.  Initially, Sergeev’s definition of the 
intelligentsia seems not unlike Ovsiannikovo-Kulikovskii’s, in that both thinkers view the 
intelligentsia as including everyone who participates in academic life (what Hamerton described 
as a dedication to literature, the sciences, or the fine arts).  For Sergeev, the intelligentsia is a 
professional group in the production and spread of ideas—professional in the sense that they live 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowledgeable in a variety of fields and strove for diversity in his wisdom, such as Leonardo da 
Vinci and G.W. Leibniz. 
252 Ibid., 9. 
253 Shliapentokh, “Intellektualy kak nositeli spetsificheskikh moral'nykh tsennostei: tam i zdes',” 
22 49 (1986), 165-166. 
254 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990), ix. 
255 Ibid., 280. 
 128 
off the material rewards of their work.256  He delineates five intellectual “types” that make up the 
intelligentsia: 1) anyone who works in the intellectual profession; 2) a creator and/or propagator 
of spiritual values; 3) an individual (regardless of education) who lives a deeply religious life, 
often undertaking service “in the name of the people”; 4) any highly spiritual, cultured, and 
moral individual; 5) a representative of any new exploitative class that takes the place of the 
bourgeoisie.257  He stresses that for each of these five types, their intellectual activity is their 
profession, citing by way of example Belinskii, Dostoevskii, Mikhailovskii, Rozanov, and 
Lunacharskii.258
While the contemporary reader might find Sergeev’s definition of intelligentsia too 
inclusive, in the sense that it seems to make room for academics, spiritual leaders, cultured 
individuals, and proselytizers, he delineates intellectuals as a subcategory of the intelligentsia.  
Thus, if intelligenty are those individuals who both participate in “the intellectual life” and who 
live off that work, then intellectuals embody all these qualities plus an additional (and necessary) 
ideological function.  While this ideological function does not have to be their primary 
engagement or the primary source of their income (here he cites Karamzin and Pushkin as 
   
                                                 
256 Sergeev, “Dosovetskaia Rossiia (XVIII – nachalo XX veka),” in Mysliashchaia Rossiia (M: 
Nasledie Evrazii, 2009), 19. 
[“То есть интеллигенция — это именно профессиональная группа по производству и 
распространению идей, это их работа, за счет которой они материально существуют.”]    
257 Ibid., 15-16. 
258 Ibid., 19-20. 
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examples),259 Sergeev emphasizes that intellectuals are those intelligenty who act as official 
institutional, governmental, and clerical representatives.  They are functionaries and bureaucrats 
like Lomonosov (whom he calls an example of a “pure government intellectual”), Tatishchev, 
Bolotov, Shcherbatov, and Radishchev—all “intellectuals who pursu[ed] ideological and 
scholarly production alongside their primary occupation.”260
After distinguishing intellectuals from the larger category of intelligenty, Sergeev goes on 
to elevate the non-ideological intelligentsia above intellectuals, though he admits that 
government intellectuals are rapidly growing in numbers.
  Here Sergeev focuses in particular 
on Tatishchev, whom he views as a bureaucrat moonlighting as an intellectual.    
261  While the nuances of his distinction 
are not entirely clear—and, ultimately, he will later collapse the two terms into one and use them 
interchangeably in the second half of the work—the primary quality under scrutiny seems to be 
the addition of ideology.  Both intellectuals and intelligenty are “professional,” but only the 
intelligent earns his living off some ideal of pure work, whereas the intellectual lowers himself to 
the institutional, ideological realm.  John Gross makes a similar argument in The Rise and Fall of 
the Man of Letters (1969), where he writes that “journalism is a career; literature is, or ought to 
be, a vocation.”262
                                                 
259 Sergeev, “Dosovetskaia Rossiia,” 20. 
260 Ibid., 20.  
[“… занимающихся идеологическим и гуманитарным производством «по 
совместительству» с основной деятельностью.”] 
261 Ibid., 21. 
262 Gross, The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters, 26.   
  Here, for Gross, career seems to imply that journalists live off their work, 
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where as literature is a calling—a reference to the original use of the term “vocation,” which was 
employed in the context of clergymen.263
Still, Sergeev’s trouble with intellectuals appears not to be that they earn money off their 
work (he notes that the intelligentsia too are “professionals”).  Rather, it is their official status 
that he finds disconcerting.  This is not an unusual approach, and here we see a link to the 
average Soviet-era academic’s attitude toward his craft.  In fact, this is the same idea on which 
the after-the-break narrative from Chapter One pivots: the idea that due to censorship, politics, 
lack of materials and the opportunity for international collaboration, philosophical discourse 
persevered in the Soviet Union not through official channels like publications and lectures, but as 
a style of life.  Philosophy was believed to have taken up residence in private apartments and the 
desk drawer, in the form of late-night discussions and well-circulated copies.  In this sense, 
philosophy was viewed not as a profession, but as an activity.  Bright, well-articulated, original 
ideas did not necessarily get you published, pay the bills, earn you prestige, or grant you 
permission abroad.  According to this story, it was not “practicing” philosophy (in the official, 
clinical sense) that mattered, but the act of philosophizing.  In his commentary on the 
insufficiency of the current philosophical climate, Valentin Tolstykh displays a clear nostalgia 
for this ideal of “philosophy as activity”: “Philosophical societies, seminars, self-titled public 
   
                                                 
263 In an article in the first volume of Thinking Russia, Vadim Radaev makes use of the idea of 
“professionalism” in a similar way, defining professionalism in philosophy as earning a living 
through the practice of philosophy.  See Radaev, “Issledovatel'skie instituty: sostoianie i 
problemy.  Beseda s Vadimom Radaevym,” in Mysliashchaia Rossii I (M: Nasledie Evrazii, 
2006), 44. 
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lectures, meetings in stairwells and kitchens, where the most unexpected, clever, and tricky 
questions of human life were posed—these have all disappeared somewhere.”264  In Tolstykh’s 
statement we see a conflation of philosophy with its mode of practice.  Noticing that the location 
of philosophy has shifted from private gatherings to more public mediums, Tolstykh concludes 
not that something has changed in the discipline, but that philosophy in Russia has simply ceased 
to exist (very much in the style of criticism of histories of Russian philosophy, as seen in Chapter 
Two).  A similar, albeit less aggressive, extension is made by Valentin Bazhanov, who laments 
the deserted stacks of the Russian State Library in Moscow (still affectionately referred to as 
“Leninka”), where in the 1970s and 80s “there were already long lines at the coat check by ten in 
the morning.”265
Still, it would be irresponsible to peg this assumption as some particularity of Russian 
intellectual citizenship, as the view of philosophy as a “way of life” or “state of being” (as 
opposed to a craft or profession) is as old as philosophy itself.  In the Republic, Plato sets 
philosophy apart from (and above) the arts (e.g. drama, poetry, rhetoric), the danger in the arts 
being their foundation on imitation.  They require of the craftsman (the imitator) no knowledge 
  
                                                 
264 Tolstykh, My byli.  Sovetskii chelovek kak on est' (M: Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 2008), 191-92. 
[“Куда-то исчезли философские сообщества – семинары, самозванные публичные лекции, 
“лестничные” и “кухонные” баталии, где ставились и обсуждались самые неожиданные, 
хитрые и каверзные вопросы человеческого бытия.”]  
265 Bazhanov, “O filosofii i ee imitatsii v sovremennoi Rossii s tochki zreniia istorika i filosofa 
nauki,” in Rossiiskaia postsovetskaia filosofiia: opyt samoanaliza, ed. Maiia Soboleva (Munich: 
Otto Sagner, 2009), 146. 
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of the truth behind what they imitate, and so the painter of the horse’s bridle, for instance, does 
not need to have any knowledge of the reins and bit themselves—their mechanism, their 
composition, their function—in order to paint their likeness.266  But, while the cobbler or the 
metal-worker do require a knowledge of the workings of the reins and bit to construct them, for 
Plato the philosopher is still higher on the chain of virtue, for even though such artisans do have 
knowledge of the things they create, and these things have a function, their craft is still just 
that—a craft.  Unlike the painter and the cobbler, who both (to varying degrees) love only 
beautiful things, the philosopher “believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things 
that participate in it and does not believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the 
participants.”267  In this way, for Plato, the status of philosopher has no internal variations, in that 
one cannot be a good or a poor philosopher in the way that one can be a good or a poor 
carpenter.268
                                                 
266 Plato, Republic, in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. S. Marc Cohen 
(Indianapolis: Hackett P, 2000), 601c. 
267 Ibid., 476c. 
268 Ibid., 475d. 
  In this sense, for Plato philosophy as a “lifestyle” and philosophy as an official 
practice are one and the same.  Unlike Sergeev’s and Tolstykh’s chastising of the alleged 
corruption of the virtue of philosophy with institutional preoccupations, for Plato the philosopher 
must have an official, public function, for only philosophers are fit to rule the city and to advise 
those who do.  Thus, for Plato the idea of philosophy for philosophy’s sake is not opposed to 
institutional and ideological structure, but is necessary to it. 
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While Sergeev chooses his examples of official intellectuals from the eighteenth century, 
we might say that the distinction he draws is particularly relevant to the twentieth century where, 
by 1917, Lenin had appropriated much of the contemporary philosophical debates and recast 
them as Party ideology; in this way we find a re-inauguration of the model of the “official 
academic”—or, those scholars supported by government institutions who wrote under the banner 
of dialectical materialism and who served as the medium through which Party rhetoric was 
realized.  These scholars not only enjoyed publishing and research privileges, but were declared 
“official” by the State.  Such partitioning of “official” and “unofficial” philosophy, or, more 
often, “philosophy” and “pseudo-philosophy,” allowed the Party to pit the discipline against 
itself in the name of philosophy and of the State, rendering competing theories, in many cases, 
powerless, and thus allowing for their repression.    
Yet, even the position of the official academic (although one of power) was periodically 
in flux, updating itself to the ever-changing policy of the Party.  The elasticity of this official 
narrative and the corresponding flexibility required of Soviet official academia is apparent in an 
examination of the canonical texts of Soviet-era philosophy: these include, for instance, the 
many volumes of the Concise Philosophical Dictionary [Kratkii filosofskii slovar'] during the 
Stalin and post-Stalin period—written collectively, as if dictated to an anonymous pen by the 
official voice of the State.  When policy changed, so did the texts.  Books’ publishers would 
periodically mail new pages to subscribing institutions, which were then expected to cut and 
paste into their copies of the books in order to keep them up to date with the official history of 
the State.   
Such textual dethroning is perhaps most apparent in the history of Soviet science and the 
philosophy of science.  This is particularly evident in the case of Trofim Lysenko, whose 
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controversial rejection of Mendelian genetics was pronounced in August 1948 as the 
agronomical theory of the Soviet Union under Stalin.269  As Loren Graham notes: “no longer 
could it be hoped that Party organs would distinguish between science and philosophical 
interpretations of science. … Soviet scientists were genuinely fearful that each field would 
produce its own particular Lysenko.”270  In 1964, however, after Brezhnev’s succession of 
Khrushchev, the Soviet administration began to allow criticism of Lysenko’s work for the first 
time.  Already by the 2 September 1965 meeting of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of 
Sciences Lysenko’s research was officially discredited as pseudoscience, after which textbooks 
were adjusted accordingly.271
In the concerns of thinkers like Sergeev and Tolstykh, we see unease over what they view 
as a similar conferring of philosophy with an official role: that is, a perceived wide scale shift 
from philosophy as an organic practice (as a “way of life”) to a career.  Sergeev’s elevation of 
  It is in this way that the official scholar, like any official text, 
acted as a figurehead of the immediate policy of the State—a position that, at any given moment, 
encompassed the past, the present, and the future, all from the vantage point of the 
contemporary, in that it constantly altered itself, its past, and its future in step with the Party’s 
protean teleology.  In other words, as policies changed, history adjusted itself accordingly, so 
that it appeared as though the policy at any given moment had always been that way, and would 
always be that way.   
                                                 
269 Loren R. Graham, Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union (NY: 
Columbia  UP, 1987), 15. 
270 Ibid., 15. 
271 Ibid., 148. 
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the intelligentsia as “a group of intellectuals par excellence,” though logically inconsistent with 
his earlier statement that intellectuals are a more specific category of the intelligentsia, seems to 
suggest that that intelligentsia is superior because its members are untainted by ideology and 
institutional concerns.  In other words, they have not sacrificed the Hambertonian ideal of a 
reflective existence for a more profitable way of life.272
If we place this argument in the context of the Western debate over the status of the 
intellectual, we see that the two approaches stand in direct opposition to one another.  
Representitive of the Western debate of the last quarter of the twenty-first century, Foucault’s, 
Gross’, and Jacoby’s respective arguments on the death of the intellectual all, in some way, point 
toward the loss of a public function—a function that, for Collini, comprised an engagement with 
a wide public, the successsful articulation of concerns to that public, and the establishment of a 
reputation for these articulations.
 
273
                                                 
272 In reality, however, while the debate over the intellectual and the intelligent has come into 
focus in Russian criticism only in the twenty-first century, if we abide by classical definitions of 
the intellectual as a highly educated individual (often a generalist) who reaches the public in 
some substantial way (as Collini, Jumonville, and Posner would claim), then Russia (including 
the Soviet period) has always had a strong tradition of intellectuals. 
273 Collini, Absent Minds, 52. 
  For Sergeev, however, it is the introduction of a public 
function that threatens the well-being of the intelligentsia.  Here, the intellectual does not 
represent the apex of contemporary scholarship, but is a deficient, opportunistic (and here we 
might say capitalistic) scholar who has betrayed the ideal of the intelligentsia.   
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Thus, while both the Western and Russian versions of these debates engage the category 
of the intellectual on the question of his public role, we see a striking conceptual difference 
between them.  It is not just that the category of the intelligentsia plays no role in the Western 
versions of these debates, but we see how contemporary reflections on the 
intelligentsia/intellectual distinction in Russia recall (even if only to a highly diluted extent) the 
religious/secular binary that dominated the 1990s.  If the category of the “intelligentsia” is 
frequently believed among its supporters to have historical ties to Russian speculative philosophy 
(Berdiaev, Ivanov-Razumnik) and is idealized as the intellectual force behind progress (Sergeev, 
Slavinskii, Tolstykh), the “intellectual” is treated by the opposing camp as part of a Western 
ideal of scholarship (Kurennoi, Radaev, Shlapentokh).  Thus, the two radically different views 
on the intelligent in Thinking Russia become clear: while according to Sergeev, the intelligentsia 
represents a specifically Russian tradition of Hambertonian-like speculation and philosophizing, 
for the opposition, the intelligent is identified by his clinging to an antiquated, isolating, and, 
ultimately, unproductive style of life, which removes him not only from the public, but from the 
worldwide intellectual process.  In fact, we see that contemporary Russian debates over 
intelligent/intellectual are again divided along the same old lines of the religious/secular 
narrative: that is, the more conservative group views the entire Western discussion of 
intellectuals as foreign to the Russian tradition of the intelligentsia, while a more Western 
oriented opposition calls for the end of discussions of the intelligentsia as Russia's “true great 
minds.”   
Within the boundaries of these debates over the status of the philosopher in Russia, 
however, we also see an extremely diversified and self-reflexive body of criticism—especially in 
the two volumes of Thinking Russia, which contain numerous layers of disagreement and 
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contradiction among their authors.  Not only are these volumes self-reflexive, in that they 
address the current state of contemporary Russian philosophy (and not only its history, as we saw 
in the previous chapter), but they undertake such an examination from many points of view at 
once.  It is precisely this presense of internal discord—both on a structural and conceptual 
level—that I would pinpoint as one important indicator of a healthy philosophical climate.  On 
the structural level, in Thinking Russia we see internal discord as a primary organizing premise: 
by this I mean that articles that contradict one another and offer competing points of views are 
placed side by side.  On the conceptual level, however, in the two volumes of Thinking Russia 
there is very little dialogue between articles.  This lack of self-referencing is particularly 
noticeable in the second volume, where the reader anticipates a dialogue with the first.     
In the next chapter we will see a second approach to internal discord in the work of two 
contemporary philosophers.  There, discord is used not as a method of structuring the text, but as 
a conceptual strategy.  The goal is not to place competing theories side by side but to break the 
religious/literary narratives open from inside, demystifying the very terms in use by 
simultaneously employing and confounding them.      
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5.0  THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TURN: TWO INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE 
“RUSSIAN IDEA” 
The study of “literature as philosophy” in Anglo-American universities has historically made up 
its own sub-discipline, where it has been housed primarily in Continentally minded Philosophy 
or English departments and circulated in its own specialized academic journals.274  If we trace 
the same phenomenon in Russian thought from the nineteenth century and the Silver Age, we do 
not see nearly the same level of anxiety over whether literary criticism (often disparaged in 
Europe and the United States as being popular philosophy for dilettantes) has a role in university 
philosophy.  Indeed, as Abdusalam Guseinov and Vladislav Lektorskii point out, “in Russia, 
there were no concrete borders between professional philosophy and popular philosophy until the 
contemporary period.”275
                                                 
274 For instance, the journal Philosophy and Literature based at Bard College.  
275 Guseinov and Lektorskii, “Filosofiia v Rossii: proshloe i nastoiashchee,” in Rossiiskaia 
postsovetskaia filosofiia: opyt samoanaliza, ed. Maiia Soboleva (Munich: Otto Zagner, 2009), 
15. 
  Not only were the lines between these areas of philosophical inquiry 
blurred (if not entirely erased) during the nineteenth century and Silver Age, but as we saw in the 
first chapter, literature-centered speculation on the “Russian idea” became the dominant pursuit 
of much of Russian philosophical production in the immediate post-Soviet period.  We already 
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saw how this blending of philosophy and literature continues in the sub-departments of the 
History of Russian Philosophy in the twenty-first century, where Dostoevskii, Tiutchev, and 
Tolstoi regularly appear as figureheads of the Russian philosophical and spiritual tradition. 
In this chapter I will look at look at two contemporary alternatives to the religious 
narrative and the religious-literary conflation: Valerii Podoroga’s visual, or analytic 
anthropology, and Sergei Horujy’s synergetic anthropology.  Both Podoroga (currently the chair 
of the Sector for Analytic Anthropology at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of 
Sciences in Moscow) and Horujy (director of the Institute for Synergetic Anthropology in 
Moscow) began rejecting the re-appropriation of pre-revolutionary religious philosophy as early 
as the early nineties, and both take anthropology as their point of departure in proposing a new, 
non-essentializing philosophical paradigm for contemporary Russian thought.  By calling them 
“alternative” I do not mean to imply that Podoroga’s and Horujy’s approaches to philosophy are 
in some way anti-literary, or even anti-Orthodox.  In fact, both thinkers regularly appeal to 
Russian fiction in their work, and Horujy’s approach is explicitly Orthodox-centered, while 
Podoroga’s is often relegated by critics to the sphere of “postmodern literary criticism.”  Rather, 
by referring to them as “alternative” I have in mind the fact that they signal important shifts in 
Russia’s “Continental tradition,” such as it was, away from what Horujy has called the 
“methodological sloppiness” of pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy (and, by extension, much 
of the post-Soviet resurrection of this school of thought).276
                                                 
276 For Horujy’s statement regarding “methodological sloppiness,” see: Kristina Stoeckl, “Sergei 
S. Horujy’s ‘Synergetic Anthropology’—One More Phenomenon of Philosophy Grounded in 
Orthodoxy or an Original Approach in Religious Philosophy?,” Landshaft 2 (2008), 4. 
  While there are countless interesting 
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contemporary thinkers who do not conform to the religious stereotypes about Russian thought, I 
have chosen to look specifically at Podoroga and Horujy here: 1) because they began their 
criticisms of the “Russian idea” already in the early-nineties; and 2) because their criticisms 
come not from the camp of analytic philosophy (for which religious and literary philosophy is an 
easy target) or some other outside sphere, but from inside the literary/religious narrative.  By this 
I mean that, at first glance, the language and content of their work appear to align them 
unequivocally with many of the standard clichés of Russian speculative thought, while in fact, 
upon closer inspection, we see that their respective relationships to the history of Russian 
thought are methodologically quite innovative.   
5.1 ANTHROPOLOGY AS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 
It is no surprise that in the past decade anthropology has become the point of departure not only 
for Podoroga’s and Horujy’s methodologies, but for a manifold of other philosophical 
critiques.277
                                                 
277 To Podoroga’s and Horujy’s anthropological approaches we could add a number of new 
anthropologies being practiced and developed in Russian academies, including Fedor Girenok’s 
much criticized “archeo-avantguardism” and Ivar Maksutov’s philosophy of “hyper 
anthropology.”  The growing number of alternative anthropologies in the contemoprary period 
should come as no shock, given the longstanding emphasis of Russian thinkers (in particular, 
historians of Russian philosophy) on anthropology and the problem of man.   
  From the very beginning of its development, anthropology was based both in 
scientific and philosophical inquiry, relying on the virtues of the two fields of scholarly inquiry 
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to help describe the physical and metaphysical life of man.  We can trace the roots of modern 
anthropology to the intellectual life of the second half of the eighteenth century, to thinkers like 
French philosopher and political theorist Marquis de Condorcet; German ethnologist and 
naturalist Georg Forster; Scottish philosopher Henry Home (Lord Kames); Montesquieu; 
Leibnizian and author of Anthropology for Physicians and the Worldwise [Anthropologie für 
Aerzte und Weltweise, 1772] Ernst Platner; Scottish historian William Robertson; and Voltaire.  
As John Zammito notes, during this period: 
the crystallization of anthropological discourse arose from the convergence of a 
number of disparate inquiries: the medical model of physiological psychology, the 
biological model of animal soul, the pragmatic or conjectural model of cultural-
historical theory, the literary-psychological model of the new novel (Tristram 
Shandy, Sorrows of Young Werther), and the philosophical model of rational 
psychology grounded in the quandaries of substance interaction.278
In short, anthropology arose “as part of the response to the failure of the mechanist paradigm to 
incorporate the life sciences,”
 
279
To the abovementioned list of pioneers in anthropology we must add Immanuel Kant, 
who in 1798 published his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in 
 and it was this blending of several disciplines across the 
sciences and the humanities that accounted in part for its attractiveness to thinkers from a wide 
array of fields.   
                                                 
278 Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: U of Chicago, 2002), 221-
2. 
279 Ibid., 229. 
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pragmatischer Hinsicht], the result of twenty-five years of lecture notes from his university 
courses on anthropology.280  Although we see hints of the development of a new approach to the 
study of man earlier—for instance, in David Hume’s statement in his Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739) that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”281—it has 
been argued that Kant’s work is the first systematic outline of this new discipline.282
In particular, in the Anthropology Kant characterizes this new discipline as an 
“observational doctrine” [Beobachtungslehre],
  His work 
was a summary not only of what anthropology should study, but how it should go about this 
study, and what the implications of such a study would be for human life.   
283
                                                 
280 According to Manfred Kuehn, “the Anthropology clearly belongs among the small group of 
works which were conceived as textbooks for introductory course given at university level.”  
See: Kuehn, “Introduction,” in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, ed. Robert 
B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), xi.    
281 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888), xx.  
282 As Manfred Kuehn observes, Kant’s first lecture on anthropology predates even the 1774 
edition of Home’s Sketches of the History of Man by more than a year.  See: Kuehn, 
“Introduction,” vii.  Zammito takes Kant’s work on anthropology back even further, making the 
case that already in 1768, several years before Kant began his anthropology lectures and four 
years before the publication of Platner’s Anthropology, Kant “was already very advanced toward 
his conceptualization of a new disciplinary anthropology.”  See: Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the 
Birth of Anthropology, 292. 
283 Kuehn, “Introduction,” viii. 
 presenting it, at least superficially, as a purely 
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empirical endeavor.284  Furthermore, as Manfred Kuehn notes, Kant “also felt it necessary to 
point out explicitly that [in the Anthropology] he would not address such ‘subtle’ but ‘eternally 
futile’ questions or philosophical problems as the mind-body relation.”285  We see this separation 
between anthropology and “serious philosophy” (in this case, metaphysics) in Kant’s statement 
that, in anthropology, “experiences are appearances united according to laws of understanding, 
and in taking into consideration our ways of representing things, the question of how they are 
apart from their relation to the senses is not pursued at all; for this belongs to metaphysics, which 
has to do with the possibility of a priori cognition.”286  Kant continues by saying that man’s 
inner life, made up in part by his inner sense and intuition, “[is] not merely anthropological.”287
This division between anthropology and “serious philosophy” is often attributed to a split 
in Kant’s work between a pre-critical stage and a critical stage: in other words, between the 
early, popular Kant of the Anthropology and the older, more academic post-1781 Kant of the 
Critiques.  The Anthropology is attributed to his less mature oeuvre, while the point at which he 
became a mature thinker (and turned away from anthropology) is typically placed at the 
  
Thus, one’s consciousness of oneself, of how one appears to oneself through inner experience, 
does not belong to the sphere of anthropology, but to that of psychology and metaphysics. 
                                                 
284 Although, as Zammito points out, his method was perhaps more physical than empirical.  See: 
Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, 302. 
285 Kuehn, “Introduction,” viii-ix. 
286 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, ed. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006), 33. 
287 Ibid., 53. 
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completion of his Inaugural Dissertation, published in 1770, in which he denounces the 
empirical sciences (among whose ranks he includes anthropology) as naïve.  The split between 
“professional” and “popular philosophy” that Guseinov and Lektorskii speak of in the 
abovementioned quotation is quite similar, as their concept of “professional philosophy” implies 
scholarship that requires “special training” to comprehend.288  And indeed, not only is this the 
analytic camp’s most common critique of Continental philosophy and “literature as 
philosophy”—that it is not “technical enough”—but the same critique was made of Kant’s work 
on anthropology.  Although two thousand copies of the Anthropology were printed in its first 
edition (more than any of the first editions of his other works) and his lectures on anthropology 
were anecdotally said to be more popular among his students than any of the other topics on 
which he lectured, Kuehn notes that, critically, the book did not gain the philosopher any 
respect.289  It received only a single, embarrassing discussion in contemporary journals upon its 
publication—a negative review by Friedrich Schleiermacher, who reduced the text to “a 
collection of trivial matters.”290
                                                 
288 Guseinov and Lektorskii, “Filosofiia v Rossii,” 15. 
289 Kuehn, “Introduction,” x. 
290Qtd. ibid., x.   
   
 Indeed, the replacement of anthropology by “serious scholarship” is assumed to have 
gone hand-in-hand with a significant decline in his status.  Zammito notes that, while Kant was a 
well-known participant in intellectual and university culture in the 1760s and some of the 1770s, 
he had fallen out of widespread recognition almost entirely by the time he completed the twelve-
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Yet, although Kant’s empirical anthropology seems to in many ways coincide with 
generalizations that we might make about anthropology in its contemporary form—the history of 
man and the objects of man, accompanied by a kind of Geertzian “thick description”—it would 
be incorrect to accept a clear break between anthropology and metaphysics in his work.  While 
metaphysics might not have had a place in anthropology, Kant was clear that anthropology did 
play an important role in metaphysics.  In his summary of the four eternal questions of the 
discipline of philosophy in the Logic [Logik, 1800], for instance, the final query is an explicitly 
anthropological one: namely, “What is a human being?.”  Moreover, Kant notes that all four 
questions—the others being: What can I know?; What ought I to do?; and, What may I hope?—
“could be reckoned to be anthropology, because the first three questions are related to the 
last.”291  In this way, it is only with the help of the anthropological method and the knowledge it 
provides that the philosopher is able to achieve the primary goals of philosophy: “to be able to 
determine: 1) the source of human knowledge; 2) the extent of the possible advantageous use of 
all knowledge, and finally; 3) the limited use of reason.”292
                                                                                                                                                             
year project that would be the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which began in 1768/69.  See: 
Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, 229. 
291 Kant, Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (NY: Dover P, 1974), 29. 
292 Ibid., 29. 
  Thus, while critics are often inclined 
to separate the Anthropology from the rest of Kant’s philosophical oeuvre, Kant himself made 
his stance on anthropology very clear: although anthropology was certainly more superficial than 
psychology and metaphysics, it was to serve as the doorway to these higher disciplines.    
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We see a similar struggle to reconcile philosophy and anthropology played out in 
Podoroga’s and Horujy’s contemporary projects.  The tension between a notion of academic 
philosophy and some form of popular philosophy (in this case, anthropology) remains salient 
even in the twenty-first century, and both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s philosophical anthropologies 
fall into the latter, marginal category.  They are criticized as being just two more re-
appropriations of the pre-revolutionary tradition, whether in their religious content (Horujy) or in 
their speculative language (Podoroga and Horujy).  While both approaches do make use of some 
of the language and gestures of the dominating religious paradigm that was resumed with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, in reality they seek to forge a new paradigm for Russian 
philosophical thought.   
In presenting Podoroga’s and Hojury’s philosophies as alternatives to the religious 
narrative, I do not have in mind Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigm shifts.  First, Kuhn’s 
approaches to the concept of “paradigm shift” is limited to the context of the active, informed 
achievements in the sphere of the theoretical sciences.293  Second, for Kuhn, such paradigm 
shifts work in only one direction—that is, we can never look back once we have accepted a 
former paradigm as mistaken, and incorrect attempts to forge new paradigms are rarely 
remembered.294
                                                 
293 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970), 10. 
294 Ibid., 17.  Thus, Kuhn notes that, now knowing that light is photons, we can never return to 
the scientific paradigm held in the early nineteenth century that asserted that light was transverse 
wave motion. 
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Alasdair MacIntyre offers what I find to be a more workable model for the humanities in 
his essay on the “epistemological crisis,” which he sees not as a wholesale shift from one 
paradigm to another but as involving the historically informed construction of a new narrative, 
that “enables the agent to understand both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her 
original beliefs and how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them.”295  The 
resolving of an epistemological crisis does not result in us being in a position to claim that we 
possess the truth or are now fully rational, he continues.  We can say only that “this is the best 
account that anyone has been able to give so far, and that our beliefs about what the marks of ‘a 
best account so far’ are will themselves change in unpredictable ways.”296
5.2 AGAINST “METHODOLOGICAL SLOPPINESS”: VALERII 
PODOROGA AND SERGEI HORUJY 
  While we do not 
necessarily find this level of modesty in the two alternative anthropologies that I want to look at 
here, both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s approaches are active attempts to resolve a very real 
epistemological crisis of contemporary Russian philosophical thought. 
In 1993 and 1994, Valerii Podoroga—head of the then Laboratory for Post-classical Research 
[Laboratoriia postklassicheskikh issledovanii] at the Moscow Academy of Sciences—led a series 
                                                 
295 MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” in 
The Tasks of Philosophy I (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 5. 
296 Ibid., 5. 
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of ten meetings at the newly opened Center for Modern Art in Moscow.297  Together the 
seminars made up the “Visual Anthropology Workshop” [“Masterskaia vizual'noi antropologii”] 
and were attended by philosophers, artists, and art critics.  Each meeting took the form of 
interactions with, and discussions on, a variety of visual artifacts (some of which were authored 
by workshop participants), including both classical and avant-garde paintings, drawings, 
photographs, films, installations, and performances.  As Podoroga described it during one of the 
meetings, his anthropology “is like any other anthropology: it studies morals and customs, 
symbols, gestures, rules and all the other multifarious particulars of the everyday and not-so-
everyday life of man.”298  In Phenomenology of the Body [Fenomenologiia tela, 1995], Podoroga 
emphasizes that his practice of visual anthropology, which exists as a sub-category of the larger 
methodology of analytic anthropology, is not about challenging the discipline of anthropology, 
but of extending its reach from observations of data (in this case, artistic, cinematic, and literary 
texts) to “a philosophical understanding of anthropological material.”299
                                                 
297 The Center for Modern Art in Moscow opened in 1991. 
298 Podoroga, ed., Masterskaia vizual'noi antropologii 1993-1994, curator V. Miziano (M: 
Khudozhestvennyi zhurnal, 2000), 50.  
[“Визуальная антропология … подобно всякой другой антропологии, исследует нравы и 
обычаи, знаки, жесты, правила и все другие разнообразные реквизиты обыденной и 
необыденной жизни человека.”]   
299 Podoroga, Fenomenologiia tela (M: Ad Marginem, 1995), 6-7.  
[“В анализе я стремился идти от литературных, живописных, кинематографических 
образцов к философскому осмыслению антропологического материала.”] 
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In reality, however, in Podoroga’s anthropology the focus is not as much on the objects 
of study as on the very mechanisms and practices of observation.  Here the gaze is turned upon 
its own source so that the act of perceiving itself becomes the object of criticism.  The idea that 
“we never have the power to be one step ahead of our own bodies”300 takes up the center of 
Podoroga’s anthropology, and during the Visual Anthropology Workshop many of the 
discussions focused on the human body as an inescapable border between the observer and the 
observed.  Implicitly recalling Kant’s own lengthy discussions of the faculties of the senses in 
the Anthropology, Podoroga focused on the concept of “surface” and on one’s sensing of one’s 
own “skin”—that is, the physical outer limit of the human body.  “Human behavior is given to 
us, but always through the observer,” Podoroga says in his characteristically postmodern style of 
presentation, and so the task of visual anthropology is “to observe what is human in man.”301
                                                                                                                                                             
In 1997 the Center for Post-classical Research at the Institute of Philosophy became the Sector 
for Analytic Anthropology—the name it keeps to this day.  See the sector’s official site:  
http://iph.ras.ru/analit_anthropology.htm 
300 Ibid., 50. 
[“Мы никогда не в силах опередить собственное тело”] 
301 Podoroga, ed., Masterskaia, 50.  
[“Нам дано человеческое поведение, но всегда дано через наблюдателя, его задача: 
наблюдать за человеческим  в человеке. / “Наблюдать за человеческим в человеке.”]  
  
Here the word “human” can be read as referring to the limits of human observation, again 
emphasizing the focus in his work on the borders between the body and the external world.   
 Although the Visual Anthropology Workshop was conceived immediately after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union (it was the first of its kind in the then newly post-Soviet Russian 
Federation), it bears little stylistic resemblance to the otherwise dominating resurrection of the 
legacy of pre-Revolutionary Russian religious philosophy.302
                                                 
302 The topic of post-Soviet identity is equally absent from the discussion—a topic that would 
later become fundamental to the research conducted in Podoroga’s sub-department at the 
Institute of Philosophy in the late nineties and the first decade of the twenty-first century.   
  Instead, any thematic or 
conceptual structure is undermined by the dissociative poetics of postmodernism.  In fact, even 
more so than any theories of visual observation or art theory, the primary mechanism at play in 
Podoroga’s Visual Anthropology Workshop is postmodern philosophy and its aesthetic and 
semantic canon.  We pick up not only on references (more often implied than explicit) to 
Georges Bataille, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, but the workshop, especially when looked 
at as an ongoing conversation, is structured by the pastiche that has in many regards become the 
identifying structural unit of postmodernism.  Here I have in mind not only the aesthetic hodge-
podge implied by the word “pastiche,” which is apparent in the way that discussions move from 
one topic to the next with little structure, and whereby ideas are rarely “summed-up” or brought 
to a logical conclusion.  I have in mind also, in some senses, the imitative meaning of “pastiche,” 
in that the discussions are a reflection of a particular postmodern style of philosophizing whereby 
a variety of broad, speculative, and often abstract, topics and questions are introduced and then 
quickly replaced, leading to a sweeping, almost performative, play of ideas that do not 
necessarily lead to answers but to more questions and more ideas.  Alexei Penzin has called this 
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Podoroga’s philosophy of “‘exceptionalism’ [ekstseptsionalizm], where the content lies not so 
much in the critique as it does in the potentialization of other discourses.”303
We see this gradual unfolding of discourse at the third meeting of the Visual 
Anthropology Workshop, for instance, which took place on 9 December 1993 and included 
invited guest Susan Buck-Morss.  The theme of the day was the nature of “disgust,” and the 
discussion moved from questions of whether aversion can or cannot be the main inspiration 
behind a work of art to a discussion of the nature of art itself.  “What is a work of art?,” asked 
Elena Petrovskaia, faculty member in Podoroga’s department at the Institute of Philosophy.  “Is 
it what you put in quotation marks, or are the quotation marks themselves the work of art?”
     
304
                                                 
303 Penzin, “Minima Anthropologica: ‘analiticheskaia antropologiia’ v obshchestve mimeticheskogo 
truda,” Intelros: Intellektual'naia Rossiia. http://www.intelros.org/club/pemzin.htm 
[“В целом она определяется как философский «эксцепционализм», работа которого 
состоит не столько в критике, сколько в потенциализации других дискурсов.”] 
304 In an equally postmodern gesture, the answer that Petrovskaia gives is that the quotation 
marks themselves are the work of art.  See: Podoroga, ed., Masterskaia, 74 
[“Что же является произведением искусства – то ,  что ты ставишь в кавычки,  или сами 
кавычки?”] 
  
Continuing with postmodernism’s fondness for capitalization and punctuation (be it the use of 
quotation marks, parenthesis, the hyphen, or the act of “bracketing”), the conversation then 
jumped back to the question of aversion, where Podoroga makes the distinction between “ot-
vrashchenie,” or “dis-gust,” and “so-vrashchenie,” or “sed-uction.”  He identifies these 
phenomena (which he hyphenates to play on their shared root vrashchat' [to turn or rotate]) as 
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inverse reactions, explaining in a drawing that if we start at a center, or “null,” point of 
observation, “disgust” is the observer’s turning away from that point, while “seduction” is the 
turning toward or down onto that same point.305
The very same focus on human corporeality is apparent in Podoroga’s personal body of 
work, where literature (and sometimes cinema and the other visual arts) becomes the primary 
object of study.
  This schema is then abandoned without much 
further reflection and the conversation moves on to a different topic.  
306  In his work on Dostoevskii, Podoroga defends the claim that the author’s 
heroes lack definition from their surroundings and are fused to the settings and plots in which 
they find themselves.  They are “bodies without skin,” Podoroga writes, in that they “include 
within themselves ‘their personal’ objects, landscapes, people, time (by which [they] live and 
die), space (which they render habitable or traverse), bodies, faces, looks, etc.”307
                                                 
305 Ibid., 85 
306 For Podoroga’s most recent work on literature, see: Mimesis. Materialy po analiticheskoi 
antropologii literatury, 2 vol (M: Kul'turnaia Revoliutsiia, Logos, and Logos altera, 2006); On 
cinema and painting, see, for instance: Podoroga, Fenomenologiia tela (M: Ad Marginem, 1995) 
and “Litso i pravila raskroia. Fiziognomicheskii opyt Sergeia Eizenshteina,” in Fenomenologiia 
tela (M: Ad Marginem, 1995): 282-326. 
307 Podoroga, “Chelovek bez kozhi.  Dostoevskii.”  Antropolog.ru. http://www.antropolog.ru 
/doc/ persons/podor/podor 
[“включает в себя ‘свои’ вещи, ландшафты, людей, время, которым живут и умирают 
герои, пространство, которое они обживают или пересекают, тела, лица, взгляды и т.п.”] 
  Thus, the 
typical Dostoevskian hero is not given through description and strategic narrative unfolding, but 
 153 
is exposed to the reader “like a wound.”  It is for precisely this reason that architecture plays a 
fundamental role in Dostoevskii’s work, whereby the interior of one’s room acts as the skin that 
the heroes lack.308
What is more, Podoroga adds that although Dostoevskii’s narrators strip their characters 
bare and expose them to humiliating and injurious acts, the narrators themselves have no 
personal sensory experience of corporeal life.  Thus, through narration “there is no situation of 
vision created for the reader, by the help of which he might perceivably (through touch) imagine 
the figures of the characters, things, natural objects, time, or space. … [Dostoevskii’s] is a dim 
   
According to Podoroga, it is Dostoevskii’s narrators that strip the characters bare of their 
metaphorical skin.  In particular, they do so through their rapid, rambling narratorial style.  This 
is a narration not in the classical sense, in which action depends on the movement of the 
characters’ bodies from scene to another or from one action to the next; it is an unstoppable 
verbal acceleration nourished on the destruction of the human form, where narrative progresses 
at the expense of the body.  As Dostoevskii’s stories move forward, bodies are exposed, 
wounded, stricken with illness and anxiety, and exterminated; they are bought and sold, broken 
through suffering and hard labor, and thrown to the floor in fits of hysterics and acts of 
confession.  Podoroga refers to this encounter of the Dostoevskian form, which he terms a “new 
experience of the body,” as regressive: it propels the character backward to its most corporeal 
state, a condition Podoroga likens to Catalepsy, where the muscles become uncontrollably rigid 
and bodily functions slow down dramatically.   
                                                 
308 Ibid. 
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and unprepossessing world.”309  Given that for Podoroga it is the sense of touch that is frequently 
privileged above the other modes of perception (we will recall that even in his description of 
visual anthropology, the boundaries of our skin are the very limits of our perception), it is not 
surprising that Podoroga focuses on here is Dostoevskii’s narrators’ deficient sensory 
capabilities.  While it may be ironic to speak of connecting with a text through touch, for 
Podoroga, what these narrators lack above all is the ability to provide the reader with this tactual 
experience.  Unable to rely on the language of Dosteovskii’s narrators for a haptic connection, 
the reader is left no choice but to turn to the pace of narration as a guide.  Thus, as Podoroga 
writes: “In Dostoevskii, the haptic is reduced to the experience of the speed of the events of the 
narration, and it is only through this shroud, as if falling on the text of his novels, that we get the 
sensation of a new experience of the body.”310
                                                 
309 Ibid.  
[Но в текстах Достоевского для читателя не создано никакой ситуации видения, с 
помощью которой он мог бы зримо (через касание) представить себе фигуры 
персонажей, вещи, природные объекты, время и пространство.  Это мир тусклых и  
невзрачных … .] 
310 Ibid. 
[“ … гаптическое сводится у Достоевского к переживанию скорости событий речи, и  
только через эту пелену, словно опустившуюся на тексты его романов, мы получаем 
ощущение нового опыта тела …”] 
  In this way, Dostoevskii’s bodies are not written 
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as subjects that move within the narrative, but they are “alcoholic, hysterical, epileptic, body-
machines, body-victims,” subject to their respective narrator’s own self-absorbed momentum.311
For Podoroga, it is crucial that the reader understand the alienating nature of 
Dostoevskii’s texts as facilitating this new experience of the body.  To react negatively to his 
rapid narratorial style would be to misunderstand the author, he argues.  But should such a 
misunderstanding occur, it would not a problem of one’s knowledge or consciousness, he argues, 
but a problem of the body.
 
312
 We misunderstand a text not because we lack the knowledge to comprehend it,  
  but because we are unable … to establish adequate corporeal communication with 
  it, because we are unable to ‘enter’ into a new imaginary space, just as the   
  language that describes it remains profoundly foreign to us and even seems  
  incapable of being literary language.
  Thus, as Podoroga emphasizes:  
313
                                                 
311 Ibid.  
[“… тела алкоголические, истерические, эпилептоидные, тела-машины, тела-жертвы …”] 
 Podoroga is careful to distinguish Dostoevskii the author from his narratorial voice, 
although he does draw a comparison between the speed of narration in Dostoevskii’s works and 
the author’s own habit of dictating his novels rather than writing them. 
312 Ibid. 
[“Непонимание  - это прежде всего проблема тела … .] 
313 Ibid. 
  
[“Мы не понимаем текст потому, что не можем на первых порах установить с ним 
адекватную телесную коммуникацию, не можем “войти” в новое воображаемое 
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Jumping ahead a little over a decade, the second “alternative anthropology” in question is 
philosopher and theoretical physicist Sergei Horujy’s synergetic anthropology.314  Although 
Horujy and Podoroga are of the same generation (Horujy was born in 1941 and Podoroga in 
1946), Horujy’s anthropology made its appearance as a developed methodology only in 2005 
with the publication of Studies in Synergetic Anthropology [Ocherki sinergiinoi antropologii, 
2005].315  This was the same year in which Horujy founded the Institute of Synergetic 
Anthropology [Institut Sinergiinoi Antropologii], of which he is the director.  The opening of the 
Institute came about around the same time that Horujy and several other members of the section 
for Science and Theology at the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences renounced their 
memberships during a falling-out over (from Horujy’s perspective) pseudoscientific and 
unprofessional behavior on the part of several Academy members.316
                                                                                                                                                             
пространство, так как язык, который описывает его, остается нам глубоко чуждым и даже 
кажется невозможным как литературный язык.”]  
314 Horujy’s synergetic anthropology has also appeared recently in Mikhail Epstein’s “Ideas 
Against Ideocracy: The Platonic Drama of Russian Thought,” in In Marx’s Shadow. Knowledge, 
Intellectuals, and Power in Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. Costica Bradan and Serguei A. 
Oushakine (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2010), 13-36. 
315 Horujy had been writing on synergy as early as 1995, with the publication of Synergy. 
Problems of the Asceticism and Mysticism of Orthodoxy.  See: Khoruzhii, Sinergiia. Problemy 
asketiki i mistiki Pravoslaviia (M: Di-Dik, 1995).  
316 For more on this see Stoeckl, “Sergei S. Horujy’s ‘Synergetic Anthropology,’” note 3.   
  The Institute of Synergetic 
Anthropology is not a formal, accredited institution of higher education, but runs a lively lecture 
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series at various venues and hosts an extensive on-line library of texts on all aspects of 
Synergetic Anthropology in several languages.317
The goal of the Institute, in the words of its mission statement, is to familiarize the 
intellectual community with the ideas of synergetic anthropology.
   
318  Here, in the original 
Russian, the modifier “synergetic” is the unexpected adjective “sinergiinyi” (as opposed to 
“sinergichnyi”), which refers back to Byzantine Church Father and defender of Hesychasm 
Gregorios Palamas, canonized in 1368 as a Saint in the Eastern Orthodox Church.  Hesychasm, a 
process of gaining insight into God through various forms of retreating into the self, including 
solitude, rigorous aestheticism, and trance-like repetition of the Jesus Prayer (“Lord Jesus Christ, 
Son of God, have mercy on me, the sinner”), came under attack by the Orthodox Church in the 
mid-fourteenth century.  In particular, Hesychasm was accused of polytheism for viewing God 
not as a unity but as two distinct substances.  We see suggestions of the source of this charge in 
Palamas’ use of the Greek energeiai to distinguish between the energy of God and the essence of 
God.  While we do not have access to God’s essence, Palamas argued, we do have access to his 
energy, “which penetrates and changes a man’s heart when it is diffused throughout his body.”319
                                                 
317 In February of 2006, a Center for Synergetic Anthropology was established as part of the 
Department of Philosophy at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow).  The Center is run by 
Oleg Genisaretskii and Horujy.  See: http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/sci/137463   
318 Khoruzhii,  Institut sinergeiinoi antropologii, http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3 
319 Qtd. Robert Payne, The Holy Fire: the Story of the Fathers of the Eastern Church (NY: 
Harper, 1957), 277. 
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It is from Palamas’ understanding of energeiai that Horujy derives the adjective 
“sinergiinyi,” which he employs as a descriptor of his Neo-Patristic concept of “synergy”—a 
metaphysical conformity of events, or the joining of both human and divine energies as the final 
rung of the Hesychast spiritual ladder.320  Horujy continues that, unlike classical European 
approaches to anthropology, which begin and end their examinations with the physiognomic and 
behavioral characteristics of man, synergetic anthropology’s foundation in Hesychasm allows us 
to “view [man] as a formation of energy—as an aggregate of all possible multidirectional 
energies.”321  The individual passes through a number of possible energy configurations as he 
ascends the “Hesychast ladder,” striving toward the final goal of a dialogue with God—the top of 
the ladder; the “highest configuration.”322
While Kantian anthropology treats man and his sensory faculties as the primary object of 
study, Horujy moves the body from the center to the border.  He is not interested in man’s 
   
                                                 
320 Khoruzhii, “Chto takoe ‘sinergiinaia antropologiia,’” Institut Sinergiinoi Antropologii, 
http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3595 
Horujy has mentioned that he began studying Hesychasm in the 1970s, together (in part) 
with Vladimir Bibikhin.  See: Khoruzhii, “Filosofiia pod antropologicheskim uglom zreniia” 
Institut Sinergiinoi antropologii,  http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=4301#H 
321 Khoruzhii, “Filosofiia pod,” 4. 
[“…рассматривает его как энергийное образование, совокупность всевозможных и 
разнонаправленных энергий”] 
322 Khoruzhii, “‘Brat'ia Karamazovy’ v prizme isikhastskoi antropologii, Institut Sinergiinoi 
Antropologii, http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3595. 
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development as an isolated subject, or in the sense data we may gain about him, but on the limits 
of man and the spaces in which he interacts with others—in particular, his interactions with 
divine energies.  These synergetic relationships occur in the space that Horujy calls the 
“anthropological border” [“antropologicheskaia granitsa”].  In her extensive work on his 
synergetic anthropology, Kristina Stoekl has called this Horujy’s search for an alternative to the 
Cartesian subject,323
At its most basic level, synergetic anthropology seeks to provide us with a way to 
describe and explain religious (and primarily, but not exclusively, Orthodox) phenomena from a 
purportedly methodological, or systematic, point of view.  What is more, Horujy’s explicitly 
Hesychast approach seeks to transform human action and man’s relationship with the divine into 
a fecund sphere of anthropological inquiry rich with phenomena overlooked by traditional 
anthropological methodologies.
 since Cartesianism does not make room for a discussion of the energies of 
God and man, nor for the process of deification [obozhenie] that occurs when these energies join.   
324
                                                 
323 Stoekl, “A new anthropology: Sergej S. Khoružij’s search for an alternative to the 
Cartesian subject in Ocerki sinergijnoj antropologii,” Studies in East European Thought 
59.3 (2008): 237-245. 
324 Khoruzhii, “Filosofiia pod,” 2. 
  Horujy claims that we can speak about religious phenomena 
in many of the same ways and with much of the same vocabulary (e.g. energy, synergy) with 
which we discuss scientific data.  Therefore, when we switch from the scientific to the religious, 
he contends, it does not require a methodological move from logic to mysticism, just as, in the 
Russian context, it does not imply that we must turn away from science and toward pre-
revolutionary religious philosophy.  In this sense it is productive to compare Horujy with Pavel 
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Florenskii who, in his work in physics and electrodynamics at the beginning of the twentieth 
century—and in particular, in his book Imaginary Numbers in Geometry.  The Expansion of the 
Field of Two-Dimensional Forms of Geometry [Mnimosti v geometrii.  Rasshirenie oblasti 
dvukhmernykh obrazov geometrii, 1922]—sought to prove that his geometrical reconfiguration 
of Einstein’s theory of relativity was the same geometrical structure we might find in the 
kingdom of God.325
Like Podoroga, Horujy is often quick to apply his synergetic anthropological method to 
literature, and we see one such application in his reading of Dostoevskii’s The Brothers 
Karamazov [Brat'ia Karamazvy, 1880].  For Horujy, the novel’s “anthropology of the 
Karamazov’s” is in many ways a reflection of Dostoevskii’s own understanding of 
Hesychasm.
   
326  Not only was Dostoevskii most certainly familiar with the tradition of 
Hesychasm, but Horujy points out that in the summer of 1878, as he was beginning work on The 
Brothers Karamazov, the author made a brief visit with Vladimir Solov'ev to the fifteenth-
century Optina Desert Monastery in Kozel'sk, Russia.327
                                                 
325 Florenskii, Mnimosti v geometrii.  Rasshirenie oblasti dvukhmernykh obrazov geometrii (M: 
Editorial URSS, 2004).  For Horujy’s own, often critical, reading of Florenskii, see “Filosofskii 
simvolizm Florenskogo i ego zhiznennye istoki,” in Posle Pereryva. Puti russkoi filosofii (SPb: 
Alteiia, 1994); and Mirosozertsanie Florenskogo (Tomsk: Volodei, 1999).  
326 Horujy is well known not only for his active and widespread promotion of synergetic 
anthropology, but for his co-translation of James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), published in 1993.  See 
Dzheims Dzois, Uliss, trans. Viktor Khinkiss and Sergei Khoruzhii (M: Respublika, 1993). 
327 Khoruzhii, “‘Brat'ia Karamazovy,”’ http://synergia-isa.ru/?page_id=3595 
  It is in part due to this trip to the 
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“center of Hesyachast thought,” Horujy argues, that accounts for the important status of 
Hesychasm in the novel, and for the fact that the “anthro-cosmos” of the novel is rooted almost 
entirely along the border where anthropological phenomena and Hesychasm meet.328
In contrast to Podoroga’s reading of Dostoevskii, in which the narrator moves his 
characters backwards toward a regressive, cataleptic corporeality, Horujy focuses on the 
movement of Dostoevskii’s spiritually privileged characters up the Hesychast ladder.  While for 
Podoroga it is the narrator who moves bodies according to his will, for Horujy the narrator has 
no anthropological role in The Brothers Karamazov; he has no position of his own—no singular, 
Bakhtinian voice.  Horujy argues that the Hesychast doctrine is most apparent in the character of 
Dmitrii Karamazov, who embodies in his conversion the two main rungs of the Hesychast 
ladder: the struggle with human passion and the need for repentance through Christ.  Again, here 
Horujy makes use of the dialectic of synergy: “As Hesychsm tells us, the world of repentance 
and the world of passions stand in opposition to one another and man must forge a path through 
them, overcome one with help of the other, to move further, higher.”
   
329
                                                 
328 Here Horujy again speaks of borders, this time of the border between the anthropological life 
of man and the practices of Hesychasm.  He calls the points where these two meet the “bordering 
stratum,” or “layer” [“primykaiushchii sloi”]. See Khoruzhii, “‘Brat'ia Karamazovy,’” 7-8. 
329 Ibid. 
[“Как говорит исихазм, мир покаяния и мир страстей противостоят друг другу, и человек 
должен выстроить путь через [sic] них, отринуть один и с помощью другого двинуться 
дальше, выше.”] 
  We see the various 
stages of the Hesychast ladder played out in the text, he asserts, from Dimitrii’s struggles with 
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desire to his conversion at the novel’s close.  It is for these reasons that Horujy not only cites The 
Brothers Karamazov as an exemplary instance of synergetic anthropology in practice (even if 
only in “literary practice”), but he identifies its publication as ushering in a revival of Hesychast 
thought in late nineteenth-century Russia. 
Without stepping into a debate over whether there was such a Hesychast revival in Russia 
and whether The Brothers Karamazov was the force that brought it about, we might note that, 
upon first glance, both Podoroga’s and Horujy’s respective anthropologies stir up the same 
criticism as Kant’s Anthropology: that is, What do these “anthropologies” have to do with 
philosophy? Moreover, they also evoke the standard critical query directed at contemporary 
Russian philosophical thought: Are not analytic anthropology and synergetic anthropology just 
two more speculative attempts on the part of literary criticism and/or Orthodox theology to forge 
seamless, exclusionary worldviews that promote exceptionalism and exclude dialogue?   
While both thinkers are undoubtedly the object of reproach for their non-classical 
approaches to philosophy, what makes them interesting for our purposes is that they both exist 
inside the classical Russian speculative tradition without conforming to all the clichés bound to 
the religious narrative.  In this sense, we might view them in light of the enlightenment 
anthropological project: that is, if anthropology arose in the work of Kant, Platner, and Home “as 
part of the response to the failure of the mechanist paradigm to incorporate the life sciences” as 
Zammito suggests,330
                                                 
330 Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, 229. 
 then in the post-Soviet period we might view new anthropological 
approaches (of which Podoroga’s and Horujy’s are only two) as similar reactions against some 
failed paradigm.  In this particular case, for both Podoroga and Horujy, the failed paradigm is the 
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religious narrative—and, more specifically, the legacy of pre-revolutionary Russian religious 
philosophy—resurrected by the overwhelming majority of thinkers after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.   
In visual anthropology, for instance, Podoroga does not seek to identify what is Russian 
about Russian literature, or to link it with the history of Russian philosophical thought.  On the 
contrary, he rarely cites Russian-language sources in his work, seeking instead to propagate a 
reading of the Russian literary tradition that is linked with the Continental tradition—primarily 
French post-structuralism and postmodernism and the Frankfurt School.331  As Penzin points out, 
in Podoroga’s lectures in the late nineties he regularly used the term “negative anthropology” as 
a means of connecting what he and his colleagues at the Institute of Philosophy were doing with 
the Frankfurt school and Günther Anders, in whose work traditional anthropological methods 
were criticized for failing to account for the real conditions of human existence in modernity: 
suffering, alienation, violence, and terror.332
Although Podoroga labeled his anthropological approach “analytic” early on in the 
workshops, insofar as the goal was to analyze observation from a philosophical perspective, we 
see that it is quite the opposite of Wittgenstein’s description of analytic philosophy in both the 
Tractatus (1921) and the Logical Investigations (1953), where philosophy does not lead to more 
   
                                                 
331 In particular, he has criticized the Russian tradition for uncritically blurring the boundaries 
between literature and philosophy, arguing that although the two disciplines are intimately 
related in Russia, this relationship has a long and complicated history.  See: Podoroga, 
“Filosofiia i literatura,” in Polit.ru, http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2006/07/28/podoroga.html 
332 Penzin, “Minima Anthropologica.” 
 164 
quandaries but is the way that we simplify discourse and dissolve problems: as Wittgenstein 
describes it, the aim of philosophy is “to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle.”333  In 
Wittgenstein’s model, thus, the successful philosopher closes the space of philosophy through 
the offering of answers, so that when he has finished his work he has no questions with which to 
occupy himself.  Podoroga takes the opposite approach.  Instead of closing down philosophical 
discourse, whether through analytic reduction or through the identification of “characterizing 
traits” or “Russian ideas,” in analytic anthropology the result is the opening of a wider and wider 
space of discourse through the posing of more and more abstract questions.334  “The analytic 
procedure is simple,” Podoroga writes.  “It is to trace the perception of any given utterance, 
which, as we know, is not carried out in its own time: that is, any utterance is irrecoverable, but 
if it is recovered it is done so at the expense of the time of understanding.”335
                                                 
333 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. Anscombe (NY: Macmillan, 1953), 
Sect. 309. 
334 Penzin has called this Podoroga’s approach of “neutrality in the ‘war of discourses.  See: 
Penzin, “Minima Anthropologica.” 
 335 Podoroga, ed., Avto-bio-grafiia.  K voprodu o metode. Tedradi po analiticheskoi antropologii (M: 
 Logos, 2001), 164-6.  
[“Аналитическая процедура проста: проследить за восприятием того или иного 
высказывания, которое, как мы знаем, осуществляется не в его собственном времени, т.е. 
всякое высказывание невосстановимо, а если восстанавливается, то за счет времени 
понимания.”] 
  In this way, the 
analytic method works towards “the reconstruction of the meaning allotted to a given object … 
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in every opposing discourse.”336
In synergetic anthropology we see the same rejection of the standard religious narrative.  
Although Horujy emphasizes that, in synergetic anthropology, the individual’s spiritual journey 
begins with a turning [obrashchenie] toward God and ends with deification [obozhenie] through 
synergy, Horujy explicitly avoids aligning himself with Solov'ev’s discourse on all-unity or 
Godmanhood, as he finds it un-nuanced, neo-Platonic (as opposed to Neo-Patristic), and 
ultimately, unable to account for essential (i.e. having to do with essences) differences between 
humans and the divine.
  Thus, his use of the adjective “analytic” here has less to do 
with the analytic approach as a philosophical movement and more to do with the systematic 
tracing of utterances in and out of various contexts.  
337  In fact, Horujy takes great and careful pains to differentiate his 
Orthodox philosophy from much of the history of Russian philosophy.  Despite the explicitly 
religious content of his writing, he has described his development of synergetic anthropology as 
a “moving away from the ‘methodological sloppiness’ of the pre-revolutionary religious 
philosophers to the theological rigor of the Neo-Patristic theologians.”338
                                                 
336 Ibid., 8.  
[“… аналитическая работа сводится к реконструкции смысла, которым наделен тот или 
иной объект … в каждом из противоборствующих дискурсов.”] 
337 Khoruzhii, Imiaslavie i kul'tura serebrianogo veka: Fenomen moskovskoi shkoly 
khristianskogo neoplatonizma. Opyty iz russkoi dukhovnoi traditsii (M: Izd-vo. Parad, 2005), 
297. 
338 Qtd. Stoeckl, “Sergei S. Horujy’s ‘Synergetic Anthropology,’” 4. 
  In articles, talks, and at 
round tables he has spoken out against the concept of the Russian idea, as well as against the use 
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of the phrase “Russian philosophy” [“russkaia filosofiia”] as necessarily implying Russian 
religious philosophy.  Furthermore, he has criticized Mikhail Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev, as 
well as their contemporary followers for considering Solov'ev’s philosophy of “all unity” a 
starting point for any serious Orthodox metaphysics.339
Although Podoroga’s analytic anthropology is primarily a-religious, delving into religion 
only as far as in a Heideggerien sense, what it shares with Horujy’s explicitly Orthodox 
synergetic anthropology is that both shift the focus from a man-centered conception of 
anthropology to a philosophical anthropology of the border.  In Podoroga’s case, this shift occurs 
by focusing not just on the human faculties of observation, but on the limits of observation and 
on the limits of the body itself.  While during the Visual Anthropology Workshop much of the 
discussion was not on the individual as anthropological subject but on “skin” and the physical 
limits of the human body, Horujy’s own parallel shift from the center to the border occurs in his 
discussion not of individual essence, but of the borders where human and divine energy 
converge.  In both instances we see the influence of postmodern readings of Heidegger, and 
while this might be expected in Podoroga’s case, it should also not surprise us in Horujy’s, given 
the long collegial relationship between Horujy and Vladimir Bibikhin (1938-2004), who was 
  Here the identification of 
“methodological sloppiness” and the negative attitude toward the majority of pre-revolutionary 
Russian religious thought is crucial, for although he may not always be successful in convincing 
his readers, Horujy actively works against the essentializing tendencies of the standard 
religious/literary conflation.   
                                                 
339 Ibid., 7. 
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Losev’s student and secretary and a translator of Heidegger.340  Here, in the move from a purely 
descriptive anthropology to metaphysical (or, at least, phenomenological) concerns—be it 
Podoroga’s reflection on the manipulation of time through narrative or Horujy’s theories of the 
merging of human and divine essences—we see the shift from a physiological anthropology to 
the metaphysical.  It was precisely this kind of content, one could speculate, that might have 
appeased Schleiermacher, transforming Kant’s Anthropology in his mind from “a collection of 
trivial matters,”341
                                                 
340 See: Khaidegger, Rannii Khaidegger. Materialy k seminaru, trans. Vladimir Bibikhin (M: IF 
sv. Fomy, 2009); Khaidegger, Bytie i vremia, trans. Vladimir Bibikhin (Krasnoiarsk: ACT, 
2003). 
341Qtd. Kuehn, “Introduction,” x. 
 or mere Beobachtungslehre, into a discipline of real philosophical 
significance for mankind.   
While, realistically, Podoroga’s and Horujy’s anthropological approaches to philosophy 
would find little sympathy in the overwhelmingly analytic Western philosophical context, in 
Russia they are alternatives in a philosophical climate that is still, in many spheres, dominated by 
pre-revolutionary approaches to the discipline.  They are active rejections of the “literature as 
religious philosophy” model by two of Russia’s most well-known contemporary philosophers.  
By no means do Podoroga and Horujy shed entirely the standard criticisms of Russian 
philosophical thought—in many instances they even play into these criticisms.  However, their 
alternative anthropological approaches are important insofar as they challenge the traditional 
narrative of what is meant by the term “Russian philosophy,” calling for a revision of not only 
the terms at play, but the foundation on which these terms rest. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION: “A HOLIDAY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY” 
 
In February of 1912 in the journal Russian Thought [Russkaia mysl’], Pavel Novgorodtsev, 
professor at Moscow State University and a leading figure in both the neo-Kantian movement 
and the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party, wrote of the thirty-year anniversary of 
colleague Lev Lopatin’s philosophical career:   
  This was not the typical anniversary celebration, signifying a long term of service  
  or a period of enduring labor.  There was something more here: In truth, it was a  
  holiday of Russian philosophy, which, through the persona of Lopatin, celebrated  
  its coming of age, possibilities of independent creation having opened before it.342
                                                 
342 Qtd. Ershov, Put' razvitiia filosofii v Rossii, 34.  For the original, see: “Prazdnik russkoi 
filosofii. Iubilei L. M. Lopatina,” Russkaia mysl' (Feb. 1912), 40.    
[“Не обычное юбилейное чествование, обозначающее срок долгой службы или искус 
продолжительного труда; тут было нечто большее: это был поистине праздник русской 
философии, которая в лице юбиляра праздновала свое совершеннолетие, пред которой 
открылись перспективы самостоятельного творчества.”] 
 
 Lopatin and Novgorodtsev were colleagues at the journal Questions of Philosophy and 
Psychology [Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii], which Lopatin co-edited and to which Novgorodtsev 
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Novgorodtsev’s language here is likely to elicit at least two questions from the contemporary 
reader: 1) Does “independent creation” indicate a philosophizing that is no longer imitative of 
the West, whereby Russia’s “coming of age” is synonymous with her becoming more 
“Russian”?; or 2) Does “independent creation” signify Russia’s contribution of original, 
influential ideas and texts to the international philosophical community, in which case “coming 
of age” is synonymous with the engagement of a wider circle of external intellectual and 
academic institutions?   
These two lines of questioning are by no means specific to Novgorodtsev’s praise of 
domestic philosophy, but represent two historically self-standing approaches to the study of 
                                                                                                                                                             
contributed.  Novgorodtsev, a doctor of civil law, was one of Russia’s most active advocates of a 
rule-of-law state governed by the theory of natural law—the idea that law is dictated by nature, 
and is therefore universal.  In accordance with these loyalties, for Novgorodtsev the most 
pressing question of his contemporary was a neo-Kantian one: “to understand the connection 
between the existent and the imperative and their ultimate harmony.”  See: Kuvakin, ed., A 
History of Russian Philosophy, from the Tenth through the Twentieth Centuries, vol. II (Buffalo, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 1994), 544.  In his later articles, such as “The Essence of Russian 
Consciousness” [“Sushchestvo russkogo soznaniia”] and “The Church in Its Relation to the 
Spiritual Life of the Future Russia” [“Tserkov v ee otnoshenii k dukhovnoi zhizni budushchei 
Rossii”], we see a growing inclination to include religious considerations into his reconciliation 
of the contemporary political reality and the idea of a universal code of law.   
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Russian thought.343
                                                 
343 Here I should emphasize that in using Novgorodtsev’s speech as an example, I am aware that 
this involves, to a certain extent, projecting a contemporary debate on to an early twentieth 
century text.  This is not necessarily something that we should avoid, however, for although 
Novgorodtsev clearly did not have these two lines of analysis in mind while preparing his 
remarks for Lopatin’s jubilee, the ambiguity in them highlights the historical difficulty in 
untangling the two narratives from one another.  
  These divergent methodologies, as we have seen, permeate all orders of 
philosophical inquiry, from broad questions concerning the beginning of the Russian 
philosophical tradition, its “characterizing traits,” and its most notable figures, to minor details, 
such as the terminology (russkii or rossiiskii) that we are to employ when we speak of the 
tradition.   
If we turn our attention to the first line of questioning, where the holiday of philosophy 
may be interpreted as the celebration of Russian philosophy coming to terms with its own 
“Russianness,” it would be no exaggeration to say that speculation on the “originality” of 
Russian philosophy is a specter from which thinkers (both past and present, Russian and non-
Russian) have long been unable to escape.  This is the more historical paradigm, whereby 
Russian philosophy—a concept that, given Russia’s autocephalous legacy, has often been 
synonymous with Russian Orthodox philosophy—is viewed as somehow fundamentally different 
from the West and thereby indescribable outside the microcosm of its own national thought.  
This is also the very same paradigm that was re-appropriated in the early nineties as the proper 
path for the future of Russian philosophy.   
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As we have seen, however, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the pendulum 
has begun to swing toward the second line of questioning.  Whether disillusioned with the idea 
that Russia has some special philosophical gift it was meant to share with the world, or, more 
likely, never convinced by that argument to begin with, we see the emergence of the second 
reading of Novgorodtsev’s commentary.  Namely, the idea that the primary goal of Russian 
philosophers should not be to highlight the originality of Russian thought, but to work toward 
ways in which Russian thinkers might contribute more frequently and actively to the 
international philosophical scene.  Although we can find such figures in all historical periods, it 
is particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century that we see the emergence of a number 
of studies on Russian philosophers from all spheres—from religious thinkers to logicians; from 
social philosophers to “scientific atheists.”344
Perhaps more surprising, however, are attempts to break down the religious/secular 
boundaries altogether in the work of thinkers like Podoroga and Horujy who, although 
themselves conforming to a number of stereotypes surrounding religious and literary oriented 
philosophy, dismantle the narrative from within, attaching unexpected meanings to historical 
signifiers.  As this occurs, and if borders between sub-departments and schools begin to break 
down, the very concept on which this work is titled—the idea of being “between philosophies,” 
or “between paradigms”—becomes anachronistic, and for the better.  The contemporary holiday 
 
                                                 
344 One such example is the series “Philosophy in Russia in the Second Half of the XX c. 
[“Filosofii Rossii vtoroi poloviny XX veka”] edited by Vladislav Lektorskii, et al.  The series 
comprises twenty one volumes on thinkers such as Valentin Asmus, Aleksei Losev, Merab 
Mamardashvili, Lev Mitrokhin, Georgii Shchedrovitskii, and Aleksandr Zinov'ev.   
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of Russian philosophy, then, would be a parting with the tradition of philosophy as a hegemonic, 
objectively existing set of essentialized national characteristics, as demonstrated in histories of 
Russian philosophy from 1840 to the present.  Collectively, it appears that much of the 
contemporary body of work is already seeking to do just that, widening the scope of what is to be 
housed under the term “Russian Philosophy” and actively forging a new definition so that by 
“russkaia filosofiia” we mean not just “Russian religious philosophy,” but “philosophy in 
Russia.”    
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